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This thesis uses a narrative approach to explore how hallucinations are understood by 
people with dementia, their carers and community mental health nurses.  The study 
aims to make visible the multiple enactments of realities of hallucinations as they are 
practiced within a community mental health setting. While existing research shows a 
growing body of research about experiences of dementia, the experience of 
hallucinations has been unexplored.  Research about hallucinations has 
predominantly focused on epidemiology or pharmaceutical interventions. 
The research was conducted in one area of Scotland, using three triadic case studies 
comprising a person with dementia living at home, their carer and community nurse.  
Data were collected through conversational interviews. In this study realities are 
conceptualised as enacted and multiple.  The study was informed by an ethic of care 
approach which critiques the view of people as isolated individuals.  People are 
understood to live in relationships within which they co-construct narratives.  It 
provided an ethical framework to research relationships and data analysis.  Data were 
analysed using voice centred relational analysis, which uses four separate ‘listenings’ 
for each interview.  This method identifies the multiple voices speaking and allows a 
high degree of reflexivity.  I-poems were produced for each of the interviews and 
some visual illustrations were used in different ways to illustrate the analysis and 
allow an alternative interpretive perspective on the data.   
The analysis reveals that people with dementia and their carers contextualise their 
understanding of hallucinations into their narrative identity.  They strive for 
continuity but also experience them as potential threats.  Ambiguity and uncertainty 
are characteristic of the experience of hallucinations of people with dementia and 
carers and I suggest that liminality is a useful concept to understand this.  
Community nurses have multiple, and fluid understandings of hallucinations; they 
negotiate these different hallucinations within a situated practice enactment.  Their 
 
 
decision to act on hallucinations does not depend on whether they relate to consensus 
reality, but whether they cause distress. 
The findings of this study highlight the complexities and ambiguities of 
hallucinations within dementia and shows how they are managed in practice.  The 
theoretical perspectives of enacted realities and ethic of care, alongside creative 
methods enhances understanding of the ephemeral nature of hallucinations.  This 
study adds to literature challenging the exclusion of the people with dementia from 
research by demonstrating that they are able to talk about their experiences of 
hallucinations.  The study contributes to the story of hallucinations in dementia by 
disrupting the fixed boundaries of the dominant discourse that views hallucinations 
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Introduction  1 
1 Introduction 
This thesis and the research on which it was based concern narratives of 
hallucinations in dementia.  The aim of the study was to explore differing realities of 
hallucinations of people with dementia, their carers and community mental health 
professionals.   The research questions were 
 How do hallucinations affect the daily lives of people with dementia? 
 Do hallucinations impact on the self-identity of people with dementia? 
 How do the multiple practices of dementia and hallucinations hang together? 
I examined how people with dementia living in their own home, and carers, made 
meaning from hallucinations in dementia.  This allowed for an examination of how a 
person, and a carer, each impact on the identity of the other, acknowledging that 
people do not live in isolation from each other.  The experiences of the people with 
dementia were set alongside those of their carers and the mental health professional 
who visited them. 
In this brief introduction I set the background and context for this research, including 
two clinical stories from my past that provide examples of the impetus for the study.  
I acknowledge some of the difficulties that arise in studying something as ephemeral 
as hallucinations.  Finally I present an overview of the chapters that comprise the 
main body of the thesis. 
1.1 Context for the study 
1.1.1 Hallucinations 
The definition of hallucinations used here is predominantly a psychiatric one - 
perceptions experienced by someone, which other people do not perceive.  The 
dominant understanding of hallucinations in the western world comes from 
psychiatry.  Historically they have been understood in different ways (Al-Issa, 1995, 
Lukoff, 2007) and the psychiatric understanding continues to be contested in the 
present day (Henderson and Henderson, 2002, Hornstein, 2012). 
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Within western psychiatry, hallucinations are a symptom, often of psychosis but also 
of a variety of organic illnesses, including dementias (Sacks, 2012).  Dementia is a 
syndrome comprising a number of diseases (Jacques and Jackson, 2000, Brown and 
Hillam, 2004).  I argue that the implied singularity of the disease model is too 
simplistic, hallucinations in dementia are not only multiple, but also shape shifting.  
They are elusive, they change, and boundaries are crossed and troubled in ways that 
are difficult to pin down.  Categories make absences (Law, 2004), in this case they 
make absent the social context and uncertainty inherent in hallucinations. 
This thesis attends to the ways that people experience and understand hallucinations, 
and integrate them into narrative identities.  By focusing on the experiences of 
people with dementia, it draws on, and contributes to, the growing body of research 
seeking to engage with the subjective experience of people themselves (Wilkinson, 
2002).  In the majority of previous research studies, hallucinations in dementia have 
been decontextualized; they have been understood as a psychiatric symptom of a 
biochemical disease of the brain.  This definition ignores the more complex 
interpersonal, clinical and political meanings of both hallucinations and dementia. 
1.1.2 Dementia 
Dementia currently has a high profile on the political agenda in the UK, with each 
individual country producing their own dementia strategy.  The strategies argue that 
they were created as a response to both a demographic crisis, and to improve the 
individual journeys of people with dementia. 
Within the UK at the present time, both dementia and hallucinations are mainly 
diagnosed by older people’s mental health services.  Community mental health 
professionals are, therefore, likely to come into contact with people who hallucinate.  
In modern Western society, hallucinations are traditionally sited within a psychiatric 
frame of reference.  Since 1906, with the discovery of the neurological changes that 
went on to constitute Alzheimer’s disease, the dominant paradigm of dementia has 
been medical (Cheston and Bender, 1999, Maurer et al., 1997).   
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A diagnosis places signs and symptoms within an explanatory framework that is 
value-laden (Bracken and Thomas, 2005, Hughes, 2011).  The implications for a 
person receiving a psychiatric diagnosis, including a diagnosis of dementia, have 
been well documented (Kitwood, 1997, Harding and Palfrey, 1997, Hughes et al., 
2006, Sabat, 2001, Sabat et al., 2011, Bracken and Thomas, 2005, Busfield, 2000).  
Both dementia and hallucinations are feared because they attack our concepts of 
what it is to be constituted a person, resulting in assumptions of loss of selfhood 
(Kontos, 2006, Ballenger, 2006). 
There has been a dearth of literature about hallucination and dementia.  Studies have 
been anecdotal and reliant on reports of other people, such as caregivers, both family 
and paid (Berrios, 1992, Gustafson and Risberg, 1992, Cohen-Mansfield and 
Golander, 2012).  One recent qualitative study examining the experience of people 
with dementia and visual impairment identified that some people experience 
hallucinations as a compounding feature in visual impairment, and that caregivers 
were unsure how to manage them (Lawrence et al., 2009).  There are a limited but 
growing number of studies of the subjective experience of people with 
schizophrenia, who hallucinate, but they too remain rare within academic literature 
(Thornhill et al., 2004, Karlsson, 2009). 
1.2 But what is reality? 
The question of reality has plagued or perhaps preoccupied me throughout this 
research.  This whole project may be seen to concern reality, and like most other 
people I am certain that I know what that is.  There is little dispute that people 
generally conduct their everyday lives under the assumption that there is a real world 
out there, that is experienced by everyone in very similar ways, and can be known to 
a greater or lesser extent (Law, 2004, Gillett, 2004, Radley and Chamberlain, 2001). 
Hallucinations and delusions presuppose a definite objective view of reality against 
which they can be measured (Pollner, 1975).  A common-sense view of reality would 
lead to the conclusion that hallucinations are not real, although my experience when 
talking to some people with hallucinations is that they can suddenly change, and 
there are times when I am not sure how or when this happens, so reality shifts. 
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1.3 Writing uncertainty 
All texts….are edited, selected, pruned and spruced in order 
to draw the eyes of the reader towards certain spaces. 
(Speedy, 2005: 63) 
It has become a truism to say that the way research is reported does not reflect the 
reality of the process.  Academic writing has been linear, ordered and detached. The 
author disappears, leading to the semblance of an authoritative, ‘objective’, single 
truth (Fleischman, 1998).  Interviews are selective and focused; the researcher then 
concentrates the material even more, to tell their own story of the interviews.   
In a world where there is a multiplicity of nuanced and sometimes contradictory 
narratives, it becomes a challenge not only to capture them, but also to know how to 
express them to a reader (Smart, 2009).  How am I to turn the mess, that is the world 
(Law, 2004), into some sort of order, without descending into total fragmentation, so 
that my thinking is comprehensible, without actually losing a sense of the mess? 
The topic of my study is hallucinations and dementia, how can I ‘know’ what is 
going to be a different reality to mine, and that of most other people with whom I 
assume I share a common reality, and how should I best describe it?  Making a text 
out of hallucinations requires the experience to change from an internal perceptual 
one to an external linguistic representation.  It addresses the limits of the verbal, and 
requires decisions about how to find words to express a non-verbal experience.  I 
have chosen to use poetic, and some visual, representations to try to convey other 
positions. 
Although I used a narrative methodology within this study, a narrative does not 
represent reality but only how we chose to create it (Mischenko, 2005)  Narrative 
form is ordered, the world is disordered, the world of dementia and ‘madness’ is 
disordered even more so, it may be impossible to write a structured narrative.  
Creating structure into this narrative changes the nature of the experience.  Creating 
an unstructured narrative, however, risks further banishing people with dementia as 
problems, and less than full members of society. 
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1.4 Background 
I do not believe that I can bracket out my experience.  As Mauthner and Doucet  
point out the reason we follow up certain ideas is influenced by ‘our own personal, 
political and theoretical biographies’ (Mauthner and Doucet, 1998: 122).  It was my 
experience as a clinical practitioner that informed my choice of subject.  The way I 
relate to people with dementia and carers has led to methodological decisions, and 
the practicalities of how I relate to people during the research.  I have worked as a 
community mental health nurse for many years and am therefore interested in how 
other community mental health practitioners view hallucinations.  This also means 
that I share their training and similar experience. 
This thesis needs to be understood first and foremost as situated, situated within my 
experience, my pre-occupation and my ‘fascination’ as Jennifer Mason (2011) so 
cogently describes.  My fascination is with hallucinations.  I make a choice as to 
which story of hallucinations and dementia I use to begin this thesis, there have been 
many throughout my career, but some are more memorable than others.  There are 
also many stories that can be told about each encounter. Two stories in particular 
from my practice illustrate my fascination with hallucinations. 
This project begins then with John, a man with a diagnosis of Lewy body dementia.  
He lived with his physically disabled wife, and in many ways was her carer.  They 
had a reciprocal caring relationship.  John had mild memory problems and knew me 
as a community nurse whose visits involved discussions with both himself and his 
wife.  One day he opened the door for me and said he would find his mother, he went 
upstairs shouting for his mother.  He was obviously distressed by being unable to 
find her, saying she had been there a few minutes ago.  I had assumed that he meant 
his wife but he had rushed past her.  She was sitting in the living room and her 
obvious presence did not seem to satisfy him.  I cannot recall how this situation 
ended but I know it calmed down quickly.  It preoccupied me though, and I wanted a 
model of some sort to make sense of it.  My analytically trained supervisor suggested 
attachment theory, which gave me an explanation, and satisfied me for some time.  
Attachment theory was developed by Bowlby (1971) to theorize the way that infants 
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develop strong relationships, and the anxiety that ensues, with the separation from 
the attachment figure.  More recently there has been an interest in explaining the 
behaviour of seeking important figures throughout life, including in dementia, as a 
response to anxiety provoking situation (Miesen, 1993, Stanley, 1993, Doucet and 
Mauthner, 2002). 
The problem with this theory is that it may explain the cause of the behaviour in this 
instance, but I have known other people with dementia where this does not seem to 
be the case.  Some years later another memorable encounter disturbed me even more, 
because I felt I did not know how to resolve it. 
Alex lived alone, having moved from a different town to be closer to his daughter.  
His speech was often confused, disadvantaging him in conversation (Shakespeare, 
1998).  His social manner remained polite and I took advantage of both these features 
to gain access to his house.  I justified my actions to myself as a necessary response 
to the assumed risks of him remaining at home, expressed by his doctor and family.  
On one visit he was extremely distressed, talking about fires and then people being in 
his house.  I knew he thought people from the television came into the house and also 
that he thought his reflection in the mirror was an intruder but on this occasion he 
rushed into the bedroom and pulled suits out of the wardrobe.  I did not understand 
whether he thought they were people, or where he thought the fire was, and tried my 
usual repertoire of responses to calm him down.  Telling him I did not see what he 
saw but believed him did not help.  Finally at a loss, I told him I did not know how to 
help, but that I thought he would be safe.  He visibly relaxed and said he believed 
me.  Although I was relieved that something had finally worked, I wondered how 
long this would last, given that I was going to leave him alone.  It left me questioning 
what the best way of responding to these situations is.  
The impetus for this study was twofold, an aspiration to understand what was 
happening, a naiveté on my part at this early stage that I would find the answer, and 
a desire to improve practice.  
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1.5 The search for certainty 
My move to an academic situation was driven by a desire to solve practice problems.  
I initially struggled to find ‘the answer’ and found it difficult to relinquish a need for 
certainty and security in my search for understanding.  I moved from a solid belief in 
my practice knowledge, to a search for what I now see was universal, context-
independent knowledge.  As Law et al argue 
the will to purity is powerful: but it is none the less a chimera 
(Law et al., 2013: p11) 
For a time I forgot what I knew, in my desire to achieve that idealised, impartial 
knowledge. 
 As Back (2007) has pointed out, the claim to know whole truths has led to many of 
the atrocities of the twentieth century.  Political science is full of examples where 
closure is not achieved by force or logic (Mol, 2002).  My first degree is in political 
science, I should know better.  The research process involves both theory and 
practice (Ribbens and Edwards, 1998), and this study needed to integrate my 
knowledge from working as a mental health nurse, with theoretical understandings, 
and the practicalities of research. 
There are different ways of knowing, and different stories can be told; I am aware of, 
and even comfortable, with this in practice, although have often been in the position 
where other people have wanted a definitive answer from me that I was unable to 
give.  Law (2006) argues that it is easier to achieve coherence in theory than in 
practice. 
The study originated from my own experiences as a mental health nurse.  My 
understanding of dementia is contextualized by my experience as a nurse, educated 
within a model of psychiatry, but also by my earlier education within the radical 
politics of the nineteen seventies.  I assume that people with dementia are able to 
speak about their own experiences, that they live within relationships and in a 
society, which impinges on their experiences.  
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1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
Chapter 2 presents a selected review of the literature.  As stated earlier there have 
been few studies on the subjective experience of hallucinations in dementia.  I 
conducted a narrative review of the main themes in the field of dementia relevant to 
my research questions.  This review focuses on the multiplicities of discourses of 
dementia and hallucinations.  The study is set within a medical context and so the 
different understandings within disease and illness are discussed.  The diverse 
approaches to the self and identity impact on the way people are treated by society 
and by other individuals.  I include a personal story that illustrates the conflicts that 
can arise between ideas of the self and the relationality of care.  I demonstrate that 
the unity of medicine that can be assumed in the discourse of disease, and diagnosis, 
is not accurate and that we need to address the realities enacted in practice. 
Chapter 3 develops this discussion by examining some of the theoretical 
understandings of multiplicity and situated knowledge.  The work of John Law and 
Annemarie Mol were especially useful in developing my understanding of 
boundaries and elusiveness.  Finally I discuss an ethic of care framework, which 
provides an underpinning for my research approach.  This offers an ethical 
understanding of people within relationships that continues to challenge the view of 
the isolated individual, inherent in the discussion of the loss of self in the previous 
chapter. 
Chapter 4 describes the design and the conduct of the research.  Some of the 
dilemmas I faced as a researcher researching my own community are examined 
alongside challenges to my sense of myself as a novice researcher. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the data from my study.  Each chapter is a separate 
triadic case study prefaced by an illustration. They are presented as separate realities 
of each of the participants, person with dementia, carer and nurse. 
Chapter 8 draws together the findings from the data into an exploration of narrative 
understandings of hallucinations.  Understandings are contextualised, and dementia 
may be a part of the context, inseparable from the narrative of hallucinations. 
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Chapter 9 uses liminality as a theoretical framework to understand hallucinations in 
dementia. 
Chapter 10, the final chapter, reflects on the implications of the study for practice 
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2 Competing discourses 
This study aims to explore different realities of hallucinations experienced by people 
with dementia, their carers and community mental health professionals.  It is located 
within a community mental health site of practice, where there is increasing dialogue 
between medical discourse and the experiences of those with the illness (Bracken 
and Thomas 2005).  The research questions address the impact of hallucinations on 
the identity of the person with dementia.  Within dementia studies there has been an 
important debate about the self and dementia that has implications for understanding 
identity. This chapter locates the background to the study in the bodies of literature 
from which it draws and hopes to influence.  It is located within differing theoretical 
understandings of dementia.  It can be argued that dementia is an organic medical 
disease as evidenced by changes in the neurological structure of the brain.  The 
growth and implications of dementia as a medical disease is considered first.  This is 
followed by a number of challenges to the medical agenda that focus on the ways 
people are living with dementia and other chronic illness.  The assumption that 
medicine is singular is disputed, as illustrated in the section on the agenda of 
evidence in health research.  I end with a personal reflection on an incident with my 
mother that challenged some of my own rhetoric of care.  
2.1 Introduction 
There are opposing discourses of dementia with differing emphases, which can lead 
to ambivalence and contested territories (Clarke et al., 2010: 695).   I want to bring 
my practical clinical experience and being a daughter together with my selected 
literature to inform my study.  I am interested in multiplicity, the multiplicity which 
somehow hangs together in hallucinations and dementia.  There is an assumption that 
when we talk about a disease or a symptom this is a singular reality but in practice 
there may be many realities, this is considered in more detail in the following 
chapter.  I review some of the multiple conceptualisations of dementia that are 
relevant to the practice of care.  These are dementia as a disease, illness narratives, 
personhood and socio-political discourses.  Care is complex and is not informed by a 
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single understanding of disease.  Tensions can be experienced and managed in 
different ways within the same healthcare setting (Moreira, 2010). 
Although I use the terms dementia and hallucinations, this does not mean that I am 
accepting them uncritically.  The etymological root for ‘dementia’ is demens 
meaning out of your mind.  Calling someone ‘demented’ is now considered an insult, 
and ‘dementia’ may well be associated with these synonyms.   Within a medical 
definition, dementia is an umbrella term rather than a single disease, but groups such 
as the national Alzheimer Societies (Alzheimer Scotland Action on Dementia, 2013, 
Alzheimer Society, 2013) have chosen not to use ‘dementia’ despite working with 
people with any type of dementia.  The founding of Alzheimer’s societies is closely 
linked to the re-creation of Alzheimer’s disease as a disease as discussed in the 
following section.  I will use the term dementia throughout this thesis in line with the 
Scottish Dementia Working Group (Scottish Dementia Working Group, 2013) 
practice, unless there is a reason to use the name of a specific disease.  I also chose to 
use the term person with dementia as it places the person before the dementia.  In this 
study I do not use the term carer to describe someone who is paid on a contractual 
basis to provide care such as a nurse or careworker in a care home.  I use carer to 
describe a significant other who is in a relationship with the person with dementia, 
for example a family member or friend. 
2.2 Dementia as a disease 
Dementia was labelled as a disease entity for the first time in the United States in 
1976.  It is argued that this was due to political lobbying by carers who set up 
Alzheimer’s societies and medical researchers.  Before the 1970s Alzheimer’s 
disease had been understood as a rare condition which affected people under 65.  In 
1976 it was reclassified and became one of the most common diseases in the Western 
world, and a major cause of death.  The apparent increase in incidence was used to 
enhance funding and increase the status of medical research.   Changing the way it 
was understood, had implications for individuals, whose roles changed.  Doctors 
become experts and people with dementia become patients (Cheston and Bender, 
1999, Fox, 1989, Davis, 2004). 
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The medical definition of dementia is established by organizations such as the World 
Health Organization and the American Psychiatric Association.  The definitions used 
by both organizations are very similar and are in common usage throughout medical 
practice (Brown and Hillam, 2004, Jacques and Jackson, 2000).  Dementia became 
constructed as a biomedical disease, situated within the neurological changes in the 
brain (Davis, 2004).  There are, however, on- going debates about whether 
Alzheimer’s disease exists as a disease or whether the neurological signs are part of 
the ageing process (George et al., 2011, Lock, 2011).  The discourse of dementia as a 
disease is based on a neuroscientific understanding, with dementia placed firmly in 
the brain.  It accounts for a consciousness without reference to the world outside.   
Critiques of a medical paradigm of dementia have come from social psychologists 
(Kitwood, 1997), social constructionists (Harding and Palfrey, 1997) and more 
recently within the narratives of people with dementia themselves (Sterin, 2002, 
McKillop, 2002, Bryden, 2005).    
Social scientists question the claims of science to neutrality, arguing rather that it is 
socially situated (Harding and Palfrey, 1997, Prior, 2003, Law, 2004).  The 
classification of dementia results in pathologisation of behaviour and social skills.  In 
common with other mental illnesses, behaviour becomes part of the disease process 
(Cheston and Bender, 1999). It ignores the social context and experience of people 
with dementia and can result in care practice and societal assumptions that places 
people with dementia as problems awaiting a medical cure. 
2.3 Hallucinations in dementia 
Western medicine understands hallucinations as symptoms of disease, often of severe 
illness.  They are one of the principal diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, but can 
also be found in other disease processes such as dementia and delirium.  Modern 
understandings that hallucinations are pathological are a recent phenomenon.  
Esquirol, the early French psychiatrist, first associated hallucinations with madness 
in the 1830s.  Until that time they were associated with the supernatural, rather than 
located in the brain (Sacks, 2012).  In the Middle Ages, visions, voices and dreams 
were all named as visions, and were usually integrated into religious experiences 
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(Kroll and Bachrach, 1982).  Hallucinations are a universal experience, which are 
attributed differently in different cultures and different historical periods (Kroll and 
Bachrach, 1982, Al-Issa, 1995).  They can occur out-with  psychiatric diagnosis,  
associated with sleep deprivation, bereavement and sensory isolation (Sacks, 2012, 
Al-Issa, 1995, Hornstein, 2012).  When they enter diagnostic terminology they 
become pathological. 
Henderson and Henderson (2002) explore how the hallucinations of an American 
Indian woman were attributed to her ‘speaking to the other side’.  Medical 
descriptions of hallucinations, delusions and misinterpretations exist out-with social 
context although it is recognised that stressful experiences such as bereavement can 
often result in hallucinatory experiences.  A social constructionist context addresses 
the discourses that society uses to understand concepts and within which individuals 
shape experiences (O'Connor et al., 2007, Burr, 2003). A social constructionist view 
questions the way that pathology is judged.  Behaviour is seen as part of a disorder 
that is socially, rather than biologically determined, leading to the problematizing of 
the individual who does not conform to the shared view of reality (Palmer, 2000). 
The hallucinations that are symptomatic of schizophrenia are predominantly 
auditory, but those in dementia and delirium are often visual (Larøi et al., 2012).  
Visual hallucinations are defined within the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) as ‘visual perceptions without 
adequate visual stimulus’(Mossiman et al., 2006: p154).  Estimates of the prevalence 
of hallucinations and delusions in dementia vary, but it is generally agreed to be 
higher than would be expected amongst older people as a whole (Berrios, 1992).  A 
review of 100 articles written between 1990 and 2001 identified a prevalence of 
hallucinations in Alzheimer’s Disease ranging from 4% to 76% (Bassiony and 
Lyketsos, 2003).  The authors put these variations down to the ways in which 
hallucinations, delusions and Alzheimer’s disease were diagnosed.  A more recent 
newsletter by the Alzheimer Society has suggested that the prevalence should be 
closer to 3%, and that the confusion has arisen because of misdiagnosis. (Alzheimer's 
Society, 2008).  Together with behavioural problems, such symptoms are more 
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predictive of carer stress and institutionalisation than memory impairment (Leroi et 
al., 2003, Hinton et al., 2006) 
Both dementia and hallucinations are primarily understood even by lay people 
through the definitions of scientific medicine.  The advances in availability of 
neuroimaging techniques and genetic tests, alongside the development of new 
pharmaceutical treatments suggest this is where they should sit.  Mental health is 
increasingly located within natural sciences rather than within social science 
(Busfield, 2000). 
Differing understandings of concepts such as dementia and hallucinations over 
historical periods lead to different beliefs about causes.  One of the ways in which 
medicine shapes a disease and makes it a reality is by naming it through diagnosis.  
The following section discusses some of the debates around diagnosis. 
2.3.1 Medical diagnosis 
Diagnosis is a fundamental component of medicine; it names and provides an 
explanatory structure to a disease.   It is a universal way of classifying and reframing 
experiences within medical terms (Bracken and Thomas, 2005).  Illness is organised 
as pathology as opposed to normality (Foucault, 1973).  Psychiatry originates from 
the Enlightenment understanding of reason (Bracken and Thomas, 2005).  The 
validity of psychiatric diagnoses has long been contested.  They rely on a binary 
between normal and pathological that is not clear cut, but requires a value judgment 
(Hughes, 2011).  Bracken and Thomas (2005) problematize the concept of diagnosis 
in psychiatry, and their arguments can be equally applied to dementia.  They 
compare the functionality of diagnosis in psychiatry and medicine and make the 
point that as symptoms in psychiatry are experienced within the mind, to ignore the 
context has different implications than it does in physical medicine. 
There have been suggestions that the term ‘dementia’ be removed from medical 
terminology due to its negative connotations in everyday language.  Julian Hughes 
describes the term as ‘a conceptual mess’ (Hughes, 2011: 17).  A diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s disease has been criticised because of the unsubstantiated correlation of 
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a brain scan and cognitive decline (Rose, 2009), and the emphasis on cognitive 
change as the main diagnostic feature of dementia (Hinton et al., 2006, Hughes, 
2011).  Much clinical literature features behavioural concerns, rather than cognitive 
deterioration (Hinton et al., 2006).  In Alzheimer’s original case history of Auguste 
D (Maurer et al., 1997), her behavioural changes are equally central to his narrative 
as cognitive features.   
‘She had a striking cluster of symptoms that included reduced 
comprehension and memory, as well as aphasia, 
disorientation, unpredictable behaviour, paranoia, auditory 
hallucinations and pronounced psychosocial impairment’ 
(Maurer et al., 1997:  1546) 
The realities that are created have no context.  We know little of Auguste D’s social 
situation, in a similar argument, Georgaca (2003) highlights how the absence of a 
contextual framework for ‘psychotic speech’ renders it pathological. Psychotic 
symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations are reduced to biological causation 
and their content is rendered irrelevant (Lovell, 1997).  Focusing on the purely 
cognitive aspects of dementia is in my opinion too narrow,  it relies on a Cartesian 
split between mind and body which is too simplistic (Davis, 2004). 
Hinton et al (2006) argue that DSM-IV criteria for dementia with its emphasis on 
cognitive features relegates behavioural changes to a ‘nosological borderland’ 
despite their prevalence within clinical literature.  They describe the line between 
pathological and normal behaviour as being difficult to draw.  They do however 
seem to find it easy to state that hallucinations are abnormal.  I would dispute this 
definitive view of hallucinations.  As Oliver Sacks (2012) describes in his recent 
book ‘Hallucinations’, difficulties can sometimes arise between the distinctions of 
boundaries between  hallucinations, illusions, misperceptions and dreams.   
A diagnosis does not adequately describe the experience of living with the disease 
(Beard and Fox, 2008).  Although opinions about telling people they have a 
diagnosis of dementia are changing, a comparison to a disclosure of a cancer 
diagnosis, which is a common argument, can be misleading.  As Hughes (2011) says 
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the implications are very different.  Families can gain comfort from the diagnosis, 
which offers an explanation for the  behaviour of their relative (Harding and Palfrey, 
1997) but it can result in a failure to understand the social constituents of behaviour.  
A diagnosis may be helpful to both the person and their relatives but it also results in 
the person becoming subject to the ‘medical gaze’, which impacts on their identity 
(Naue and Kroll, 2008).  A diagnosis of dementia can, however, be dependent on 
culturally and socially unacceptable behaviour (Harding and Palfrey, 1997).  As has 
now been well documented, changes in behaviour are more likely to be responses to 
negative responses from other people and difficulties in negotiating the environment  
(Kitwood, 1997, Cheston and Bender, 1999, Hughes, 2011).  Diagnoses create 
realities and bestow moral authority on them, making mental states governable 
(Rose, 2009).    
2.3.1.1 Psychiatric classification 
The DSM is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and is 
published by the American Psychiatric Association.  It is described as a standardised 
classification tool for mental health professionals in the United States, and is also 
used in other countries including the UK (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Describing this as a standardised tool suggests that diagnosis is clear cut but the 
DSM reflects much more than a standardised measure.   
Documents are produced in a social context.  Prior (2003)  suggests we should 
examine texts in action and observe their role in forming identity.  They make certain 
things visible.  He describes the DSM as a generative document, a document that sets 
out rules.  It is produced by a group of experts and enters into performance in 
everyday life.  The DSM has undergone a number of changes throughout its history 
and scholars have critiqued the historical and social aspects of the changes (George 
et al., 2011).  Petitions have been mounted for diagnoses to be added or taken away 
from the manual by advocacy groups such as those formed around Asperger’s 
syndrome.   Feminists and other groups have criticised some of the categories, 
suggesting that the categories reflect dominant social norms; most famously 
homosexuality was removed in the 1970s (Pickersgill, 2011, Marecek and Gavey, 
2013). 
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It is revised at regular intervals with disorders being added and taken away.  The 
fourth edition DSM-IV is currently used, although DSM-5, the latest edition, is 
coming out at the time of writing.  It has been argued that DSM-III saw a change 
from a psychodynamic to a somatic explanation of psychiatry, which locates 
problems within the individual and ignores any contextualisation (George et al., 
2011). 
In conclusion the practice of diagnosis in psychiatry is not the objective value free 
process it may appear at first sight.  Both hallucinations and dementia, which are of 
particular relevance to this study are criticised as diagnoses, because they depend on 
the creation of a binary between normal and pathological.  This  
expose(s) the need to make value judgments about such 
things as treatment and research. 
(Hughes, 2011:26) 
 The line between disease and ‘normality’ is not clear cut, yet a diagnosis of 
dementia can change the way that people are seen and valued within our society 
(Kitwood, 1997, Hughes et al., 2006).  Evaluation judgements are also involved in 
the debates about illness and disease that are discussed in the following sections 
2.4 Illness and Disease 
Disease is constructed as an ‘objective’ medical condition.  Illness is the subjective 
experience of the person who is diagnosed with the disease.  Medical sociology and 
disability studies have condemned the discourse of medicine for ignoring the 
experience of illness.  They have done this from a number of different perspectives, 
medical sociology uses an understanding of chronic illness as social deviance, and 
disability studies frame the argument within social oppression (Thomas, 2007).  
Medical professionals have been urged to add an illness perspective to their 
knowledge of patients.   
Social science created itself an area for study alongside biomedicine and called it 
illness, leaving disease to medicine, in a similar way to the way it separated gender 
and sex.  However, with recent interest in the socio-material aspects of scientific 
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practices in ethnographic studies, there have been attempts to interlink illness and 
disease (Habers et al., 2002).  The separation of illness and disease  risks 
dichotomising biomedical and social or cultural knowledge (Mol and Berg, 1994). 
As Mol (2002) says this leaves disease to medicine, there is little suggestion that 
social science add disease to its agenda whereas the picture she describes is more 
complex.  The idea of the unity of medicine has been challenged on a number of 
fronts.  Medical sociologists, having emphasised the social power of doctors, 
deriving from their monopoly on medical knowledge, began to explore the work of 
other health professionals and smaller groups of doctors uncovering many 
differences.  Anthropologists too have unmasked the idea of the coherence of 
western medicine (McCrea and Markle, 1984).  There are variances within medicine, 
not just between medicine and other sites (Moser, 2011).  Bracken and Thomas 
(2005) argue that there are fundamental differences between the diagnosis of 
physical illness and that of psychiatric illness. 
‘Medicine is not a coherent whole..(it) is a heterogeneous 
coalition of ways of handling bodies’  
(Berg and Mol, 1998a: 3) 
The tensions that have become inherent in medicine may take the form of conflict, or 
difficulties in co-ordination (Berg and Mol, 1998a).  There has been a missing 
dialogue between medical caring, which is identified as professionalization leading 
to increase of social power, and the discourse in the nineteen seventies that tried to re 
value the hidden caring work of mothers as work.  Within this tangle there have been 
analyses of the way the work of nurses has been associated with the work of women 
in an attempt to re-constitute it as a profession (Mol et al., 2010).  
Medicalization asserts medical control over an area of life by assigning medical 
supremacy over it (Harding and Palfrey, 1997).  It can take place at the levels of 
concepts, institutions, and the doctor-patient relationship (Conrad and Schneider, 
1980).  Criticisms of the medical model do not necessarily imply that individual 
health professionals ignore wider social issues within their practice.  The increase in 
chronic illnesses over the past few decades has resulted in changes in relationships 
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between doctors and patients.   Patients are often better informed about their own 
health and there has been a reduction in deference to medical authority (Bury, 2005).  
The growth of carers’ advocacy groups, and more recently advocacy groups for 
people with dementia has contributed to people becoming better informed in 
dementia care.  Highly technical scientific machinery is seldom a feature of care for 
people with chronic illness, except in crisis situations.  Chronic illness is mostly a 
responsibility of primary care and people will have long term relationships with their 
general practitioner.  A substantial feature of these relationships is that they are 
constituted by patient narratives of how they are coping with day to day life (Bury, 
2001).  People with dementia and mental health problems are more likely to be cared 
for in the community, and clinicians working in the community are more liable to 
work collaboratively with user groups and non-medical groups (Bracken and 
Thomas, 2005). 
Bury (1982) cautions that a division between illness and disease can be too simplistic 
and points out that medical knowledge is often limited, especially in chronic disease. 
It needs to be supplemented by biographical knowledge from the individual.  He 
attributes the difficulties to high expectations of medicine rather than negative effects 
of medicine. 
2.5 Illness narratives 
The rise in chronic illnesses and the narrative turn in social sciences have coincided 
with a corresponding rise in illness narratives.  Narratives about illness are available 
everywhere, from popular autobiographical accounts, novels and research studies to 
online support communities.  They are used by practitioners, researchers and 
bioethicists to discuss issues in the particular, rather than as universal principles and 
therapists (Rauol et al., 2007).  Illness narratives have been privileged in social 
science literature  (Atkinson, 1997).  There were a number of writers in the 1990s 
who explored how narratives gave people a different voice other than biomedicine to 
express  their experiences (Frank, 1997, Hydén and Örulv, 2009) 
Any illness will cause a disruption, but acute illness can cause a temporary re-
assessment of our health, whereas chronic illness may cause a reassessment of the 
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relationship of our bodies to our world (Bury, 2005, Bury, 1982).  Narratives have 
become especially prominent in chronic illness, one way that people cope with 
chronic illness is to incorporate it into the on-going autobiographical story of their 
lives (Hydén and Brockmeier, 2008). 
There have been a number of different categorisations of illness narratives.  One of 
the most influential frameworks is that developed by Arthur Frank.  Frank described 
three types of illness narrative 
 Restitution - in which the plot is about returning to previous health 
 Quest - in which there is a journey to search for spiritual meaning. 
 Chaos - in which there is no control and no meaning is possible.  Life will 
never get better and it results in fear 
(Frank, 1997). 
Frank’s illness narrative types are well developed and sophisticated but other 
researchers have found illness narratives that are more fractured (Hydén and 
Brockmeier, 2008). 
2.5.1 Adjusting to chronic illness 
The rise in chronic illness has led to concerns about both social consequences and 
also to studies of how individuals cope with illnesses (Bury, 2005).  In the past 
illness was a normal part of the life cycle but now we value health.  Chronic illness 
challenges the expectations of modern society, which include the government 
discourse of healthy ageing.  The cultural expectations of a long and healthy life can 
lead to a sense of shock and fear when this is threatened.  
In 1982 Mike Bury wrote his classic work on illness as biographic disruption about 
the impact of being diagnosed with, and living with a chronic illness.  He describes 
three aspects of disruption resulting from a chronic illness.  It can disrupt taken for 
granted knowledge, causing people to wonder what is happening.  Secondly it can 
cause someone to have to rethink their biography and thirdly it can necessitate people 
having to think about and organise resources (Bury, 1982). 
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Any chronic illness can precipitate a change or adjustment in self-concept and 
identity, and indeed illness can become a focus of identity.  Bury (2001) argues that 
people with chronic illness are faced with a change in identity and self-presentation 
that they need to deal with.  People do not experience disease in isolation, they make 
sense of it in ways that are meaningful for themselves (Habermann, 1999).  The 
consequences of chronic illness are not just physical symptoms and care needs but 
the possible threat to their sense of self, if things that are valued disappear and are 
replaced by a negative self-concept (Charmaz, 1983, Gillies and Johnston, 2004, 
Harman and Clare, 2006).  There are a growing number of studies that contend that 
people make sense of an illness in ways that normalise it (Robertson, 2013) 
Harman and Clare (2006) used a self-regulating model of illness as a framework in 
their study of adjusting to a diagnosis of dementia.   
The stance each individual takes lies somewhere on a 
continuum between self-maintaining responses which are 
aimed at maintaining the prior sense of self, and self-
adjusting responses, which involve acknowledging the 
changes dementia brings and integrating these into one’s 
sense of identity 
(Harman and Clare, 2006:  484)  
The respondents did not remain static in one position but moved backwards and 
forwards along the continuum.  The predominant themes were the desire to remain 
‘me’, and the view that it will get worse. 
Dementia is a chronic illness, like cancer in which mortality is made visible (Little et 
al., 1998).  Kaufman (2006) describes the cultural work done by dementia at the end 
of life as making life ambiguous by blurring the boundaries between life and death.  
Although she does not use the concept of liminality this would seem to me to be an 
appropriate understanding of her argument.  Liminality is a period of ambiguity in 
which boundaries are blurred (Turner, 1967). 
The cultural expectations of a long and healthy life can lead to a sense of shock and 
fear when this is threatened.  When liminality is used as an anthropological term, as a 
stage in a rite of passage, there is an expectation that people having been stripped of 
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one social status, enter a liminal state, then move on to another social status.   In 
chronic illness people may stay in a liminal condition, instead of moving from a 
situation of illness back to one of health they remain in a state of illness.  This has 
been described in people with cancer and with chronic pain (Little et al., 1998, 
Jackson, 2005).  If we view the world as a system of classification people who do not 
fit because they have some ambiguity can become stigmatised (Douglas, 1966).  
Again this is seen within chronic pain and also in some mental health difficulties as 
people straddle boundaries (Jackson, 2005, Barratt, 1998). 
The way in which dementia is framed will affect the treatment of people with 
dementia (Downs et al., 2006) and  
‘there is growing evidence to indicate that at least some of the 
negative consequences of dementia may be mitigated or 
delayed  by an approach to care that respects and supports 
each individual’s personhood’  
(O'Connor et al., 2007: 122)  
Personhood extends the model of dementia and has been widely adopted within 
dementia care  (Hughes, 2011).  The next sections discuss the emergence of the 
personhood debate and the on-going debates around identity and self in dementia. 
2.6 The emergence of personhood 
Definitions of personhood vary (Baldwin, 2009) and the relationship between  
personhood, self  and identity is equally contested, with the terms sometimes being 
used interchangeably (Millett, 2011).  I will concur with Millett and use the terms 
self and personhood synonymously in line with common parlance. 
In 1997, Tom Kitwood, a social psychologist brought out his influential book 
Dementia Reconsidered (1997).  Kitwood developed his understanding in response to 
the poor care that he identified in dementia practice, and he collected a number of his 
papers together in this book summarizing his approach to what he called the ‘person-
centred care’ (Baldwin and Capstick, 2007, Kitwood, 1997, Leibing, 2006).  He 
famously described personhood as 
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a standing or status that is bestowed upon one human being 
by others, in the context of relationship and social being.  It 
implies recognition, respect and trust 
(Kitwood, 1997:  8)  
The place of interpersonal relationships and recognition by others is fundamental to 
Kitwood’s view of personhood.  He points out that the adverse effects of other 
people, and an inappropriate environment, result in what he calls malignant social 
psychology.  He was influenced by the disability movement and distinguished 
between neurological impairment and disability, where difficulties for the person are 
caused by social and environmental factors (Kitwood, 1993, Baldwin, 2008, 
Kitwood, 1997).  
In his formulation of dementia Kitwood appeared at times to accept the biomedical 
model, and his somewhat missionary zeal sometimes overtook his development of 
consistent theory.  He placed the person with dementia at the centre of his model 
although his measure of well-being, dementia care mapping is carried out by the 
observation of people with dementia by others. His concept of person-centred care 
has been one of the most influential theories on the rhetoric of dementia care practice 
in the last few decades (Baldwin and Capstick, 2007, Harding and Palfrey, 1997).  
Although his concept of personhood is ‘conferred by others’ (Kitwood, 1997: 84), 
which ignores any agency for the person with dementia, it does highlight the 
potential for negative and positive effects of other people within care practice. 
Clinical practice is beginning to offer an alternative narrative of dementia, from that 
of a  medical problem, to one of personhood (Leibing and Cohen, 2006).  
Personhood has ‘provided a lens for conceptualising dementia practice and research 
for over ten years’ (Bartlett and O'Connor, 2007: 107).  The idea of personhood has 
been linked to good care within dementia practice (Leibing, 2006).   The emphasis 
on psychosocial care may however neglect the need for physical care such as treating 
pain, which can become an issue especially as the disease progresses (Hughes, 2011).  
Kitwood’s (1997) emphasis on the importance of relationships in preserving 
personhood can implicate carers. They may feel the person they knew has 
disappeared and an insistence on personhood can devalue their bereavement (Davis, 
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2004, Baldwin and Capstick, 2007).  Although many care settings would now say 
that they provide person-centred care, what this actually means in practice fluctuates 
wildly (Hughes, 2011).  Personhood can however still provide a useful concept for 
the consideration of dementia care and research. 
The Centre for Research in Personhood in Dementia in Canada in collaboration with 
researchers in the UK has identified a framework for research focused on personhood 
in dementia that encapsulates current research and future directions for research on 
personhood.   
 
Fig 1 (O'Connor et al., 2007: p214)  
The two objectives for research into personhood are understanding and supporting 
personhood.  Within this perspective personhood has three facets (1) the subjective 
experience (2) the interpersonal environment (3) the socio-cultural context 
(O'Connor et al., 2007).  This approach develops Kitwood’s conceptualisation of 
personhood, taking forward the view of personhood as a process which occurs within 
the context of family and social care (Baldwin and Capstick, 2007).  The emergence 
of personhood in clinical practice and other arenas allows for a different narrative of 
dementia to that of inevitable biological decline (Leibing and Cohen, 2006). 
2.6.1 Self lost 
Despite the increasing public awareness of dementia through campaigning and 
National Strategies, the picture of dementia can still be portrayed as bleak, with an 
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inevitable decline, resulting from neurological changes (O'Connor et al., 2007, 
Kitwood, 1997).  Public awareness of dementia, supported by some of the national 
policies continues to sustain the view that people who have a diagnosis are a burden 
to both society and caregivers.  People with dementia are depicted as deviating from 
the norm, their subjective experiences are marginalized.  Early literature about carer 
burden contributes to the exclusion of people with dementia from the rest of 
humanity (Leibing, 2006).  People in our society fear losing their minds (Kaufman, 
2006) and people with dementia are commonly seen as victims of that worst fear. 
They may be depicted as ‘shells’, who have lost their self (Aquilina and Hughes, 
2006, Beard and Fox, 2008). 
Ballenger (2006) argues that the stigma attached to dementia is related not to 
behaviour but to our anxieties surrounding the boundaries between normal and 
pathological.  It attacks the skills with which we present a stable self to other people, 
which is based on cognition.  In her study of caregiver perceptions of hallucinations 
in people with dementia living in a care home, the caregivers interviewed by Cohen-
Mansfield (2012) often attributed behaviour that they were unable to understand to 
hallucinations. 
The literature addressing the relationship between people with dementia and 
caregivers is extensive (Boss, 2004, Garwick et al., 1994, Vass et al., 2003, Gillies 
and Johnston, 2004), but the main focus has until recently been the impact of a 
presumed loss of the self of the cared for person.   At the same time carers may 
balance allowing change in the person they care for and wanting to preserve the 
person they knew (O'Connor et al., 2007, Balfour, 2006).  A study of the effects on 
spousal relationships of Parkinson’s disease and psychosis identified changes in 
identity as a main theme for carers in psychosis (Williamson et al., 2008).   
Philosophical interest in dementia has increased over the past few years (Hughes, 
2013).  Hughes, Louw and Sabat (2006) edited an important collection ‘Dementia:  
Mind, meaning, and the person’ in which a number of dementia practitioners and 
philosophers were invited to explore issues of personal identity in dementia.  
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Dementia brings into question what constitutes selfhood and our understanding of 
selfhood informs our care for people with dementia. 
Approaches to the loss of self in dementia range from Fontana and Smith’s (1989) 
‘unbecoming of self’, to social, cultural and bodily representations of self that reject 
a purely cognitive approach (Twigg, 2010, Hughes et al., 2006, Kontos, 2004). 
Although we all change throughout our lives the fear in dementia is less of change 
than of loss (Lesser, 2006).  The history of dementia as a disease is short, but the 
association of memory with identity are longer.  The Enlightenment situated memory 
in the brain resulting in successful identity.  John Locke promoted the idea that 
memory is essential for a rational person (Katz, 2013).  If a Lockean view of identity 
that is dependent on the ability to remember oneself in the past and envisage oneself 
in the future is adopted, it may well result in loss of identity in dementia. 
The Enlightenment was the age of reason, which informed understanding of mental 
illness.  There were two main strands to this, the importance of reason that led to the 
promotion of an orderly society and technological solutions to human science, and 
the focus on the self.  These led to the ‘great confinement’ and the rise of human 
sciences, resulting in the ‘medical gaze’ and also an requirement that people regulate 
themselves.  (Foucault, 1977, Rabinow, 1984, Foucault, 1973, O'Farrell, 1989, 
Roberts, 2005, Bracken and Thomas, 2005).  Reason was placed in opposition to 
madness, which diminished the possibility of subjective interaction between clinician 
and patient (Lovell, 1997) 
The dominant narrative of loss in dementia privileges cognition, which is highly 
valued in Western society but it is not the only indicator of identity (Beard, 2004).  A 
person with dementia is disadvantaged within a cognitive understanding of identity, 
resulting in them being understood as ‘the demented other’ (Naue and Kroll, 2008).  
Stephen Post (2000, 2006) describes a ‘hypercognitive society’ that stigmatises those 
with dementia as non-persons.  He thinks that people have a potential for 
relationality that he calls a soul.  He points out that society, in its care of persons with 
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dementia, demonstrates a different understanding from that of rationalist 
philosophers who classify them as non-persons.   
People with dementia themselves have spoken of a loss of self.  Robert Davis, one of 
the first people with a diagnosis to write of his experience, describes 
The loss of self, which I was experiencing, the helplessness 
to control this insidious thief who was little by little taking 
away my most valued possession, my mind 
(Davis, 1989:  91)  
It is in the later stages that the uncertainty about identity is more evident.  If spoken 
language becomes a problem it can become more difficult to know how to 
understand the unique identity of the person with dementia (Hughes, 2013).  If we 
assume that people with later stage dementia lose identity there must come a point 
when it disappears.  This is, however, difficult to reconcile with clinical experience 
and research evidence that memory and awareness fluctuate.  
2.6.2 Self found 
There is a wide range of opinion from people with dementia, carers, professionals 
and scholars about whether the self remains or disappears.  The evidence from many 
people with dementia that has grown with the practice of earlier diagnosis, is that it is 
important to people that they are still themselves (Basting, 2003, Snyder, 2006). 
Postmodernism has informed debates that challenge the concept of a fixed coherent 
self.  Despite the rejection of realist concerns of truth, narratives from people with 
dementia are still treated with suspicion (McLean, 2006).  The subjective experience 
of living with dementia has been marginalised by assumptions that people living with 
dementia are unable to speak for themselves.  Despite this view there have been an 
increasing number of research studies about the subjective experience of living with 
dementia (Baldwin, 2008, Beard, 2004, Clare et al., 2005, Clare et al., 2006, Surr, 
2006, Wilkinson, 2002, MacRae, 2010).  Common themes to emerge from this work 
are coping, identity and loss of self.  The concepts of self and identity are already 
challenged in the postmodern world, and dementia raises important issues for how 
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we see ourselves as a person.  Tension is often expressed between the notion that 
identity changes throughout our lifetime, and attempts to maintain the self in 
dementia (Harman and Clare, 2006). 
Identity can be usefully considered philosophically from two different aspects, that 
of quantitative or qualitative accounts.  In a quantitative understanding, identity is 
defined in terms of its singularity and cannot be changed.  We inhabit one body 
which is unique and we have our own social narrative. Taking this into consideration, 
it supports the growing importance of considering embodiment within discussions of 
dementia.  Qualitative elements on the other hand are characteristics that make up a 
person and they can change.  (Hughes, 2013, Millett, 2011). 
People with dementia are writing less about the fear of losing self in the years since 
Davis (1989) wrote his book, and more about the fear of becoming a burden 
(Leibing, 2006).  This may be related to policy discourses of healthy ageing.   In 
some studies people with a diagnosis of dementia acknowledged changes, but not 
fear that they were losing themselves (MacRae, 2010, Steeman et al., 2011). 
Much of the research into self and dementia has been done using interviews with 
people in the earlier stages of dementia who are still living at home (O'Connor et al., 
2007, Surr, 2006).  People in the early stages of dementia may be concerned at the 
prospect of loss of some aspects of self, but are evidently able to remember 
themselves in the past and envisage a future.  They often express a desire for 
continuity within their day to day lives (Clare, 2003, Harman and Clare, 2006). 
The loss of a sense of identity and self-awareness does not necessarily mean a loss of 
identity.  People continue to exhibit different ways of being, and value things that 
have always been important such as music, even when verbal memories are eroded 
(Radden and Fordyce, 2006, Matthews, 2006).  There is evidence that people with 
dementia retain emotional memory longer than semantic memory (Mills, 1997).  
McLean (2006) reminds us that coherent narratives carry a persistent emotional truth.  
Many clinicians would point to embodied interactions as indicative of identity 
(Hughes, 2013).  
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Lesser (2006) reminds us of the ‘boundedness of identity’, identity is connected to 
the past and future in the same way as we are bounded by life and death, one is not 
possible without the other.  There is no sudden split between a then self and a now 
self, whereas there is an evident divide between life and death.  However disabled a 
person becomes it is not the same as being dead and someone who is alive is not 
treated in the same way as a dead body (Matthews, 2006, Post, 2006).   
Our bodies (also) define our temporality, especially our 
finitude.  The body is the locus of past present, and future 
(Thomas et al., 2004: 18) 
More recently there has been a growing interest in embodiment in dementia.  It 
broadens the debate about loss of self and assists in informing what Hughes (2011) 
calls our ‘human-person-perspective’, which is what we need to relate to the Other.  
Embodiment expands our resources for addressing selfhood from the biomedical 
emphasis on disease of the brain and the interactionist perspective of the social  
(Kontos and Martin, 2013).  Kontos (2004, 2006, 2013) argues that selfhood is 
enacted in and through the body.  She integrates Merleau-Ponty’s conception of self 
with Boudieu’s habitus to argue that even people who are severely affected by 
dementia exhibit selfhood in their corporeality.  Merleau Ponty argues that the body 
is both subject and object to itself.   Perception is not passive; it is interlinked with 
bodily knowing.  Habitus comprises social and cultural understandings that function 
below consciousness.  The body continues to make meaning despite cognitive 
impairment as our bodies have intention and understanding at a pre-reflexive level.  
(Kontos, 2004, 2006, Kontos and Martin, 2013, Lock and Strong, 2010). 
Steven Sabat (2002, 2001) has written extensively about the way the performance 
and quality of life of people with dementia is affected by how they are positioned by 
others. He wrote a seminal paper with Harré in 1994 describing two aspects of 
selfhood (Sabat and Harré, 1994).  Sabat  has since developed the model to include 
three aspects of selfhood that he calls Self 1, Self 2 and Self 3 (Sabat, 2001, Sabat, 
2002).  He distinguishes between the way a person’s identity appears to others and 
the way people experience their own identity. 
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Self 1 is the sense of one’s own personal identity, which includes continuity over 
time.  For Sabat this self is evidenced by the use of personal pronouns and adjectives 
such as ‘I’, ‘me’ and ‘mine’ and is retained throughout life.  It is a ‘sense of self as a 
uniquely embodied being’ (Sabat, 2001:  290). 
Self 2 consists of our unique mental and physical attributes, some of which remain 
over time while others may change.  A diagnosis of dementia belongs in this self 
along with our beliefs, including beliefs about our attributes.  If someone is given a 
diagnosis of dementia then their beliefs about the elements this brings are in Self 2. 
Self 3 comprises socially presented selves, meaning there can be multiple Self 3s 
including various different roles.  Self 3 is the self that is dependent on the co-
operation of others; one cannot be a teacher unless there are students who accept you 
as such.  This self is most vulnerable in dementia as someone may be positioned by 
others, according to the negative aspects of dementia seen in Self 2.  This can affect 
the Self 3. 
Sabat’s theory of selfhood starts to address criticisms that a purely social view of 
selfhood misses out the embodied self (Kontos, 2004).  
In conclusion there is no consensus about the self in dementia but dementia 
challenges philosophy in the same way that philosophy can challenge assumptions 
about dementia (Hughes et al., 2006).  Research and clinical evidence has shown that 
a sense of self awareness is retained in early dementia and that for the person with 
dementia it is important that they are recognised as individuals with a unique 
identity. 
As Sabat’s conceptualisation of Self illustrates, despite the modern view of the 
individual self, people do not live alone, they live within relationships.  These 
include close intimate relationships and relationships with other members of society 
and they all impact on our experiences. 
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2.7 Living in relationships 
Fontana and Smith (1989) argue that some carers who assume the role of agents for 
people with dementia, as if their old self were still there are deceiving themselves.  
Balfour (2006) in his exploration of the unconscious processes for the person with 
dementia describes the carer as a ‘container’ who reflects the world of the person 
with dementia.  Mills (1997) in a longitudinal study of narrative identity of people 
with dementia, which she defined as requiring a life history and memory, argues that 
narrative memory and narrative identity faded for some people as their illness 
progressed.  She suggests that 
They had bequeathed their narrative to another…..In this 
sense, therefore the personal narrative of dementia sufferers 
is never lost 
(Mills, 1997: 695) 
The tension for caregivers between maintaining the identity of the person with 
dementia and grieving for the loss of shared memories and a relationship can result 
in guilt. 
The development of personhood within the dementia debate focused predominantly 
on the experience of the individual.  This is understandable given its naissance as a 
response to poor care within institutions, but over the past decade there has been a 
recognition of the place of relationships (Hellström et al., 2005).   People live within 
a context of relationships and we should move beyond a person-centred approach to 
a relationship-focused approach (Nolan et al., 2004).  A number of recent studies 
have focused on how a sense of self is co-constructed within relationships (Clare and 
Shakespeare, 2004, Hellström et al., 2005).  Taylor (2008) highlights the perception 
of others that the self is lost in dementia if the person is unable to recognise the carer.  
Carers are frequently asked ‘does she recognise you’ as if a negative answer to this 
question absolves us from recognising the person with dementia.  The narratives of 
others should not be viewed as privileged over those of people with dementia, but as 
assistance in setting the context by providing factual information such as dates and 
characters (McLean, 2006).  Positioning memories outside of the self extends the 
boundaries of the self to include relationships (Leibing, 2006).  The notion of the 
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autonomous person has been challenged from ethical positions (Post, 2006) including 
both cultural  (Tsai, 2009)  and feminist perspectives (Gilligan, 1982, Barnes, 2012).  
Ethics of care perspectives will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
2.8 Socio-political discourses 
People are living longer and the drive within the public health agenda is towards 
healthy ageing.  Ageing well is active ageing, the goals of which are maintaining 
cognitive, physical and social capacities (Williams et al., 2012).  In Scotland people 
with dementia are being consulted in government policy about dementia.  Socio-
political discourses continue to be disadvantaging, however, often framing dementia 
in a negative way. 
2.8.1 Epidemic 
There were 71,000 people in Scotland with dementia in 2010 and this was forecast to 
double within the following 25 years (Scottish Government, 2010).  Dementia 
predominantly, although not exclusively, affects older people, with a common co-
morbidity associated with ageing, and people with dementia are significant users of 
health and social care services resulting in high expenditure. (McCrone P et al., 
2008).   It is described as apocalyptic and challenges our ideas of what matters as 
identity (Kaufman, 2006).   
The prevailing paradigm of dementia within Western society is often one of a 
degenerative disease that poses an increasing socioeconomic problem for society 
(O'Connor et al., 2007, MacRae, 2010).  Dementia has become a more pressing 
social and political issue because of demographical predictions of  the expanding 
growth of older people within society (Naue and Kroll, 2008). 
There is a growing literature on how dementia has been constructed as a global 
epidemic (Fox, 1989, Cheston and Bender, 1999).  The metaphoric description of 
dementia as an epidemic plays on people’s fears of dementia as a devastating force 
that destroys the self of the person with dementia, as well as people with dementia as 
overwhelming consumers of social and economic resources (Johnstone, 2013).  
George and Whitehouse (2012) compare the metaphors used, describing a ‘war on 
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Alzheimer’s disease’, with those describing a war on terror following the events of 
9/11 in New York.  Dementia has become the evil enemy in order to increase 
research funding (Beard and Fox, 2008) yet despite improved financial support, a 
cure has not been found (George and Whitehouse, 2012). 
Dementia constitutes a threat to society because it occurs in an ageing body that does 
not conform to the ideals and aspirations of a healthy body.  Within Western society 
ageing is often associated with deterioration and death.  People with dementia and 
older people are understood in terms of loss rather than as valued and equal members 
of society despite the conflicting agenda of active ageing.  A diagnosis can be 
dependent on culturally and socially unacceptable behaviour (Harding and Palfrey, 
1997).   
2.8.2 Self advocacy 
James McKillop (2002) described a possibility available to him following his 
diagnosis of dementia in 1999 
I could have kept blundering around my shrunken world 
deeply depressed, as I had been decisively excommunicated 
from a misunderstanding society 
(McKillop, 2002: 110)  
He did not accept this option but instead went on to found the Scottish Dementia 
Working Group (Scottish Dementia Working Group, 2013).  The practice of 
dementia care and research is changing focus to one of person-centred care.  Clinical 
practice is beginning to offer an alternative narrative of dementia, from medical 
problem, to one of personhood (Leibing and Cohen, 2006).   Research is addressing 
the subjective experience of people who have dementia alongside that of carers.  The 
belief that people with dementia are unable to discuss their experiences has been 
challenged (Mills, 1997, Clare et al., 2005, Wilkinson, 2002).   
The opening article in the first edition of the research journal Dementia was written 
by a woman with dementia (Sterin, 2002).  People with dementia have begun to 
speak about the impact that a label of dementia has made to the way society sees 
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them (Bryden, 2005, McKillop, 2002). Organizations such as Alzheimer Scotland 
and Alzheimer’s Society UK, which were established by carers in the 1970s, now 
have active members with dementia. Campaigning groups run by people with 
dementia such as Scottish Dementia Working Group (Scottish Dementia Working 
Group) and Dementia Advocacy Support International (DASNI) (Dementia 
Advocacy and Support Network International) have been established.  They have 
begun to address issues of power relationships and citizenship within dementia 
(Bartlett and O'Connor, 2007).  People with a diagnosis of dementia are utilising 
technology and writing blogs (Swaffer, 2013, Taylor, 2013b).  The 2012 Alzheimer 
Europe conference saw over fifteen people with dementia attending, many of them 
giving presentations.  At this meeting the European Working Group of People with 
Dementia was founded (Alzheimer Europe, 2012).  
 People with mental health problems have also become more active in challenging 
the narrative that they are unable to speak for themselves (Hornstein, 2012, Roe and 
Davidson, 2005).  Of particular interest with regard to this study is the Hearing 
Voices Movement, which is critical of psychiatry’s traditional classification of 
auditory hallucinations.  Groups have been established throughout the United 
Kingdom where voice hearers support each other and challenge traditional 
psychiatric practice (Hearing Voices Network, 2013). 
Both UK and Scottish government are committed to partnership working with 
increased public participation at policy and individual levels within health and social 
care. 
Patients and carers are after all, the real experts in what it 
feels like to receive care from NHS Scotland. Our task is to 
listen to them, think afresh about the ways in which we 
involve and engage them in shaping their care and work in 
new and different ways, which challenge traditional 
boundaries, both within and between organizations. 
(NHS Scotland, 2007: 49)  
Importantly Scotland’s first Dementia Strategy was published in 2010 and it has just 
been updated at the time of writing in 2013 (Scottish Government, 2010).  The 
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Scottish Dementia Working Group was consulted in the development of the strategy 




O'Connor et al. (2007) identify a gap in research into understanding the implications 
that the wider policy, institutional and cultural context have on the subjective 
experience of dementia and personhood.  There is an emergent body of work that is 
beginning to addresses the intersection of cultural setting and subjective experience 
(O'Connor et al., 2010, Hulko and Stern, 2009).  Although the contribution of the 
concept of personhood into understanding the discrimination suffered by people with 
dementia is acknowledged, it has been criticised as an apolitical concept.  This has 
resulted in  an increasing interest in the concept of citizenship (Bartlett and 
O'Connor, 2007, Bartlett and O'Connor, 2010). 
2.9 Evidence in health research 
Before the introduction of evidence-based medicine, medical procedures were 
condemned for being based on personal preference or custom (Lambert, 2006). The 
gold standard in clinical biomedical research is now the randomised control trial.  
This supremacy has not, however, gone uncontested.  As Bracken and Thomas 
(2005) point out, the best treatment is decided on by committee rather than the 
circumstances of the individual patient.  This view of science and research assumes 
the objectivity of science that has been challenged by a multiplicity of theorists and 
researchers (Haraway, 1988, Latour and Woolgar, 1986, Harding, 2008, Law, 2004). 
Murray, Homes and Rail (2008) assess evidence based medicine from a Foucauldian 
perspective, believing that it threatens the clinician-patient relationship, and is of 
limited use to the individual patient.  Positivism dominates but clinical practice is 
often about uncertainties and storytelling, which raises issues about whose 
knowledge is privileged (Miller and Crabtree, 1998).  There are competing political 
drivers in healthcare.  Alongside the requirement to practice evidence-based 
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medicine is another agenda calling for more public participation.  Participation calls 
for user control, collaboration and consultation, which requires a shift from the 
power of the professional (Nolan et al., 2007).  Evidence based medicine is seen by 
some as a threat to the clinical judgement of the individual doctor and by others as an 
increase in power and authority for a collective professional body (Lambert, 2006).  
Views of doctors are traditionally seen as more realistic than those of the patient in 
what Becker calls a ‘hierarchy of credibility’ (Becker, 1967: 241) .  Nolan et al. 
(2007) argue that the service provider has factual knowledge whereas the knowledge 
of the service user is situated knowledge. 
Thornhill et al (2004) call for psychiatric practice to catch up with academic 
theorizing by listening to multiple realities.  They point out that there is more than 
one way to understand experiences and that post-modernism has rejected the idea 
that there is a single answer. Evidence-based medicine does not engage with social 
and cultural issues despite their impact on health status, although many individual 
clinicians take into account in their practice (Lambert, 2006).  
Bracken and Thomas (2005)  would ascribe different realities of  psychiatric 
understanding to the split between academic and clinical psychiatrists, arguing that 
academic psychiatry has retained its ‘scientific’ underpinning whereas many clinical 
psychiatrists, in the move to community provision of services are engaging with user 
groups.  My experience concurs with the clinical practice described by Hughes 
(2011) of working with people with dementia within context, although I accept that 
this may be an individual  experience. 
A different way of understanding these tensions is provided by Frank (1997), he 
argues there is a clash between administrative and cultural change, and an older 
modernist assumption of the professional expertise and the rational individual.  
Mol et al (2010) point to the way that the care sector often separates care into 
interventions and relational work.  The role of clinical trials is to establish whether an 
intervention constitutes good care, relational aspects of care are measured by medical 
ethics.  As the next chapter will explore further, they argue that the practice of care 
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involves local solutions to particular problems rather than generalised disembodied 
principles. 
The final section returns to a personal view of care with a story of my relationship 
with my mother. 
2.10 View from a daughter 
My mother was admitted to a care home a few years before I began this study.  She 
had Parkinson’s and was finding it more difficult to cope at home, so decided to 
enter full time care.    I am not sure if she ever had dementia or whether her 
Parkinson’s caused her symptoms but whatever the medical cause, the effect on me 
was the same.  I could probably explain the aetiology of her behaviour in a medical 
way but that would not be enough to account for the experience. 
Visiting my mother in her care home was becoming more difficult.  Her multiple 
health problems, which had begun with Parkinson’s had led to some memory 
impairment and episodes of paranoia. I knew this was a common side effect from her 
medication.  I sat with her in the sitting room struggling for conversation.  
The care home was having a fete; it was busier than usual. The staff were wearing 
their own clothes rather than their blue uniforms.  They bustled in and out, 
organising different stalls.  A welcome relief from the usual routine, they had given 
up their day off to raise funds for the home.  A young boy around twelve arrived 
looking a little awkward.  He was the son of a nurse, roped in to help out, or maybe 
just refused permission to stay at home alone.  My mother suddenly perked up ‘you 
need to watch that boy, he steals’ she announced.  Her voice, normally quiet and 
slurred, changed by Parkinson’s, rang out unexpectedly clearly across the sitting 
room. 
I sat still for a second, embarrassed; I could see she was still attentive.   I didn’t 
want her to continue with her tirade and blurted out ‘you’re a foul old woman’.  She 
looked at me, a smile, breaking through the mask of the disease.  I felt a flash of 
recognition for the person who was once my mother and the argumentative 
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relationship that we had.  Then the embarrassment again. These people knew what I 
did for a living; I wanted to tell them that I do not speak to my patients like this. 
As a clinician I believe that people with dementia do not lose their self, but as a 
daughter I was more conflicted.   My mother had changed; I was sure of that, she 
liked children and would never previously have reacted so aggressively towards this 
boy.  I attempted throughout the period she spent in the home to tell the staff 
something of who she had been.  It was important to me.  Despite living 200 miles 
away, I tried to do all the right things when I visited.  I took in photographs of her 
and told them about her earlier life.  Our interaction in this incident was no different 
to our previous communication style, but its meaning for me was very different. 
An ethics of care framework acknowledges that care can be part of an on-going 
relationship and does not ignore the emotional aspect of care (Barnes and Brannelly, 
2008).  As Davis (2004) points out the relationship between myself and my mother 
began before her illness.  My way of being with my mother was part of a pre-existing 
narrative and whatever Kitwood (1997) may say, her memory problems and her 
paranoia changed that relationship.   
Since her illness our relationality had altered and this was what I found problematic 
to manage.  I found it difficult to create a new kind of relatedness.  I concur with 
(Lambek, 2007) that for me remembering was also a moral and ethical practice.    
My need to inform her care home of her past was a desire not to let her history begin 
in the present, as a woman who was dependent and unpleasant.  I was creating 
different selves for my mother each time I told the story, and continue to do so.  I am 
however silencing her telling of her self, and her subsequent death has meant her 
ability to tell her own fractured self has been silenced for good.  I do however believe 
that it supports my understanding of personhood as existing as part of a bounded life, 
which provides an ethical approach for me. People with dementia remain people 
whatever stage of the illness they experience. 
My struggle was about the ambiguity of my relationality and my emotional knowing. 
Liz Stanley (1993) describes this struggle of knowing and not knowing her mother.  
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She was sure that somewhere her mother as she had known her remained but was 
hidden beneath a different self. 
2.11 Conclusion 
As Rauol et al. (2007) claim narratives of illness can appear at different levels - 
individual, groups, professional and societal.  Each will privilege a different aspect 
over others.  This chapter has addressed the main discourses that are relevant to this 
study.  People with dementia who hallucinate are often cared for by mental health 
teams, so the predominant narrative of dementia as a disease, and some of the 
implications of this were discussed.  We can tell the story of our self or it can be told 
by others.  The story that is told will impact on the way people with dementia are 
viewed by society, and by carers, both family and paid. 
Hallucinations remain elusive; each of the discourses of dementia misses something 
out.  If as Julian Hughes says dementia is a ‘conceptual mess’  (Hughes, 2011: 17), 
there needs to be another way to describe something that is messy ‘because simple 
clear descriptions don’t work if what they are describing is not itself very coherent’ 
(Law, 2004: 2).  Socio-political stories of dementia may conflict with the stories of 
individuals with dementia but the differing multiple stories may all have relevance to 
experiences of care.  The next chapter discusses a number of social science theories 
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3 Situating knowledge 
I float on the sea of knowledge ….I sail on the surface of 
understanding, a flicker here, a silence there 
(Jamie, 2012:  17) 
This haunting description comes from an essay by the poet Kathleen Jamie 
describing a journey to the Arctic.  She manages to verbalise the difficulties of 
knowing the intangible in ways that distil its essence.   
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I outlined a variety of different discourses of dementia.  Each 
of the conceptual models of dementia can be clinically useful but they have different 
values (Hughes, 2011)  This chapter introduces the theoretical lenses through which 
diverse discourses can be understood and that shaped the research. 
The theoretical work that has influenced me and will be discussed here comes from 
three main fields.  Firstly it comes from science, technology and society studies 
(STS), especially those studies that address the concept of reality (Law, 2006, Law, 
2004, Law et al., 2013, Haraway, 1988) and the heterogeneity of medicine (Mol, 
2002, Mol and Berg, 1994, Moser, 2011).  The second influence is the concept of 
liminality that originates in anthropology, but has recently been used to inform other 
areas such as illness and disability (van Gennep, 1960, Turner, 1967, Adam, 2004, 
Blows et al., 2012). Lastly I will discuss the work of feminist care ethics (Gilligan, 
1982, Tronto, 1993, Barnes, 2012).   
Care involves the network that continues to make small adjustments to enable things 
to work rather than being about cure.  It utilises different knowledges that are fluid 
(Moreira, 2010).  Mol (2008, Mol et al., 2010) describes the continuous fine tuning 
involved in care practice as ‘tinkering’.  In this chapter I introduce a number of 
concepts to argue alongside Law, Mol and others from STS that multiplicity is 
integral to care practice.  
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3.2 A view from somewhere
1
 
Many people who undertake a doctoral study talk of it being a journey.  This chapter 
acknowledges my journey to find a lens that could inform my research approach.  It 
also needs to reflect my understandings of hallucinations and dementia. 
Back reminds us of the need to integrate theory and empirical enquiry  
The usefulness of theory lies in its ability to invite us to ask 
different questions of the social world 
(Back, 2007: 16) 
I am studying something that is ephemeral: hallucinations in dementia can appear 
and disappear.  They are like the family resemblances studied by Jennifer Mason 
(2011), difficult to pin down and not conforming to any rules of temporality or 
regularity.  This immediately poses difficulties for my study as it disrupts our 
common sense ideas of reality and truth. 
The world is not homogenous and individuals deal with complexity and 
contradictions daily. There are different ways of knowing and different stories that 
can be told, as we saw in the previous chapter.  I am aware of and even comfortable 
with this in clinical practice. I have often been in the position where I am unable to 
give a definitive answer that other people have wanted from me.  The individual 
trajectory for a person with dementia is not predictable.  Law (2006) makes the point 
that it is easier to achieve coherence in theory than in practice.   
Feminism methodologies have changed understanding of knowledge and influenced 
the way research is conducted.  Feminist researchers have embraced reflexivity in 
questioning the nature of knowledge claims and research relationships (Ribbens and 
Edwards, 1998, Doucet and Mauthner, 2002). 
                                                 
1
 This expression was used by STENHOUSE, R. 2009. Unfulfilled expectations: A narrative study of 
individuals' experiences of being a patient on an acute psychiatric inpatient ward in Scotland. PhD, 
University of Edinburgh. 
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If, as I would argue, knowledge is situated and contextualised then a reflexive 
element in knowledge construction is inevitable.  Reflexivity recognises the role of 
interpretation in all knowledge production, disputing the idea that there can be any 
true mirroring of facts, as well as acknowledging  the importance of interpretation 
within the research (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009)  
Although not always referred to explicitly as reflexivity, the 
project of examining how the researcher and intersubjective 
elements impact on and transform research has been an 
important part of the evolution of qualitative research 
(Finlay, 2003: 4 italics in original)  
Ethnographic texts are no longer prefaced as ‘objective’ descriptions of unknown 
communities written from the perspective of a stranger.   It is now commonplace to 
have studies of familiar communities that  acknowledge the contribution of the 
interaction of the researcher in the field towards knowledge production  (Coffey, 
1999).  Reflexivity involves us owning that we are part of the social world that we 
study. We bring knowledge with us, which may be flawed but can become part of 
our inquiry (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995).   Subjectivity is inescapable within 
research starting with the decision of what to study and continuing all the way 
through to the presentation of findings.  Placing the researcher in the context means 
making explicit how and why the research was carried out (Stanley and Wise, 1993). 
Feminist researchers in particular have identified the dilemmas that can arise within 
research relationships, reflecting especially on power differentials (Mauthner and 
Doucet, 2003, Ribbens and Edwards, 1998).  My writing is partial and situated, 
where I am situated impacts on the knowledge I create  (Ribbens and Edwards, 
1998).  However much I as a researcher wish to adopt an inclusive approach, 
inevitably I decide what is written and how.  People with dementia remain a 
marginalized voice within society.  They may be perceived as vulnerable therefore 
the question of power in research involving them is an inevitable consideration of 
this study.  My study also involved relatives and professionals and a reflexive 
approach to my relationships with both these groups was equally important and will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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It has been a struggle for me to reject a search for ‘objective’ knowledge despite the 
clinical experience that allows me to live with complexity and contradiction.  Neilsen 
captures the emotional conflict well when she writes  
I believe deep down that our positivist souls are still attracted 
to knowledge as answer, as firm ground 
(Neilsen, 2002: 210) 
My subjectivity shapes the way I have constructed knowledge.  Haraway (1988) 
highlights the dichotomy that exists between the pole of objectivity and that of 
relativism.  She uses the term ‘situated knowledge’ as a way to reclaim an engaged 
view from somewhere. 
3.3 Partial and situated knowledge 
We live with partial connections and contradictions all the time and denial of this 
leads to what Haraway (1988)  calls ‘the god trick’.  This is the supposition that we 
can assume a view from everywhere, an all-knowing, objective view of the world.  
Haraway calls this view a self-delusion.  Our knowledge is never complete but 
always partial.  All knowledges are partial and situated within a context. We cannot 
know and represent everything.  There is no single, absolute and authoritative truth 
out there waiting to be discovered.  This is not a problem unless as Haraway (1988) 
argues we assume to speak from an objective truth, to perform ‘the god trick’. 
If we can live with partialities and contradictions, and I would argue that medicine 
does this all the time in practice, then we need to find methods in research in which 
we can live with this mess without ignoring or ‘othering’ it (Law, 2006, Law, 2004).  
Law (2004, 2006) argues that it is impossible to know the world, including 
describing it, because whenever we bring something into presence we unavoidably 
leave something out.  Presence is what is made present, which inevitably implies 
absence.  If we do not pretend that we are seeing everything it is not problematic.  
Ignoring the other, means we pretend that there is a coherent story in our research 
and that the world is not messy.   
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Method does not just represent social life, according to Law, method is performative, 
it produces realities, making visible some aspects of reality out-there and making 
others invisible.  Methods have a double social life, they are shaped by the social 
world and they also help to shape it (Law, 2010).  Recent understanding of the 
practice of social science is that it does not just describe the social world but 
contributes to making and remaking it, it can contribute to the world it wants to 
make.  Law and Urry (2004) cite the analysis of deviance that has led to attempts to 
decrease stigma in society.  This social science concept achieved wider societal 
understanding, and appreciating the consequences of labelling on people resulted in 
changes in social policy.  Methods inevitably make assumptions about the social 
world and reproduce them (Law, 2010).  I am assuming here that there is a group of 
people who have dementia, and they have realities that differ at times from 
consensus reality and are called hallucinations.  I have this understanding based on 
my experience as a mental health nurse and this led to my desire to explore this topic. 
Although life is messy, modern society does not like disorder (Ingold, 2010).  The 
complexity and clutter of life cannot be understood through universal abstractions, 
but needs to be situated within specific contextual settings (Law, 2004, Mol, 2002, 
Haraway, 1988, Barnes, 2012).   
This study is not just about how we know the social world of people with 
hallucinations and dementia, but also how they know reality.  How then can I begin 
to understand the impact of hallucinations on the people with dementia who live with 
them, those closest to them and the mental health professionals who work with them?  
People in general assume that our perception of the environment leads to an 
unmediated independent reality, but this is ambiguous.   Merleau-Ponty (1962) 
illustrated that there is an element of creativity involved in our interpretations, using 
examples of well-known optical illusions.   
Hallucinations, which may be common place to a clinician, may startle someone who 
is unfamiliar with these strange experiences.  They may well be described by the 
person experiencing them in a matter of fact way.  Hallucinations challenge the idea 
of a shared reality but people who hallucinate do not always see or hear something 
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without an external stimulus.  My experience of hallucinations in dementia is that it 
does not conform to a narrow textbook definition of hallucinations.  I concur with 
Ffytche’s view 
Many patients who on some occasions ‘see things that are not 
really there’ will on other occasions ‘see real things 
incorrectly’ 
(Ffytche, 2004: 16) 
Boundaries act as barriers that define knowledge practices and concepts (Fox, 2011).  
Situated knowledge and messy reality challenge these barriers and the following 
section discussed some of the ways in which unstable boundaries can be understood.  
3.4 Boundaries 
Traditionally Western thinking has created dichotomies such as self/other, 
mind/body and male/female (Haraway, 1991).  Boundaries protect, they keep out 
non-coherence (Law et al., 2013).  Borders are associated with modernity but their 
purity is being increasingly challenged by postmodernity, feminism and social 
studies of science.  We saw in the previous chapter that a diagnosis of dementia is 
evaluative, ‘there is no hard scientific boundary between disease and normality’ 
(Hughes et al., 2006: 2), but attitudes towards dementia can have a critical impact on 
the way society judges people with a diagnosis. 
Rational/irrational can be just such organising categories that can result in negative 
judgements of people whose realities may not coincide with our own.  Using binary 
distinctions to aid understanding, we can forget that dichotomies simplify and iron 
out the ambiguities: the wider and more inclusive the category, the more that is 
eroded from it. These dichotomies create boundaries that have been contested in a 
number of ways. 
The next sections will describe three of these challenges, those of boundary objects 
(Star and Griesemer, 1989, Fox, 2011), cyborgs (Haraway, 1991), and messy objects 
(Law and Singleton, 2005). 
3.4.1 Boundary objects 
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entities that enhance the capacity of an idea, theory or 
practice to translate across culturally defined boundaries 
(Fox, 2011: 70-71) 
The concept of boundary objects was developed by Star and Griesemer to describe 
how different groups, amateurs, professionals and administrators collaborated to 
establish a Natural History Museum.  Boundary objects facilitate the different 
understandings and objects between interested groups to enable a mutual 
understanding between social sites (Star and Griesemer, 1989).   They can allow 
different groups to share meaning and learn about the others’ perspectives.  They 
work either because of an intrinsic property of the object or because of a specific 
context  (Fox, 2011).  They need to have a receptive audience, as Fox (2011) 
describes in his historical analysis of the way theories of infection were translated 
into practice in operating theatres.  Surgeons accepted the less convenient aseptic 
technique rather than antiseptic. Their approval was based not on expedience but on 
both contemporary medical understanding, and their equating of antisepsis with an 
accusation of impurity on the part of surgeons.  Sterile clothes and instruments were 
acceptable boundary objects as they allowed the doctors to maintain a role as healer 
rather than polluter.  Boundary objects act to blur boundaries and enable 
communication, but as Mol points out the different regions remain (Fox, 2011, Mol, 
2002). 
3.4.2 Cyborg 
Donna Haraway’s polemical Cyborg Manifesto, which was initially written in 1985, 
has been much cited.  In challenging the feminist and socialist theories of the time, 
she utilizes the metaphor of the cyborg to deconstruct the ideas of inflexible 
boundaries. A cyborg is a hybrid of organism and machine; Haraway describes it as 
social reality and science fiction.  She was critical of the Marxism and feminism of 
the time, finding them problematic because they were unable to hold contradictions 
together.  In their desire to achieve political and social change they eliminated 
difference, using the same language of dualism as Western traditions.  The cyborg 
enjoys the blurring of boundaries and uses its partiality to destabilize them giving us 
new possibilities. It is a collection of partial connections (Law, 2004).   It holds 
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together opposing concepts such as human and machine that are part of our social 
reality in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. They are vital but do not go on to 
make a new larger whole.  Haraway’s cyborg addresses materialities, providing a 
way of thinking that acknowledges material-semiotic networks.  It is a way of 
thinking about materials that treats them as having a relational effect.  Everyday 
medical practices such as the use of technological implants into the body are now 
commonplace, but can still disquiet us. (Haraway, 1991). 
Lapaum et al (2012) use a cyborg ontology to theorise the nursing practice that 
occurs between ‘person centred care’ and technological knowledge and can be 
integral to modern care.  I love the playful approach of Haraway which allows the 
freedom to enjoy messy borders.  The final sentence of the Cyborg Manifesto ‘I’d 
rather be a cyborg than a goddess’ feels liberating in a world that can still be 
constrained by dualities that do not reflect practice, a world that as Law (2006) 
argues tries to use something ordered to describe mess. 
3.4.3 Messy objects 
A seemingly straightforward request to investigate the trajectory of patients with 
alcoholic liver disease led to an unexpected difficulty for the researchers Law & 
Singleton (Law and Singleton, 2005).  They described their object of concern as a 
messy object, accounts given by interviewees could be diverse and difficult to map 
onto each other.  The reality of the alcoholic liver disease in the textbook is very 
different from that of a general practitioner for whom it was the social consequences 
of living in a deprived area.  Instead of something that they thought would be easy to 
trace, they found that it was elusive.  It is enacted in multiple sites, from a textbook 
definition where it is located in the body, to in a non-statutory agency.   Although 
what people said during interviews was not irrelevant it did not fit a narrow 
definition of alcoholic liver disease.   
They describe two possible explanations for the appearance of this messy object, 
both of which they reject.  These accounts are firstly that their research approach is 
inadequate, or secondly that the NHS facility that commissioned the research is 
managing alcoholic liver disease badly. 
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Smoothing out the mess does not allow them to know the object, which has ‘multiple 
and discontinuous absences’ (Law and Singleton, 2005: 350, Law, 2006, Law, 2004).  
A messy object is ontologically complex. 
‘a shape-changing object that, even more misleadingly, also 
changed its name’  
(Law, 2004 :79) 
This notion of a shape shifting object resonates with my experience of working 
clinically with people with hallucinations.  It fits with Gillett’s (2004) description of 
hallucinations as like a ‘will-o-the-wisp’.  Law and Singleton (2005) make the point 
that although they had difficulty with alcoholic liver disease changing in their study, 
the fluidity was managed well by the professionals they interviewed. 
I made a decision early on to use the word ‘hallucinations’ in my inclusion criteria.  I 
left the decision as to whether participants fitted this description to mental health 
nurses.  Despite my reservations that hallucinations as a diagnosis has an ephemeral 
nature, I was reasonably sure that other mental health nurses would share a similar 
understanding to me.  The boundaries between hallucinations and other perceptions 
are not clear cut especially within dementia.   Regardless of my misgivings, the 
category of hallucinations still exists within mental health practice so cannot be 
ignored, but needs to be approached with caution.  Assumptions of clarity will not 
result in coherent reality.  Law and Singleton (2005) argue that we need to tolerate 
ambiguity.  The anthropological concept of liminality explores a time and space that 
accepts and is constituted by ambiguity. 
3.4.4 Liminality 
People with dementia can be viewed as being on a threshold.   There are fuzzy 
boundaries between normality and pathology as well as between hallucinations, 
illusions and misperceptions.  One way to understand these ideas is through 
liminality.  The word ‘liminal’ comes from the Latin limen meaning threshold.  It 
was a term developed and used in anthropology to describe a stage during ceremonial 
rites of passage.  Van Gennep (1960) concluded that there are three stages during 
rites of passage, when someone transforms from one status to another, a preliminal or 
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separation stage,  a transition and a return to a new status (Turner, 1967, Felde, 
2011). 
Turner (1967, 1979, 1977) developed the understanding of the transition or liminal 
period to evaluate better the work he had done on the ritual process.  He applied the 
understanding to both small scale and larger societies believing that despite the 
decline in importance of religion, ritual process had spread to other areas of socio-
cultural life.  He described the liminal state as ‘betwixt and between’ (Turner, 1967: 
111).  The transition that occurred, according to Turner is a process or a 
transformation. The person in the liminal state is neither one thing nor the other; they 
have left behind one status and have not yet moved on to the next, although they may 
exhibit aspects of both.  Liminality is not a static state but a confusion of usual 
categories, ambiguity and disorder.  It can be either a positive or negative experience, 
as society bestows on the person a specialised status.  It does not necessarily isolate 
people, they may also experience  camaraderie in their seclusion that allows them to 
be themselves without having to conform to institutional roles (Turner, 1967, 
Jackson, 2005).  Although limen means threshold, Turner (1977) contends that it can 
be prolonged, and using the example of monks, he argues that it can even become a 
way of life.  This thinking has been expanded to encompass understandings in the 
field of chronic health.   
3.4.4.1 Chronic illness and liminality 
Liminality has been used in health in recent years to theorize conditions where the 
person feels healthy but has clinical signs of abnormality, as in the management of 
raised cholesterol (Felde, 2011) or an abnormal cervical smear result (Forss et al., 
2004).  It has also been used in approaches to chronic health problems like chronic 
pain (Jackson, 2005) cancer (Little et al., 1998) and mental health issues (Warner and 
Gabe, 2004, Barratt, 1998). 
In the past illness was a normal part of the life cycle but now we value health.  
Chronic illness challenges the expectations of modern society which include the 
government discourse of healthy ageing.  The cultural expectations of a long and 
healthy life can lead to a sense of shock and fear when this is not what happens.  
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Dementia is a chronic illness, like cancer, in which mortality is made visible (Little 
et al., 1998).  Kaufman (2006) describes the cultural work of dementia at the end of 
life, as making life ambiguous by blurring the boundaries between life and death.  
Although she does not use the concept of liminality this would seem to me to be an 
apposite understanding of her argument.   
When liminality is used as an anthropological term, in rites of passage there is 
predominantly an expectation that people having been stripped of one social status, 
enter a liminal state and then move on to another social status.   In chronic illness 
people may stay in a liminal condition.  Instead of moving from a state of illness 
back to one of health they remain in a state of illness.  This has been explored in 
people with cancer and those experiencing chronic pain (Little et al., 1998, Jackson, 
2005).  If we view the world as a system of classification, liminal phenomena do not 
fit and so people can become stigmatised.  Again this is seen within chronic pain and 
also in some mental health difficulties, as people straddle boundaries (Jackson, 2005, 
Barratt, 1998) 
3.5 Common sense reality 
Reality has preoccupied philosophers for centuries but it is the common-sense 
assumptions of reality that are relevant to this discussion and are addressed in the 
theories of John Law and Annemarie Mol.   
Law is a sociologist who has done much interdisciplinary work especially in the field 
of science, technology and society (STS) that focusses on the impact of society on 
science and technology.  This thinking has led scholars  like Law to challenge the 
common sense attributes of reality  (Law, 2006, Law, 2004).  Law ascribes five 
attributes to common sense reality 
 Primitive out-thereness - a primitive sense that there is a reality out there that 
is beyond ourselves 
 Independence - what is out there is independent of our actions 
 Anteriority - what is out there precedes our attempt to know it 
 Definiteness - the something that is out there is not vague 
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 Singularity - the world is a single material reality that is more or less shared.  
This is not the same argument as that there are different perspectives on a 
single reality 
(Law, 2006: 6-7) 
The primitive sense of out-thereness is the only assumption he accepts.  We tend to 
take reality for granted; it informs how we live our day to day lives. Our common-
sense reality advises much science and social science research  (Law, 2006).  We are 
taken aback by hallucinations that challenge our acceptance of a shared external 
world.  A diagnostic criterion for hallucinations takes for granted a single external 
reality that the person who hallucinates sees or hears wrongly, resulting in a reality 
disjuncture. 
Pollner contends that  reality disjunctures are ‘contradictory experiences of the 
world’ (Pollner, 1975: 411).   When any difference in experience occurs there is an 
‘ironicizing of experience’, the irony happens when there is a realization that the 
initial perception is wrong.  This can become apparent either as a result of 
intrapersonal or interpersonal reconsideration.  People realise for themselves that 
their initial view was wrong or someone else points it out to them.  A reality 
disjuncture occurs when a choice is not made about which version prevails, and one 
side is portrayed as faulty.  They often result in a vicious circle, as resolution is not 
possible by simply looking at the world, because this is how the disjuncture occurred 
in the first place.  The decision to act on a particular version of reality results in the 
discreditation of the other version.  The discreditation is commonly applied to the 
experience of people who hallucinate and can result in stigmatisation 
The argument from social studies of science within the last quarter of the twentieth 
century that science is not neutral,  has led to greater interest in exploring how 
scientific realities are made in practice within laboratories and medical science 
(Haraway, 1988, Latour and Woolgar, 1986, Moser, 2011).  Medicine is a lived 
reality not just something that happens alongside the life world (Moser, 2011).  John 
Law and Annemarie Mol among others address the multiplicities that are enacted in 
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practice.  Different discourses may emerge from different approaches, which is why 
a situated approach to knowledge is singular and specific, but includes multiplicity 
(Law, 2004, Mol, 2002). 
3.6 Enacted realities 
Enactment of realities allows for multiplicity and tensions.  Law and Singleton 
(2005) argue that ‘messy objects’ can be addressed using an epistemological or an 
ontological approach. Law defines ontology as  
The branch of philosophy concerned with what there is, with 
what reality out-there is composed of  
(Law, 2004:  162) 
Epistemology is concerned with how we acquire knowledge.   In an epistemological 
approach, variations are explained as different perspectives of a single knowable 
object.  There is a flexible reality that occurs in the transactions where different 
groups meet.  The aim of knowledge is to identify the real object hidden at the 
centre, which has distinct meanings for different people.  An ontological approach 
argues that instead of multiple interpretations, we should consider multiple objects, 
that are enacted into being.  In this approach different realities are enacted into being 
through practices, in complex relationships.  Realities sit side by side but are not 
contained together. 
Ontology-in-practice comes with objects that do not so much 
cohere but assemble 
(Mol, 2002: 150) 
Law and Lien  in their study of salmon fishing argue that empirical epistemology that 
looks at the ways knowledge is shaped, either theoretical or practical,  assumes that 
there is a stable object out there beyond human control, in this case a salmon.  It may 
be seen from different perspectives but there is ‘a salmon-reality: something outside 
practice for that practice to get to grips with’ (Law and Lien, 2010: 2).  They propose 
an alternative empirical ontology where realities are enacted in relations, so the 
emphasis changes to the effects of practice that constitute the realities of the salmon. 
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The practices may be different but they are not totally separate, they interfere and 
overlap with each other. 
For Law, what is made real, whether that is a statement, a disease, or technical object 
is always in relationship to what is absent, absence helps to constitute presence.  He 
defines two types of absence; manifest absence, which is recognised, and otherness, 
which is enacted as irrelevant or impossible and therefore disappears e.g. the 
organisation of health care.  If the focus is on practice there will always be 
multiplicity, choices will be made; Law (2004) prefers to talk about method 
assemblage that is about the crafting of boundaries between presence and absence. 
In post-structuralism presence by itself is impossible: 
presence necessitates absence. In research practice this 
suggests that some things (for instance research findings and 
texts) are present but at the same time other things are being 
rendered absent. But what? The answer is: two kinds of 
things. One: whatever we are studying and describing, our 
object of research. And two, other absences that are hidden, 
indeed repressed. Othered. 
(Law, 2006: 3 emphasis in original) 
An inscription device is a system such as an apparatus that changes a material into a 
figure or diagram.  It is understood to have a direct relationship to the matter 
represented, and so the process involved is bracketed out (Latour and Woolgar, 
1986).  Medical textbooks make visible a set of aetiological, physiological and 
anatomical relations and effects, using the inscription devices of paragraphs, figures, 
drawings and references. The realities are created and the process of constructing 
them is concealed. The social only appears in science when mistakes are made, for 
example people are blamed for something going wrong rather than the method 
(Latour and Woolgar, 1986). 
Fractionality is  
a metaphor for expressing the idea that objects, subjects and 
realities…..are more than one and less than many   
(Law, 2004: 160).   
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Mol (2002) calls this multiplicity.  A number of strategies may be employed to 
produce singularity when fractitionality occurs.  These relate the different realities to 
each other and include the creation of a single smooth narrative to account for the 
variety, establishing hierarchies and rationalisation.  What Law describes as non-
perspectival strategies, include keeping incompatible realities apart in mutually 
exclusive sites, either in space, time or both, or they may be added together to create 
a different object.  Mol (Berg and Mol, 1998b, Mol, 2002) lists similar options 
available in what she would call multiplicity of realities  These include mapping 
different realities onto each other to form virtual objects, privileging one object and 
finding reasons for, or glossing over differences, using a third measure to arbitrate, or 
focussing on practicalities.  She argues that ’medicine is not a coherent whole’ (Berg 
and Mol, 1998b: 3) and if practices do hang together it is a social construction. 
3.7 The body multiple 
My starting point is clinical practice, and a theory that best describes the 
complexities of medical practice to me is Annemarie Mol’s ‘the body multiple’ (Mol, 
2002).  It reflects the hegemony of health care practice, rather than assuming that all 
practice is standardized. In a variety of disciplines, medical discourses are seen as 
objectifying and oppressive to patients, this opposition to biomedicine can mean that 
bodies in social theory are only considered as a social issue (Pols, 2011). 
Mol uses the term ‘the body multiple’ as a framework for her ethnography of 
atherosclerosis, which she describes as more than one, but less than many.  She is 
interested in how a disease is enacted in various practices, rather than from different 
perspectives.  The use of ‘perspectives’ suggests that the number of people multiply 
but that the disease entity is singular.  Mol argues that the disease entity varies to 
some extent in each clinical encounter; it is enacted with the co-operation of both 
patient and clinician.   Despite some of the recent changes that were discussed in the 
previous chapter, the use of the term disease is normally left to medicine, while 
social science concerns itself with illness.  I am a nurse, and have been steeped in 
medical terminology, but I also have a background in social sciences and have found 
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Mol’s approach to be useful in looking at the practice of hallucinations by mental 
health professionals, people with dementia and carers. 
In The body multiple,  Mol (2002) studied a disease, atherosclerosis, in a single 
hospital but her framework has been used in wider contexts.  In a study of obesity,  
Throsby (2011) examined enactments of obesity both inside and outside medical 
contexts.  My study looked at enactments of hallucinations in dementia within a 
community mental health context that included enactments of people with 
hallucinations and dementia, their carers and nurses. 
Mol tells the story of multiple enactments of atherosclerosis 
The word ‘is’ used here is a localized term.  Ontology in 
medical practice is bound to a specific site and situation 
(Mol, 2002:  55) 
The enactment of a disease differs from a study of a disease where an object of 
knowledge is the focal point of different perceptions.   A singular knowable object 
called hallucinations in dementia would probably be a definition of a disjuncture 
with consensus reality.  The body multiple refutes the idea that a disease is a single 
object.   In Mol’s study, atherosclerosis is enacted in different sites such as a 
pathology laboratory, and between a clinician and a patient.   In clinical settings and 
outside the medical domain, a multiplicity of hallucinations is enacted. 
Like Law, Mol contends that talking about perspectives suggests a pre-existing 
object that can be known, rather than a disease enacted through encounters in various 
practices and sites   
objects come into being-and disappear-with the practices in 
which they are manipulated .  And since the object of 
manipulation tends to differ from one practice to another, 
reality multiplies 
(Mol, 2002: 5). 
I find this idea more helpful than the multiple perspectives of different realities as it 
offers a better explanation of the nature of hallucinations in dementia.  Realities are 
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not given and stable, but are continual enactments that may be the same or slightly 
different (Moser, 2008). It may be tempting to describe a hallucination as a loss of 
contact with reality, but as a clinician I have often experienced some common reality 
with people with hallucinations.  In the body multiple Mol demonstrates how a 
disease, atherosclerosis, which does not initially appear to contest common-sense 
reality is not singular. How then can dementia in which even Alzheimer’s disease is 
enacted differently in the laboratory and the clinic where ‘the biomedical version is 
not necessarily sovereign’ (Moser, 2008: 103) be a singular disease? 
there are different and changing versions of Alzheimer’s 
disease, there are gradients of definiteness and realness, and 
(that) these realities co-exist  
(Moser, 2008: 104 italics in original) 
The nun study is a longitudinal research study of an order of Catholic nuns that 
examined ageing and Alzheimer’s disease.  It illustrates some non-coherence in 
pathological understanding of Alzheimer’s disease. A number of nuns presented no 
clinical signs of Alzheimer’s disease in life but autopsies showed plaques and tangles 
and vice versa (Snowdon, 2001).  Although the reality of Alzheimer’s disease in the 
laboratory may be in neurological changes, Alzheimer’s disease elsewhere can be 
very different.  Dementia is also re-enacted outside the clinical environment, as 
something that robs people of their selves, reducing them to empty shells, and as a 
drain on the health and social care resources of the country.  People with dementia 
are challenging this view by writing blogs, speaking at conferences and contributing 
to political debate about strategy (Swaffer, 2013, Scottish Dementia Working Group, 
2013, DASNI, 2013, European Working Group, 2013). 
Mol and Law both move the debate from epistemology to ontology.  ‘The shift is 
from epistemology (where what is known depends on perspective) to ontology (what 
is known is also being made differently)’(Law and Urry, 2004:  397).  Their thinking 
challenges three dualisms of human v non-human, knowing subject v passive object 
and social v nature (Law 2004).  Objects are usually assumed to be static until caused 
to change.  Disease changes from an object within the body to different ontologies of 
medical knowledge that are enacted in different sites within the hospital.   
 
Situating knowledge 
  58 
knowledge is no longer treated primarily as referential, as a 
set of statements about reality, but as a practice that interferes 
with other practices.  It therefore participates in reality 
(Mol, 2002: 153) 
Variables are not stable in the body multiple but they change from one site to 
another.  Mol argues there are ‘interferences’ between enactments.   
According to Mol coordination, distribution and inclusion are the three main ways in 
which different enactments of a disease hold together.  If a disease is no longer a 
single object but becomes many objects in the sites in which it is enacted, neither 
does it become fragmented because somehow all these objects hang together and 
become less rather than many. 
Despite their multiplicity, they do cohere making more than one and less than many.  
These realities can be co-ordinated in a number of ways so that differences are 
levelled out in order to form a single disease.  They include addition, as in addition 
of test results with a hierarchy established in the case of conflict and calibration 
where practices are made equivalent. 
I am aware that despite my use of the term hallucinations they have appeared 
differently in diverse people I have known living with dementia.  Sometimes they 
change within the same person so that I have been unclear whether this is a 
hallucination, a misperception or a ‘false belief’  
the connections are slippery: they elude one’s cognitive 
grasp, and the illusion of meaningfulness is like that found in 
a blurred or shifting puzzle picture the content of which 
seems to change as you try to define it or get it into focus. 
(Gillett, 2004: 23)  
It is a term I may dispute with people who do not work within mental health, but I 
am fairly sure that it is a term that my ex-colleagues and I would use as short hand 
and would have similar understandings. We would ‘talk about a single object’ (Law, 
2004: 50).  Mol describes the use of such a terms as a co-ordinating mechanism that 
‘bridges the boundaries between the sites over which the disease is situated’ (Mol, 
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2002: 113).    She uses the spatial metaphor of distribution because the disease is 
enacted differently in different sites.  Incompatible objects may be enacted but a 
shared ontology is not needed for medical treatment.  Differences are not just about 
disagreements between individuals, but can be about an individual altering their 
frame of reference in different sites and situations.  Mol does not advocate 
homogenization, nor is she suggesting pluralist disintegration, but the necessity to 
examine how differences are handled in various sites and situations.  There was a 
point in this research process when I struggled with the notion of such separate 
realities that I wondered if it would ever be possible to reconcile my reality with 
someone who hallucinates despite my clinical experience of such possibilities.  I 
turned into the Red Queen in ‘Through the looking glass’  
Why sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible 
things before breakfast 
(Carroll, 1993: 193) 
Pre supposition of a single object requires work to co-ordinate, in order to reduce 
controversies.  There is general agreement that people should be treated as a whole 
rather than as a part of the body, but how much of a whole, Mol describes the 
possibility of ever increasing circles of patient, family, and community.  This 
suggests a model of inclusion and hierarchy but when examining practices the 
hierarchical relationship disappears. Treatment decisions are not just based on the 
state of the diseased part of the body, but other factors sit alongside including social 
factors.  Mol points out that this does not necessarily mean that they are done well. 
Objects assemble rather than cohering as part of a stable object. 
I find Mol’s description of the tensions and doubts that exist in clinical medicine 
resonates with my experience and a useful concept to hold on to as I think about the 
data that is constructed within my study.  This idea of tensions and doubts does not 
mean that there is ‘permanent chaos’, however, as ‘tensions are tamed’ (p181) and 
realities are co-ordinated through addition, translation, distribution and inclusion.  
For my study all this discussion of slippery boundaries and body multiple means that 
I am not studying a single object, but a shifting dynamic that requires a loose 
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approach to method.  I am not however assuming that the people I interviewed have 
different perspectives of the same object, but am assuming that multiple objects are 
enacted in practice, and there is something that connects all our multiplicities. 
Mol’s body multiple shifts the realities of disease onto enactments in practice. Within 
the mental health practice from which this study originated, an integral component of 
that practice is care.  Care and ethics are also situated in practice, and care is 
theorised in the next two sections, in Mol’s logic of care, and in ethics of care. 
 
3.7.1 Logic of Care 
Mol addresses the current rhetoric of choice in healthcare in her book ‘The logic of 
care’ (2008).  In the previous chapter I discussed the competing political agendas of 
evidence –based medicine and public participation, Mol takes some of these 
considerations in a different direction.  She makes a powerful argument, contrasting 
a logic of choice with a logic of care.  Her argument is not that professional 
knowledge should dominate, and professionals should provide care to passive 
patients but that care is shaped in everyday practice in site specific situations. I 
believe with Habers et al (2002) that ‘good’ care values long term relationships 
rather than one off incidents, especially in dementia care.  My clinical practice did 
not fit into the language of choice as much as the language of living well with a 
disease within relationships.  People do not choose to live with dementia, if they 
were offered the choice they would choose to live without it. Kate Swaffer  (Swaffer, 
2013) writes in her blog post about living with dementia and losing control 
I have to’adapt to’ my new and evolving limitations. I have 
not choice. I have lost control. It is better to accept these facts 
than rail against them for too long  
Mol (2008) argues that control of the body is not an option when living with 
diabetes, but that one needs instead  to be attentive to one’s body.  This is also the 
situation for many people with dementia, they may lose control of aspects of their 
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Favoring care  not choice risks the criticism that what is being advocated is the 
patronization of people with disabilities who are not to be given the same choice as 
‘us’ (Barnes, 2012).  It may initially seem counterintuitive to reject choice especially 
in a field where people with dementia have been so thoroughly denied choice in the 
recent past, but Mol’s contention is that choice and care have different logics.  Her 
illustrations of the arguments made through the lives of real people living with 
diabetes, situate them squarely in practice.  The practices of care are embodied and 
diverse and  
good care (is) persistent tinkering in a world full of complex 
ambivalence and shifting tensions 
(Mol et al., 2010: 14) 
Mol’s claim is that choice is based on the assumption that ‘we’ in the West are all 
autonomous individuals, as opposed to the ‘other’ who live collectively.  This 
homogeneic view of the ‘other’ has been disputed by post-colonialists and care 
ethicists amongst others (Saïd, 1978, Spivak, 1988, Tronto, 1993).  Post-colonialists 
criticize this view as a caricature that reinforces the depiction of Western man as 
modern, rational and civilized as opposed to the Other, which is romanticized as 
irrational, weak and feminine (Saïd, 1978).  The argument of the care ethicists is 
discussed in the next section.  The idea of the individual continues to inform the ideal 
of choice. 
The logic of choice can be associated with the market, where patients become 
customers, weighing up the goods presented by a clinician, who provides 
information, enabling the patient to make a one off choice.  They make one choice 
and then have to live with this choice, meaning that if it is wrong they will be 
blamed.  It ignores the ongoing activity of the person with the disease.  The logic of 
care, however, recognizes that care is a process where people who live in 
relationships, and clinicians work together to improve the practicalities of living with 
a disease, which may be erratic.  This reflects my practice as a nurse and I hope I 
continued it into my research relationships.  My study explored how people lived 
with dementia and hallucinations. 
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The practice of care is non-coherent, it may involve different priorities at different 
times, in clinical practice the priority may be about biomedicine at one time, at 
another it may be about spending time with people or relatives 
care is about finding the least worst ways of putting different 
and non-coherent versions of the good together.  It is about 
holding the goods together for the moment in the full 
knowledge: that cut across one another: that they are in 
tension: and that they do not fit 
(Law et al., 2013: 15 Italics in original) 
Living with a disease in this way allows for flexibility, if something does not work 
the patient is not blamed, but perhaps another approach can be tried.  There are 
professional and ethical arguments for good care but both need to be integrated 
together within daily practice (Habers et al., 2002).   
Professionals bring a knowledge that should be used in dialogue with the particular 
knowledge of the person living with the condition (Barnes, 2012).  Responsiveness is 
an integral part of ethic of care (Tronto, 1993).  It also recognizes the care work 
being done by patients; there are people with dementia who recognize that they get 
tired easily and so limit their activities, or who know they may get lost going out so 
only go on certain routes, or go out with other people.   
3.8 Care and ethics 
Ethics of care has brought care into the agenda of ethics.  People are not seen as 
autonomous individuals but as living in relationships in specific situations. Care is a 
contested concept within our society, despite its ubiquity within everyday discourse 
(Barnes, 2012).  Recent debate in the media about care in hospitals illustrates this 
only too vividly (Guardian, 2013).   Concerns about poor care in a hospital in 
Stafford became a public scandal.  Objects of blame for the failings at the hospital 
have ranged from individual nurses who are unable to care, to government policy 
that is dismantling the NHS.   Despite the recent controversies, understanding of care 
is fragmented, and various types of care continue to be apportioned different worth 
within our society (Tronto, 1993).   
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An ethic of care approach addresses ethics as situated within a concrete situation 
rather than as abstract principles (Shakespeare, 2000).  Care is ubiquitous throughout 
the lived experience of life, and has been a major consideration of my clinical work 
with both people with dementia and carers.  Many of the people with whom I worked 
are living in interdependent situations with others, and no-one can be seen as an 
individual divorced from their social contexts.  It is also an essential element of the 
ethical framework that I used throughout my research.  In the world of clinical 
practice it is rarely possible to use the straightforward approach of adopting a 
universal principle, there are always undertows pulling in different directions 
(Hughes, 2011). 
Care-work is perceived as encompassing a narrow range of activities, is gendered 
and devalued.  It is associated with women and traditionally belongs in the private 
realm (Thomas, 2007, Twigg, 2004).  It is viewed as dirty work, involving bodily 
fluids that rightly belong in private space. The public realm belongs to ‘higher 
aspects’ of disembodied, rational and male values (Twigg, 2004).  It is however 
being relocated out with the home with more caring being done by care workers.  
Alongside a shift in the focus of medicine from cure to care, this has led to caring  
becoming more of a social and political issue (Sevenhuijsen, 2003).  Older people are 
expected to live well into old age,  they are aware of the risks that arise from being 
seen as dependent (Lloyd, 2004, Ward and Gahagan, 2010) and people with 
dementia in particular are described as part of a global epidemic that will impose a 
significant socioeconomic burden on society.  
Originating in political activism, the disability movement grew in response to a 
perceived need by people with disabilities to address the social oppression that 
resulted from being marked as different.  The advocacy movements in mental health 
and dementia are now joining this debate but not everyone with dementia is able to 
embrace the right to choice in this political way.  As Barnes (2012) points out there 
may be a danger that we create a different boundary around those of us who are 
valued as autonomous individuals. 
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The disability movement offers a different perspective on caring, claiming that care 
results in other people trying to dominate their lives.  They would contest the 
attribution of dependence, which is a devalued status, but not deny support needs 
(Thomas, 2007).  Tom Shakespeare (2000) advocates the use of the term ‘help’ 
rather than care because of its contested and value-laden associations.  Help removes 
the emotional component of care and although I understand the thinking behind this 
argument, I am not sure how useful it is to try to remove the emotional and relational 
aspects of a care relationship. An ethic of care framework replaces the potential for 
paternalism with the need for responsiveness and trust within care (Tronto, 1993, 
Sevenhuijsen, 2003). 
Care can also be associated with emotions that are gendered, but it is difficult to 
imagine any interaction without an affective component.  Primacy is given to 
relationships within psychotherapy (Bondi, 2008) and I would also contend within 
mental health nursing.  My study uses a process consent method (Dewing, 2007), 
discussed in the next chapter in which the relationship between the researcher and 
participants is integral.  Dementia care has increasingly recognised the importance of 
the social context for the experience of the person living with dementia (Kitwood, 
1997, Sabat, 2001). 
The goals of healthcare used to be the attainment of health but with the changing 
nature of prevalent diseases it is now more likely to be care.  Care has been 
complicated by the agenda of the lived experience of the disease and shifting balance 
of much of the work of healthcare to chronic disease management (Mol, 2006).   
People may be active for longer or may need social care as well as medical care 
(Sevenhuijsen, 2003). There is currently no cure for dementia, but there has been a 
change in practice towards giving people an earlier diagnosis.  A division between 
cure and care is artificial, in practice they intersect.  Medical interventions or good 
care may well be devised to enable people to live the best way possible for them, 
with their condition, whether that be diabetes or dementia (Mol, 2008).  Barnes 
(2012) points out that not all care is good care, people get it wrong, both paid care 
workers and friends and family.  This does not mean that the use of the term should 
be discontinued, although perhaps that we should be more evaluative in our use of 
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the term.  Mol  (2008) agrees that centring on care does not mean that all practice is 
good, but does not believe it will necessarily improve by advocating a policy of 
patient choice. 
3.8.1 Care and autonomy 
Both logic of care and ethics of care challenge the prevalent discourse of autonomy 
and individuality (Mol, 2008, Barnes, 2012). Harrigan & Gillett (2009) highlight that 
the notion of autonomy is based in the modernist view of individualism, which 
disadvantages those who are impaired.  They cite the view of Kitwood who thought 
individualism was valued at the expense of individuality and argue that there is a 
need to value the more situated, relational self, a ‘being-in-the-midst-of-others’ p52. 
Debates about autonomy go to the heart of the question of what is a person.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this can result in the devaluation of the person with 
dementia and their re-ordering as non-persons within our society.   
Care offers a counterbalance to a perspective that emphasises 
the cognitive and rational dimension of what it is to be 
human 
(Barnes, 2012:  12) 
It offers a different perspective to that of the ‘hypercognitive society’ described by 
Stephen Post (2000). 
Challenges to autonomy also come from a variety of cultural perspectives (Hulko 
and Stern, 2009, Tsai, 2009).  Different cultures have different views of how a 
person is constituted, and also how decisions should be made, suggesting that 
autonomy and decision-making are socially constructed.  Feminist perspectives have 
similarly questioned the idea that autonomy should be prized more highly than 
relational values in achieving well-being (Gilligan, 1982). 
Autonomy neglects social and interrelational contexts, in which decisions are made 
in ordinary life, and disadvantages those with dementia who may require help to 
achieve autonomy (O'Connor et al., 2009, Jaworska, 1999).  The Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics (2009) report on ethical issues in dementia points out that people do not 
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make decisions in isolation and recommends that joint decision making, where 
appropriate, should be an approach incorporated into the codes of practice of the 
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act  and the English Mental Capacity Act.  
3.8.2 Ethics of care 
Following its beginnings in feminist psychology, ethics of care has extended into 
political philosophy, care is not just seen as a personal but also as a political concern 
(Brown et al., 1989, Gilligan, 1982, Gilligan, 1998, Barnes, 2012).  Ethics of care 
informs both my thinking and the practice of my research.  Ethics of care originates 
in the psychological theories of moral development in the work of Carol Gilligan 
(1982).  Gilligan concluded that moral reasoning is gendered, reaching a different 
conclusion from her colleague Kohlberg who described the development of a 
universal justice ethic.  Gilligan argued that women speak ‘in a different voice’. 
According to her study, women’s voices revealed judgements that were in general 
based on contextual reasoning rather than considering some abstract dilemma.  
Although Gilligan has been criticised for being essentialist, her work has been hugely 
influential, and has been widely cited in academic literature that has considered 
feminist ethical ideas (Tronto, 1993). 
Feminist care ethicists and disability rights campaigners have both argued against the 
false dichotomy between care and justice (Sevenhuijsen, 2003, Tronto, 1993, Barnes, 
2012, Shakespeare, 2000) .  Shakespeare calls for a dialectic between the two with a 
commitment to the re-situating of welfare into an ethics agenda that would allow for 
justice and compassion, and rights and care.  
The extension  of ethics of care into the philosophical and political arena by Tronto 
(1993) in her seminal book ‘Moral Boundaries’ has broadened the debate, from a 
gendered issue, into the moral dimensions of care and caring relationships as 
practice.  Tronto’s definition of care which she developed with Berenice Fisher is 
wide ranging 
On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed 
as a species activity that includes everything that we do to 
maintain, continue , and repair our ‘world’ so that we can 
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live in it as well as possible.  That world includes our bodies, 
our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to 
interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web. 
(Tronto, 1993:  103.  Italics in original) 
Ethics of care has provided a framework to examine care in policy (Sevenhuijsen, 
2003),  a variety of caring relationships and settings (Barnes, 2012) including 
dementia care (Brannelly, 2006, Brannelly, 2011), and research practice (Ward and 
Gahagan, 2010). 
Ethics of care contests the concepts of the person as an autonomous individual with a 
desire for self-determination, that as I have argued has implications for the way that 
vulnerable people such as people with dementia are valued in society. 
Care ethics offers a relational, interdependent view of human beings.  We are all 
relational beings, but care needs may become more overt when we are vulnerable. 
Care offers a counterbalance to a perspective that emphasises 
the cognitive and rational dimension of what it is to be 
human 
(Barnes, 2012: 14) 
Our need for care in everyday life is hidden in an agenda that values autonomy, and 
associates the expression of a need for care with being a less than whole person.  
Being identified as in need of care, is viewed as being dependent, and therefore of 
less worth  (Barnes, 2012). 
Tronto (1993) describes four phases of care with the moral elements or values 
involved. 
Caring about and Attentiveness recognises that there is a need for care.  In Tronto’s 
opinion this requires us to attend to the need for care more widely than just amongst 
the people we know. It includes a societal approach, and at the same time recognises 
a need for self-care.  As Barnes (2012) argues a belief that people are autonomous 
individuals makes attentiveness less likely.   
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Taking care of and Responsibility comprise willingness and a capacity to act.  She 
distinguishes responsibility from formal duties or obligations.   It involves seeing a 
need and acting on it, providing a more flexible approach than prescribing the 
obligations to care within specific relationships. 
Care giving and Competence require resources, including knowledge, to ensure that 
care needs are met.  Care is competent if it is good care, Tronto does not think bad 
care should be described as care. 
Care receiving and Responsiveness highlights the interaction involved in care.  The 
meaning to the care receiver, of the care given, is vital to care.  It underlines 
vulnerabilities and potentiality for abuse.   
Selma Sevenhuijsen (2003) added the further element of trust to Tronto’s categories.  
Trust is bound up with power and responsibility and requires a willingness to be 
open to the other. 
Brannelly (2006, 2011) has used an ethic of care framework to evaluate ethical 
practice within dementia care.  This skilfully illustrates the complexities involved in 
caring for people with dementia within relationships.  Hearing the voice of the 
person with dementia can be compromised by their disabilities, the systems of care 
and the prevalent discourse of caregiver burden that leads to the needs of the 
professional or carer being met before that of the person with dementia.  Conflicts 
can arise within dementia care and good care requires a continuous process of 
negotiation with all members of the caring network (Barnes and Brannelly, 2008). 
3.9 Summary 
In this chapter I have considered theoretical approaches towards understanding 
complexities.  I have looked at various ways that boundaries are transgressed, 
challenging the view that we can achieve a ‘view from nowhere’.  The work of John 
Law and Annemarie Mol contest the use of perspectives as an explanation of 
different realities and instead ground differences within ontology.  Realities are 
enacted in practice, so knowledge is always partial and situated.   
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Law et al. (2013) remind us to be wary of grand narratives.  They argue that there is 
little permanence within care practice; it can be variable and non-coherent.   Good 
care is about managing uncertainties that are in tension.  Multiple realities that may 
not cohere can still be held together through practice.  Care involves ‘tinkering’ 
(Mol, 2008), acknowledging multiplicity, and managing the tensions that exist within 
differing knowledges.   
Attending to practices means working empirically and I did this through case studies 
as described in the next chapter.  My understanding of hallucinations in dementia is 
that they are enacted differently in practice by professionals.  They never achieve 
unity but they are somehow connected so they are ‘more than one- but less than 
many’ (Mol, 2002: 55). 
Ethics of care extends the literature on carer burden and situates the person cared for, 
and the carer, within a symbiotic relationship.  It argues that people exist within a 
network of relationships, and this informed my research design of a triadic case study 
with a person with dementia, a carer and a mental health professional.  Ethics of care 
recognises the importance of care in relationships rather than losing sight of it, it 
argues against the individualism (Barnes, 2012) that has devalued people with 
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4 Research design 
In this chapter I discuss the design of the study from its inception, identification of 
research issues through the design and process of conducting the research to 
analysing the data.  Law (2004) warns against seeing method as clear and precise 
when the world it tries to capture is messy. Social research methods have not dealt 
well with objects that may be transitory, complex and multiple.  My journey was not 
straightforward and I include reflections on the challenges I encountered, both with 
practicalities and to my self-conception as a nurse and researcher along the way. 
4.1 Developing the design 
Previous studies of hallucinations in dementia have been epidemiological and large 
scale clinical trials.  They have not included the perspective of the person with 
dementia. I did not want to study hallucinations but the experience of people with 
hallucinations; I wanted to explore the particular not the general. It was evident to me 
from the start that this was going to be a qualitative study.  Statistical studies see 
people as passive in the face of variables (Frank, 2000), I believe that people are 
situated and relational.   My practice has been based on establishing therapeutic 
relationships with individuals within their networks.   I wished to maintain the way I 
have always worked with people with dementia.  As with much qualitative research 
my design decisions were made at the start but they were affected by the research 
practice and context (Mason, 2002). 
My understanding of hallucinations in dementia was situated in community mental 
health care.  My belief was that hallucinations occurred primarily as a result of 
changes within the brain, caused by dementia, but that they could be exacerbated by 
environmental and interpersonal factors.   They were often a reason for referral to 
community mental health teams and these understandings influenced my design.  
The primary aim of the study was to explore differing realities of hallucinations of 
people with dementia, their carers and community mental health professionals.  A 
research design links the original questions to be asked with the data to be collected 
(Yin, 2009).  This sounds deceptively easy until the complexity of the subject matter 
is considered.  Jennifer Mason (2011) paints an image of capturing a butterfly that 
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loses its essence when pinned down in order to enable us to study it.  This notion of 
the ephemeral, which changes when it is captured is akin to Gillett’s (2003) 
description of psychotic phenomena as a slippery concept.  The previous chapter 
discussed elusive objects and non-coherence as understandings of ontology, and also 
of hallucinations. 
I considered using ethnography for my study but the practicalities involved in 
observation of people who live at home would make it too intrusive.  People who 
hallucinate do not necessarily do so constantly, nor do they experience hallucinations 
at regular times of the day.  I was unable to observe the practices of my participants 
when they experience hallucinations and so I was reliant on their narratives, they 
become the ethnographers. 
There is a need to find methods that have various vantage points to expand sensory 
dimensions (Back, 2012).  Taking this into account, I used some illustrations 
alongside interviews from different sources-the person with dementia, their carer and 
their mental health nurse.  The study was designed to elicit in-depth information 
from people, and in-depth interviews were the main method of collecting data.   
4.1.1 Research issues 
My research issues emerged, grew and changed focus throughout the data collection.   
My initial research questions were 
 How do people with dementia describe their experiences of hallucinations? 
 What are the understandings of carers and professionals of hallucinations in 
dementia? 
 How are reality disjunctures negotiated in caring relationships? 
 How do people with dementia and their carers co-construct identity when 
disrupted by reality disjunctures? 
These could be described as foreshadowed questions.  They changed during initial 
fieldwork and with my reading.    My understanding of Mol (2002) and Law (2006, 
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2004) and the particular data from my participants led to my research issues as 
follows 
 How do hallucinations affect the daily lives of people with dementia? 
 Do hallucinations impact on the self identity of people with dementia? 
 How do the multiple practices of dementia and hallucinations hang together? 
A case study celebrates the particular rather than looking for certainty (Simons, 
1996) and is therefore an appropriate methodology for the study of something as 
uncertain as hallucinations. 
   
4.2 Case study 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Case study has been used since at least the time of Socrates and has continually been 
disputed as less valuable than general theoretical knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
Flyvbjerg (2006) tackles five misunderstandings about case study in his frequently 
cited article.  He counters understandings of case study that refute its validity and 
reliability as a method.  A common argument against case study is that it cannot be 
used to generalize.  Flyvbjerg’s response to this is 
One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the 
case study may be central to scientific development via 
generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods. 
But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of 
scientific development, whereas “the force of example” is 
underestimated. 
 (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 228) 
4.2.2 Traditions of case history in psychological medicine 
Historically, case studies have been used in diverse disciplines for different purposes, 
and most people would argue that professional case histories are different from case 
study research (Simons, 2009).  Case histories are familiar to me through medicine 
and psychotherapy and although not necessarily used for research, they are certainly 
used for teaching purposes and presentation of new treatment approaches.  The 
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original description of Alzheimer’s disease was published as a case study (Maurer et 
al., 1997).  They are still valued in medicine as having scientific value and serve as 
an adjunct to randomised controlled trials.  Case history in medicine, however, 
normally follows a formalised structure, with an invisible narrator telling the story of 
the patient in a detached manner (Hornstein, 2012).  The role of the doctor as an 
instrument is ignored resulting in the presentation of the case as ‘objective’ (Simons, 
2009).   
Since the time of Freud case studies have been employed in psychotherapy as a way 
of documenting and disseminating new forms of therapy and developing practice  
(McLeod, 2010).  Radley and Chamberlain (2001)  argue that case study should be 
used in social science research by health psychologists because of their ‘dual 
relationships’ as researchers and practitioners.  I would contend the same argument 
applies in nursing research.   
Although case studies may differ from case histories, Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that 
people learn and become expert practitioners through context dependent knowledge.   
Case presentations are used to re-present the initial presentation of the patient to the 
doctor.  As Hunter goes on to highlight 
The case presentation is the fundamental medium of clinical 
thought and discourse  
(Hunter, 1992: 68) 
4.2.3 Case study research  
There are many definitions of case study research and a variety of methods can be 
used but its main feature is that a social unit is studied as a whole. The definitions 
have different emphases: for Stake (1995) the stress is on the singularity of the case 
and for Yin (2009) it is the real life context, but they are all committed to complexity 
and contextuality (Simons, 2009, Sabat, 2001).   According to Simons 
 ‘case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple 
perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness ….in a real 
life context’  
(Simons, 2009: 21)  
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 Case study is appropriate when studying phenomena in depth and in context 
especially where there may be difficulty in differentiating between phenomena and 
their context (Yin, 2009). 
Stake (1995) describes three types of case study, whilst acknowledging that it can be 
difficult to differentiate 
 Intrinsic case where the interest is in the particular case 
 Instrumental case where insight into the subject of interest is achieved by 
studying a particular case 
 Collective case study in which several cases are chosen to study the 
instrumental 
I chose to study the experience of hallucinations in collective cases.  The cases were 
also triadic, involving a person with dementia, carer and mental health nurse.  A 
psychotherapy case consists of an episode in which a person or family group receive 
help from a therapist (McLeod, 2010).  I am borrowing the triad from a therapy case 
although am not studying the therapeutic intervention directly.  Community mental 
health nurses work with people within family units and this informs my choice of 
triad. 
The outcome of a case study is a case description and descriptions of each of my 
triadic cases are presented in the following three chapters. 
Case study and narrative are often linked and in the following section I discuss my 
decision to use a narrative approach within my case studies. 
4.3 Narrative 
 ‘Case studies often contain a substantial element of 
narrative’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001 p84).  
Case studies produce narrative knowledge, stories are told about the everyday within 
cases (McLeod, 2010).  Medicine is full of stories that are told daily, stories are told 
by patients to health professionals, doctors tell stories about patients within formal 
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settings such as case conferences or informal settings, talking amongst themselves 
(Atkinson, 1981, Hunter, 1992). 
I am interested in their experience of hallucinations, but recognise that this occurs 
within the context of a lifetime of experience that may well affect the hallucinations.  
I hope that the narratives of the people involved in the study also tell something of 
groups of people with dementia who hallucinate, their impact within relationships 
with others, and the effects this may have on their identity within the wider society.  I 
have always been sure that I wanted to use narrative in some way for this research, 
but I started from a naive notion of narrative.  One of the most rewarding aspects of 
my work had been listening to the stories people told me, and I felt that this was an 
important aspect of both establishing, and maintaining a relationship. Listening to the 
individual stories that patients tell has long been an important feature of medicine 
and comparing those individual stories to others, assists doctors in identifying the 
correct diagnosis and treatment (Stake, 1995, Frank, 2000).   This does not 
necessarily mean that the patient feels they have been listened to.  Perhaps the story 
told by the physician is not the one that they wish to have told, and it is certainly not 
the only story that can be told.  Medical narratives are, however, part of clinical life 
with more kudos gained for those who are able to tell a story well, and have an 
unusual story to tell (Atkinson, 1997, Atkinson, 1981).  
I hope to avoid the danger identified by Atkinson (1997) of valorising the lifeworld 
experience of the person with dementia and demonising the medical by using a 
triadic case study approach. Using the theoretical approach of Mol (2002) should 
also contribute to this.  If reality is seen as enacted in practice then it is firmly 
situated.  As she shows in her description of some of the encounters she witnessed, 
the atherosclerosis may be enacted in the doctor’s surgery as pain in the limbs, which 
results in a person having difficulty in shopping. 
I was fascinated by the life experiences of the older people with whom I worked, but 
realised it would not be enough to merely tell their story, again.  Atkinson (1997) 
warns against this as he points out there is a need to analyse the data.  The 
omnipresence of narrative throughout our culture, which is often associated with the 
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cult of the individual (Riessman, 2008), can lead to an assumption that narrative 
speaks for itself.   We can only know what is narrated and make our own 
interpretation of it, rather than knowing any ‘true authentic self’ through narrative.  
Narratives are, however, interpreted through an understanding of broader social 
structures (Doucet and Mauthner, 2008). 
Narrative research has become increasingly popular in social research over the past 
few decades, but as with so many conceptualizations in social research, the use of the 
term ‘narrative’ is diverse; perhaps there are many enactments of it.  It is not the sole 
provenance of social research; it is used in the humanities and is widespread in all 
public life. The term narrative is not reserved solely for interview data, narrative 
research is conducted using official and personal documents, such as diaries and 
letters, as well as visual images (Riessman, 2008, Quinn et al., 2012).  Narrative is 
often used synonymously with story, as Frank (2000 : 354) points out, it sounds 
strange to say I told a narrative, ‘people do not tell narratives, they tell stories’. 
Narratives are everywhere, they are how we make sense of the world, how we tell of 
our experiences, and how we tell of ourselves; we live in a ‘storied world’ 
(Riessman, 2008).  Stories are ubiquitous and are the fundamental way we 
communicate with each other.   Law (2004) would say that narratives are how we 
depict realities, and there is no single account.  When we are unable to make sense of 
the stories people with dementia tell us, this may contribute to the judgement that 
they are losing their identity.  The only reality we are recognising is-that of a 
damaged brain.   
Coinciding with the upsurge in illness narratives (Frank, 2000), there has been a rise 
in the number of narrative accounts of life stories, in studies of older people.   There 
have been a small quantity of narrative accounts of people with dementia (Sabat, 
2001, Crisp, 1995, McLean, 2006). 
Alongside the narrative turn, there has been an interest in the concept of the ‘narrated 
subject’ (Doucet and Mauthner, 2008).  Somers (1994) argues that we come to know 
ourselves through narrative.  She contends that narrative should no longer be seen as 
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a representation but as something that is constitutive.  Narratives are rooted in time 
and space, and describe who we are and what we do.   Alongside this understanding 
is the argument that narrated subjects are relational (Stanley, 1993).  The previous 
chapter discussed an ethic of care approach and this relational view of narrated 
subjects reiterates the understanding that no one is an isolated self. 
Postmodernism has challenged and shattered meta-narratives, including a belief in 
the centrality of a core self (Gubrium and Holstein, 1994).  Despite this shift from the 
idea of a coherent unchanging self, towards a narrative self  (Holloway and 
Freshwater, 2007, Holstein and Gubrium, 2000), narratives of people with dementia 
may be treated with more suspicion. They can be viewed as less valid because of a 
perceived lack of coherence; they can clash with other scripts about dementia in 
which the person has lost touch with reality (McLean, 2006).  
I will now review my research questions in the light of the discussion of narrative 
4.3.1 Research questions revisited 
Accessing the experiences of others is notoriously difficult (Kendall & Scott), before 
adding an uncanny experience such as hallucinating.  The research was designed to 
address a gap in the literature, namely exploring the impact of hallucinations in 
dementia.  My approach to exploring these research questions was informed by both 
STS literature (Law, 2006, Law, 2004, Law and Mol, 2002, Mol, 2002, Mol, 2008), 
as discussed in the previous chapter, and narrative inquiry (Riessman, 2008, Hydén 
and Brockmeier, 2008).  There is ambiguity in the way that narrative is used in social 
science research (Polkinghorne, 1995).  It is used, often interchangeably with story, 
to describe the data that emerges from research, or it can be used to describe the form 
that research takes, and how it relates to sociocultural contexts.  I use it in both ways 
in this thesis, viewing the data from unstructured interviews, and Figure 5, as 
narrative, and also using a narrative method of data analysis. 
The study aimed to explore different realities of hallucinations in dementia.  I use 
‘realities’ not to suggest an objective, rational truth but as the flexible and multiple 
enactment of reality discussed in Section 3.6.  In Chapter 2 I discussed the multiple 
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narratives of dementia, some encompass the same ground, but there can be 
differences between specific contexts.  Hallucinations are internal experiences that 
cannot be observed but it is possible to listen to the narratives that emerge from these 
experiences.  I used a narrative approach to data analysis that enhanced my ability to 
listen to multiple voices (Section 4.10).  Narratives of people with dementia, carers 
and professionals were all elicited in this study but those of people with dementia 
were privileged.  Different realities are constructed that interact and interfere with 
each other. 
Bruner (1987) in his conceptualisation of ‘life as narrative’ argues that narrative 
knowledge differs from paradigmatic knowledge.   Both ways of knowing construct 
reality differently.  Paradigmatic knowledge traditionally categorises, moving from 
the particular to the general and the abstract whereas narrative knowledge attends to 
the particular (McLeod, 2010, Polkinghorne, 1995).  Care is also practised at the 
level of the specific, and my exploration of hallucinations in dementia is based in an 
ethic of care approach that conceptualises care as occurring within relationships. 
My first research question addresses how the daily lives of people are affected by 
hallucinations. 
‘A storied narrative is the linguistic form that preserves the 
complexity of human action with its interrelationship of 
temporal sequence...and changing interpersonal and 
environmental contexts’  
(Polkinghorne, 1995: p7) 
Narratives are an elemental way that we make meaning, life is storied (Flyvbjerg, 
2001, Somers, 1994, Robertson, 2013).  This includes making sense of illness  
(Frank, 1997, Bury, 2005, Bury, 1982, Bury, 2001), as discussed in Section 2.5 and 
also within clinical practice  (Atkinson, 1981, Hunter, 1992).  Within the context of 
my first question, I anticipated storied accounts to emerge from my research 
interviews, as narrative appears to be the only method humans have to describe lived 
time. We continuously interpret our experiences using narrative knowledge (Bruner, 
1987). 
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My concern with identity is premised on an assumption of narrative identity (Somers, 
1994).  Narrative identity is developed in interaction with a concept of self, and that 
of others (Steeman et al., 2011).  This understanding resonates with the self, 
conceptualised by Sabat (2002, 2001, Sabat and Harré, 1994), and that implicit in a 
voice centred relational analysis (Section 4.10).  This provided an analytic structure 
around the way people talked of themselves, their relationships and sociocultural 
contexts.  
My final question arose from my understandings of Mol (2002) and the idea of ‘The 
Body Multiple’ and care practices that hold non coherence together  (Law et al., 
2013). 
 
4.4 Ethical context 
In this section I will discuss the ethical procedures required for the study and also the 
way that ethics was produced within my research relationships. Ethics of care was 
discussed in the previous chapter and informed my ethical framework for this study.  
It highlights the situated nature of ethics, which happens through relationships. This 
includes both the conduct of the researcher and reciprocity.  Ethics is part of the 
whole research process; I do not believe that ethics should be a one off procedure and 
I strived to be an ethical researcher throughout the study.  My participants were 
recruited through the NHS, which meant there were certain institutional ethical 
procedures to which I had to adhere.  The procedure for ethical applications within 
the NHS are comprehensive, covering any conceivable research study and tend to be 
orientated towards medical quantitative studies. 
4.4.1 Ethical and managerial approval 
This study recruited people who lived in their own homes but recruitment was via 
community mental health teams and also involved interviewing NHS staff, meaning 
that approval had to be sought through the NHS ethical procedure.  This was a two 
pronged process involving application to both the NHS ethical committee, and the 
local NHS Research and Development department. 
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People with dementia may be considered vulnerable, and issues of capacity and 
consent in research are complex.  Initial capacity to consent was part of my inclusion 
criteria, but I did not want to automatically exclude participants if this changed 
during the study. This required that I sought approval from the regional ethics 
committee that considers research involving people who do not have capacity. 
Ethical approval was granted in January 2011 and NHS Research and Development 
approval in April 2011.  I then had to get approval from managers to recruit from 
their sites.  This proved more elusive as my applications were made at a time of 
structural change to the service.  I contacted five managers by letter but received 
replies only after follow-up telephone calls or emails.  Responses varied in the 
procedures they then requested, from wanting me to contact local nurse managers to 
wanting me to contact consultant psychiatrists for their permission.  All this proved 
more protracted than I had anticipated and so it took until November 2011 until I 
managed to meet all the teams. 
4.4.2 Ethical procedures 
As previously stated I recruited only people who had capacity to consent to take part 
in research.  The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act provides a legal framework 
regarding capacity in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2002).  Within the Act one 
either has or does not have capacity. Thinking has shifted from a focus on the global 
assessment of capacity to a situation specific assessment, as recognised in the Adults 
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act.  O’Connor and Donnelly (2009) argue that there is a 
lack of agreement as to what this would look like in practice.  The guidelines for 
practice from The Mental Welfare Commission (2006) point out that capacity may 
fluctuate and that practitioners need to take into account emotional and experiential 
factors when patients make decisions.  
I relied on the gatekeepers, members of the community mental health teams to decide 
whether people had capacity to consent.   I developed a procedure to follow, should 
this change during the study (Appendix 1) as I did not want to automatically exclude 
them.  None of my participants did lose capacity during the study period. 
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Although recent legislation has clarified legal issues, the ethical issues relating to 
care and research with people with dementia remain complex.  The agenda of 
personhood and person-centred care, and an increase in social research that focuses 
on the experience of the person with dementia rather than the perspective of carers 
has resulted in new ethical challenges for both practitioners and researchers (Bartlett 
and Martin, 2002). 
4.4.3 Consent 
Consent is related to capacity and competency but these are not synonymous 
(O'Connor and Purves, 2009).  Informed consent is traditionally associated with  
 Understanding the information given about treatment or research  
 Appreciating the relevance of the information for one’s own situation  
 Evidencing the ability to make a choice  
 Communicating that choice 
The guidelines from The Mental Welfare Commission address the problem with 
definitions within the legislation as being one of memory and is of the view that  
The person should be able to retain information long enough 
to make a decision. In addition, we believe he/she must 
 Remember the decision: and/or 
 Make the same decision consistently given the same 
information: and/or 
 Agree with a record of that decision when presented 
with a record of it 
(Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, 2006: 9)  
Informed consent can pose problems within medicine as a whole, not just dementia 
and mental health. According to O’Neill (2003) issues of informed consent have 
been more widely debated in medicine over the past twenty-five years, which has 
been partially attributed to fear of litigation.  He agrees with some sociologists who 
have described practice for informed consent as a ritual that lacks consensus.  
O’Neill identifies the difficulties for medicine as  
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 Competence- medicine is more likely to come across issues of competence 
than other areas 
 These can be permanent or temporary as in the situation of someone who is 
unconscious 
 Public health situations- where informed consent from the whole population 
is impossible. 
 Treatment decisions- are often made on the basis of information about third 
parties who have not given consent, such as family history 
The informed consent process may cause difficulties for people with dementia in 
understanding, preference and information procedures (Vass et al., 2003).  Holt et al 
(2008) describe difficulties in recruiting people with delirium to studies because of 
the acute onset and fluctuating capacity.  Capacity may well fluctuate in people with 
dementia and this can be an issue especially for people who hallucinate. 
Informed consent as a one off process can pose difficulties for ethnographic research 
where there is an expectation that the nature of research will develop within a 
relationship and thick descriptions are sought.  This leads to questions as to what 
exactly the participant is agreeing to at the start of the research process (Parker, 
2007).   There have also been arguments that informed consent is based on the idea 
of individual autonomy, which as I discussed in the previous chapter can 
disadvantage people with dementia (O'Connor and Purves, 2009, Harrigan and 
Gillett, 2009). 
Murphy & Dingwall (2007) discuss some of the issues for informed consent and 
ethnographic research.  A discrete episode of informed consent is more appropriate 
to clinical trials or experiments but qualitative researchers can spend long periods in 
the field.  Consent is likely to be continuously negotiated and possibly extended as 
the relationship develops, based on trust.  Research design and focus within 
ethnographic research may be flexible so that only partial information can be given at 
the start of the study.  I tried to address some of these issues by using the consent 
flowchart and by adopting process consent throughout the study. 
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4.4.3.1 Process consent 
It is important that issues of consent are seen as part of a process, rather than a 
discrete one off event, especially within qualitative research where there is an on-
going relationship between researcher and interviewee (Bartlett and Martin, 2002, 
Dewing, 2002).  Process consent fitted with my ethic of care framework and I used it 
throughout the study. 
Process consent has been recommended as a good principle to be adopted in 
psychiatric nursing practice as well as qualitative research, including research with 
people with dementia.  It changes the focus from the ritual of informed consent to 
consent within relationships. This means monitoring consent throughout the research 
relationship (Usher and Arthur, 1998, Dewing, 2002, Keady et al., 2009).  Jan 
Dewing (2002, 2007) identifies five elements of consent within the research 
relationship  
 Background and preparation 
 Establish basis for consent 
 Initial consent 
 On-going consent monitoring 
 Feedback and support 
Consent was continuously negotiated throughout this study.  Potential participants 
were initially approached by members of the mental health teams who asked them 
for permission to give me their contact details. I contacted them by the method 
advised by the professional.  I then spent time with potential participants going over 
the study information sheet and the consent form (Appendices 2&4).  I was flexible 
in my approach to this, allowing the person with dementia to decide whether they 
wanted to do this alone or with someone else present.  The formal process requested 
by the Ethics Committee required written information sheets and consent forms.  
Although I tried to make them as clear and simple as possible, I also needed to 
follow this up verbally, as one of my participants in particular had difficulty in 
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reading a lot of material.  Allowing them time to complete the forms by leaving them 
with participants to consider also meant they could ask for assistance from others. 
4.4.3.2 Consent for carers 
Some of the consent issues for carers were similar to those for people with dementia.  
Within my research design I only wanted to interview them once, but I left the 
decision to the person with dementia whether they wanted the carer present during all 
interviews.  One of my participants was interviewed with his carer on each occasion; 
the other two relatives were interviewed once.  It was important that I try as much as 
possible to ensure that neither party were pressurising the other into consent. 
The Ethics Committee required that I had a different consent form for carers 
(Appendix 5).  
4.4.3.3 Consent for mental health professionals 
On the face of it consent from professionals seems more straightforward.  They were 
also to act as gatekeepers for my study so the Information Sheets were slightly 
different (Appendices 3 & 6).  On reflection, perhaps I should have had separate 
sheets for their participation in the study and for their role in recruitment.  Initially I 
decided to recruit professionals for focus groups and finally I interviewed the 
individual nurses attached to my participants with dementia. 
4.5 Negotiating access and recruitment 
Setting up the study proved to be a more lengthy process than I had anticipated for a 
number of reasons, some of which were discussed earlier in Section 4.4.1.  
Recruitment was slow and I ended up recruiting individual mental health nurses 
rather than groups to the study.  This was a decision which was to inform my cases to 
better effect than the original plan to use focus groups. 
The nature of the participants I sought to recruit is a reflection of my understanding 
of hallucinations as a cause for concern that should be addressed by mental health 
services. 
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 I knew that there would be a limited number of people who were eligible.  For this 
reason I made the decision to approach all the community mental health teams within 
a selected NHS regional board.  As previously stated, it took some time to secure 
approval from the managers and to succeed in speaking to each of the teams. 
4.5.1 Context 
Participants were recruited from within a single Health Board.  The area was a 
mixture of large city with geographical mental health teams and day services, and 
mixed rural and suburban sites out with the city.  The teams consisted predominantly 
of mental health nurses but some also had occupational therapists.  Consultant 
psychiatrists were attached to each of the teams but they also worked in other 
services as well as the community teams. 
4.5.2 Gatekeepers 
Recruitment into studies is of central importance to the success of the study and can 
be challenging in healthcare because of workload commitments of health workers 
and also lack of interest in research, or research fatigue  (Broyles et al., 2011).    
I was reliant on mental health teams as gatekeepers for my study.  The fact that I 
knew many of these professionals can be seen as a help or hindrance in a study 
design.  My relationships with them may have given them confidence in my attitude 
and skills with people with dementia, but may also have made them feel more 
obligated to help.  My knowledge of their work pressure may have resulted in me not 
wishing to add to it and so not pushing them to find me recruits. 
The initial responses from team members were encouraging, they were interested in 
the study but few could immediately think of anyone who might fit my criteria, I was 
aware that these teams were about to undergo structural changes and were also under 
pressure which impacted on my ability to recruit easily.   
I realize that much of the recruitment process can be 
opportunistic, being visible.  I am not sure if I can achieve 
this with so many possible sites.  It is not the same as being 
able to spend time in a residential or hospital setting, as team 
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members come into their offices at different times of the day 
and this is to write notes or to use the telephone.   
Extract from Field work diary 
In the end two of my three participants were recruited via the same team.  I had been 
in their office before doing an interview and someone asked if I was still looking for 
participants.   
Using team members as gatekeepers meant that they made the initial approach to 
potential participants.  This meant that their enthusiasm for research and interest in 
the study affected their willingness to approach people, and also they gave the initial 
information to participants.  My only control was the written information they gave 
to participants.  On my first visit to Simon to tell him about the study he said 
‘Oh I thought it involved drugs.  Alison (nurse) said 
something about a placebo’ 
My relationship with Alison gave me confidence that this was unlikely and his wife 
confirmed this, but it illustrates the vulnerability of the researcher to the gatekeepers.  
The ethical issues raised by this are discussed in Chapter 7.  I was also aware of at 
least one occasion when one of the nurses used a previous professional relationship 
with me to explain my credentials to a potential participant.  This could lead to a 
confusion of my role as researcher or nurse that was to pre-occupy me throughout the 
fieldwork. 
4.5.3 Participants 
The initial study design specified five people with dementia and a significant other as 
my participants. The professionals were to be recruited as members of focus groups.  
As the study developed I was able to recruit the individual professionals who were 
involved with the person with dementia, which helped to contextualize the study.   
it is useful to see qualitative sampling as an organic practice, 
in the sense that it is something which grows and develops 
throughout the research process 
(Mason, 2002: p127) 
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The key participant in this study was a person with dementia who had experienced 
hallucinations.  It was essential that they were identified first, but also that they had a 
carer who was willing to take part in the study.  Inclusion criteria for all three 
participants of the triad were linked in that they were dependent on a relationship 
with each other.  
4.5.3.1 Inclusion criteria 
My inclusion criteria for people with dementia were 
 Diagnosis of dementia 
 Living in the community 
 They had experienced hallucinations 
 Capacity to give consent 
 Would not be upset discussing hallucinations 
 A significant other who was willing to participate and had capacity 
Inclusion criteria for carers were 
 They were a significant other nominated by the person with dementia 
 Capacity to give consent 
Inclusion for professionals was 
 Member of a community mental health team 
 Either a trained nurse or occupational therapist 
4.5.3.2 Sample 
My final sample comprised three people with dementia, their significant other and 
their mental health professional.  Deteriorating health meant that at least two people 
who the teams had thought may be suitable had ended up in hospital before they 
could approach them.  Another two people who I telephoned did not want to 
participate.  The table below shows the final participants in their triadic relationships.  
The names used for all participants in this thesis are pseudonyms.  Each participant is 
described in further detail in the separate case study chapters (Chapters 5,6 & 7). 
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Table 1: Case study 1 
Pseudonym Gender  
Graeme Male Person with dementia 
Lesley Female Daughter 
Kim Female Nurse 
 
Table 2:  Case study 2 
Pseudonym Gender  
Dave Male Person with dementia 
Joan Female Wife 
Alex Male Nurse 
 
Table 3:  Case study 3 
Pseudonym Gender  
Simon Male Person with dementia 
Jeanette Female Wife 
Alison Female Nurse 
 
The small number of people who were eligible for the study and difficulties in 
recruitment meant I had no control over the gender of any of the participants.  All 
three of the people with dementia were male, two lived with a spouse and the third 
lived alone.  The two married men nominated their wives as their significant other 
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and the man who lived alone nominated one of his daughters.  All the mental health 
professionals were nurses, two female and one male.  I did not choose to ascertain 
any stage in dementia, nor MMSE score (Folstein et al., 1975) for any of my 
participants as I believe this represents an unnecessary value judgment on their 
cognitive deficiency. 
 The participants were selected because of their characteristics; they reflected 
features of the population I wanted to study.  I am not making any claim for 
statistical representativeness. The most important consideration, as Flyvbjerg (2006) 
suggests was not the sampling of attitudes but the opportunity to learn most.  I 
excluded people with dementia who would become upset at talking about their 
hallucinations, but the professionals supplemented this absence with discussion of 
these people.  Although this gave a different perspective it did provide data on how 
nurses deal with distressing hallucinations. 
In the following sections I describe the data collection methods I used in the study.  I 
could not see the things that my participants saw, nor could I be there when they 
occurred, this would involve participant observation that would be far too intrusive in 
the lives of people who were living in their own homes.  One of my participants, 
Dave did have a hallucination when I was present; this incident is discussed in 
Chapter 6.  The main method data collection method I chose was to interview 
participants. 
4.6 Interviews 
Interviews have become ubiquitous in popular culture as a standard narrative through 
which individuals express their identity (Back, 2012).  They probably remain the 
most prevalent method of data collection within qualitative social research (Legard et 
al., 2003). 
Despite their similarities with everyday conversations, Rubin and Rubin (1995) point 
to the difference in purpose and the role of the participants.  Simons (2009) outlines 
four purposes for using interviews in research studies 
 Document the perspective of the interviewee 
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 Method of active engagement 
 Flexibility 
 Potential for uncovering unobserved feelings and events 
I would argue that clinical interviews within mental health nursing have an almost 
identical purpose and so it is a method that is very familiar to me.  This put me in a 
conflicted position at times and needed to be addressed through a continued attention 
to reflexivity. 
 
4.6.1 Practicalities of interviews 
There are different ways of conducting interviews, but I chose unstructured 
interviews as the main data collection method to allow participants to construct their 
own narrative in the way that they wanted.  I believe that unstructured interviews can 
be less stressful for people with dementia who may associate very structured 
interviews with being tested.  I wanted to elicit in-depth answers from my 
participants living with dementia about their hallucinations within the contexts of 
their lives.  This, alongside a need for flexibility, meant that I decided to interview 
people a number of different times.   
I introduced the topic with a broad statement, telling people what I was interested in, 
and allowed the conversation to follow the path dictated by participants.  The aim of 
the interviews was to obtain rich in-depth data, and asking the same questions of 
everyone is not going to achieve this (Rubin and Rubin, 1995).  As a result we 
covered a wide number of subject areas.  This approach meant that the research 
relationship was central to my research process. My style of interviewing was 
informed by my clinical experience and an ethic of care framework. 
I offered people with dementia the option of being interviewed alone or with 
someone else present.  Simon wanted his wife to be present and so all of his 
interviews were with Jeanette.  She helped him at times when he asked her directly 
for assistance 
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Simon: yes but you weren’t with me then were you? 
Jeanette: yes 
Simon: oh I don’t remember you being there 
Jeanette: cos we were lying in our bed in (placename) and 
the window, we’ve got Velux window and you were telling 
me about the little man, did I see the little man 
In this conversation Simon positions himself and is positioned by Jeanette as 
forgetting. 
The carers were also offered the option of being interviewed alone.  They all chose to 
be interviewed with the person with dementia.  Lesley, Graeme’s daughter said she 
would not be saying anything that she would not say if her dad was not there.  These 
interviews started with the person with dementia being quiet but inevitably they 
ended up in joint discussions.  The joint interviews cannot be said to represent whole 
conversations between the person with dementia and carer.  The person with 
dementia had already been interviewed at least once, and was aware that I was 
interested to know the understandings of their carer in this interview.  Nurses were 
interviewed once in their offices.  The following Table shows the number of 
interviews conducted for each participant with dementia and carer 
 
Table 4: Interviews with people with dementia and carers 
Pseudonym No of Interviews Place Time frame 
Graeme 3 Home 4 months 
Lesley 1 Graeme’s home  
Dave 3 Home 2 months 
Joan 1 Home  
Simon & Jeanette 2 Home 2 months 
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It was important to me to develop trust and rapport with my participants although as 
discussed later this resulted in some ethical dilemmas, when I felt conflicted about 
my roles.  Interviews are not innocent.  I felt comfortable in an interview situation as 
the majority of my clinical work was conducted through interviews.  This led me to 
collect data through interviews that may reflect mental health professional 
interviews.  
My experience as a nurse may have led to me being skilled at extracting ‘tales of 
suffering’ during my interviews, Steedman (2000) calls these enforced narratives and 
compares their intrusiveness to statistical data.  This causes an on-going ethical 
dilemma between portrayal and betrayal. 
4.6.2 Data management 
All the interviews were audio recorded; I kept the vernacular in the transcripts as it 
was more faithful to the person being interviewed.  Field notes were written as soon 
as possible after each visit and also for any telephone contact made with participants.  
These notes were used to inform the analysis; I recorded any non-verbal behavior 
and also my immediate reactions to the encounter in them.  I wrote field notes after a 
trip out with Graeme for lunch, and was able to record my thoughts on his difficulties 
negotiating space. 
I transcribed all the interviews verbatim myself, and included transcription notation 
as suggested by Silverman (2001).  In the quotations used in this thesis I have often 
added punctuation and left out pauses and changes in tone to make it easier to read.  
This process was time consuming but I thought it would allow me to see time lapses 
and changes in pitch and tone that might inform my interpretation.  I do not think it 
was necessary to use this much detail in transcription given the analysis I chose.  It 
was more likely to reflect on my position as a novice researcher, who does not want 
to leave anything out in case it may be important.  Doing my own transcription 
enabled me to spend time identifying and listening to the different voices, which 
helped to inform my analysis.   
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4.7 Interviewing people with dementia 
Interviewing people with dementia may pose challenges related to their cognitive 
difficulties.  I have a lot of experience speaking to people with dementia and used 
clinical skills such as active listening to facilitate interviews.  I interviewed all my 
participants with dementia in their own homes as they felt more comfortable there 
and had more control of the environment (Clarke and Keady, 2002).  Flexibility can 
be especially important with people with dementia.  People may become tired more 
quickly, concentration may fluctuate and some of my interviews lasted for a shorter 
period, than others.  Graeme lived alone and I always telephoned him before I went 
to ensure that he remembered I was visiting, and also to see if he still wanted to 
speak to me that day.  There were a number of times when he said he did not feel 
well enough and so we changed the day. 
Although normal talk involves confusions and is reliant on context, when this 
happens in dementia, people may be positioned as ‘problems’ (Shakespeare, 1998). 
Conversation may be more fractured in dementia, Dave had particular difficulties 
associated with his Parkinson’s and his speech tended to tail off and become much 
quieter.  He had attended a course in speech therapy that taught him some techniques 
for dealing with this and it was important to give him time and listen closely to his 
speech.  Simon too told me he felt he had difficulty in expressing himself.  I felt I 
was less skilled in recognising Simon’s difficulties; it was only during our third 
meeting that he told me this. I had felt earlier that I was not establishing a good 
relationship with him, and contrasted my interviews with Simon, with my interviews 
with Graeme and Dave.   I attributed my discomfort to my incompetence as an 
interviewer.  On reflection, this highlights the power differentials between someone 
with dementia and someone who does not have a diagnosis, as well as researcher and 
researched.  I had ignored the importance of time in establishing a relationship, and 
not recognised his struggle to find a voice.   Had I not been so uncertain about my 
own position as a researcher, I might have spotted other clues such as his desire to be 
interviewed jointly with his wife, and that his interviews were shorter than those with 
Graeme and Simon. 
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Despite some of their difficulties with language, I was struck by the determination of 
my participants to be heard.  Dave in particular had obvious speech problems and 
while watching and listening to him, at times I felt uncomfortable because of the 
effort he was expending.  It could be challenging for him to sit still and his speech 
was often circumlocutory but this did not impede his desire to communicate.  
Dave: then there’s the social aspects of it and having trouble 
keeping up conversations you know   
 A focus on the discursive or textual elements of storytelling may result in people 
with dementia being viewed as less than competent, but acknowledging the 
performative or interactive aspects changes the way we listen (Hydén, 2013) . Dave 
did not need me to help empower him; he was able to do this for himself.   My 
interviewees were generous with their time and in sharing their experiences. 
4.8 Creative narrative 
There has been an increasing interest in the use of creative arts within social science, 
and the amount of  research using creative methods has begun to flourish (Simons 
and McCormack, 2007).  Visual images have been used to illustrate anthropological 
and sociological research for some years, although the use of photographs in 
anthropology in the past has been criticised for exoticising the Other (Riessman, 
2008, Saïd, 1978). 
The Visual Sociology Group identifies three uses of visual methods in sociology 
 Collecting data using visual means 
 Studying visual data and reading them as texts 
 Communicating research findings with images and media other than words 
(Visual Sociology Group BSA, 2013) 
It is argued that creative knowing accesses different ways of knowing and allows 
connections in different ways.   It can also help to clarify thinking and stimulate 
ideas (Bartlett, 2013, Kontos et al., 2010). 
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I used poetic form within my analytic approach to re-present the words of the person 
speaking and to free me to think differently about my data.  This process is discussed 
in section 4.10.2.2.  I also used some visual data in my study.  The illustrations are at 
the start of each of the cases in the next three chapters.  This was done in different 
ways for all participants with dementia and was very limited within my research, 
The illustrations for Graeme (Figures 2 & 3) and Dave (Figure 4) were done by an 
illustrator (Middleton, 2011), who I knew, and at different times during my contacts 
with them.  Graeme had previously told me about his hallucinations, and with his 
permission, the illustrator was given a few short extracts of his description of his 
hallucinations prior to the start of the study.  They are used in this thesis to illustrate 
his hallucinations.  He was shown these illustrations and one in particular (Figure 3) 
he described as just like the experience he had had.  I found this surprising as to me it 
was not a realistic picture.  The illustration before Dave’s case description was done 
by the same illustrator, who in this instance was asked to draw activity in trees, either 
boys in bright uniform or a play.  The illustration produced allowed me to think 
through the data in a different way.  Simon drew the illustration before his case study 
(Figure 5) prior to meeting me, and so was not produced for the study at all.  It 
contributes to my knowledge of how he experiences his hallucinations, and is 
reproduced here with his permission. 
I am not assuming that a visual representation reflects reality any more than a verbal 
representation.  I do however agree with  Mannay (2010) and Simons and 
McCormack (2007) that creativity can help to fight familiarity and allow you to 
connect in different ways.  My use of the visual representations was more 
interpretive than analytic.  It allowed me to access intuitive understanding, Simons 
(2009) describes this process as like dancing with data, looking for connections and 
feelings. 
4.9 Researcher and/or nurse 
 The notion of impartiality in interviews has been widely refuted; I am implicated in 
the process of constructing interviews, as in the whole research process. 
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We now recognise that the personal account, in research 
interviews, which has traditionally been seen as the 
expression of a single subjectivity, is in fact always a co-
construction 
(Salmon and Riessman, 2008: p80) 
This extract from Salmon is written in the context of the difficulties of interviewing 
people whose narrative may be challenging.  She calls for even more attentiveness as 
a listener, including to the importance of non-verbal language.  Riessman (2008) 
follows this piece up by throwing out the challenge to integrate visual data. 
Acknowledging my own situatedness is an important aspect of my theoretical stance 
see Chapter 3.   The researcher brings a number of roles to the research relationship 
(Reinharz, 1997).  My role as both a nurse and researcher was present throughout the 
study.  It was something I was aware of in my struggle to locate myself within 
certain theoretical perspectives, but during the data collection period it surfaced 
especially within my relationships with other people.  As I believe that ethics occurs 
within relationships rather than as disembodied universal principles, my research 
relationships sometimes initiated an ethical dilemma.  
The Ethics Committee written response to my application acknowledged that I was 
an ‘experienced community psychiatric nurse’, and as discussed earlier my previous 
relationships with mental health teams may have facilitated my access to them. I 
used skills from clinical practice in interviews with people with dementia and their 
carers. 
I was honest with participants about my status as a nurse although they had all been 
given this information by the gatekeepers.  Although I had not been his community 
nurse, Graeme knew me in this context in the past, we had met regularly at a 
dementia café and a campaigning group.  My work as a nurse has resulted in my 
being privy to intimate knowledge of a person’s life, often in a very short space of 
time.  I am used to acting in a therapeutic role.  In my role as researcher the main 
purpose of my relationship was not therapeutic but data collection and this did lead 
to ethical conflicts for me as described in Graeme’s story (Section 5.5). 
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4.9.1 Research relationships 
The insider/ outsider opposition can provide a useful backdrop to the  different roles 
that may impact on research studies, although an absolute dichotomising  should be 
treated with caution (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995).  The insider/outsider debate 
has resulted in what have been called insider myths and outsider myths.  The outsider 
myth asserts that only researchers who are objective and distanced from a group can 
conduct valid research with that group.  The insider myth counters that a distant and 
objective researcher cannot understand the true character of a group. (Mannay, 
2010). 
A consideration of proximity as it impacts on research is important, as discussed 
previously, knowledge is situated, it comes from somewhere (Mannay, 2010).  In my 
study it is most obvious in relations with community mental health professionals. I 
used the term hallucinations in the information sheet I gave them, which positions 
me as one of them.   I worked as a community mental health nurse for many years so 
I am, but am no longer one of them.   
The literature on close relationships within research can fail to distinguish between 
‘going native’ and research within an already existing relationship.  Postmodernism 
warns against assuming dichotomies like insider/outsider as we are all members of a 
multitude of communities at the same time (DeLyser, 2001, Taylor, 2013a).  Our 
selves are shifting and partial and we take lots of selves into the field (Coffey, 1999) 
I had been a community mental health nurse but I was now a researcher and I know 
that some of my ex-colleagues had always thought there was a gap between theory 
and practice and criticised academia for not reflecting the ‘real world’.  
Writing in support of insider research, benefits that are identified are that it can 
enhance access, the insider will speak the same language and will be able to reach a 
better understanding (Taylor, 2013a, DeLyser, 2001).  As stated earlier, I think that 
the nurses knowing me did help me to gain access to both people with dementia and 
also to community mental health professionals.  I chose the expression hallucinations 
assuming they would have a similar understanding of its fluidity to my own. 
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Disadvantages of insider research include a concern that participants may expect the 
researcher to agree and sympathise with them.  There may be an assumption of 
shared knowledge, and the respondent may become frustrated if the researcher asks 
questions to which the interviewee is aware they know the answer. (DeLyser, 2001).  
My interviewees often said ‘you know’ suggesting to me that they supposed we had 
shared knowledge.  I think that using informal interviews helped to prevent irritation, 
although it may also have meant that I was too close to them to look for implicit 
knowledge.  It is difficult to recognise knowledge that is taken for granted as an 
insider. What Law (2004) has called absence that is othered, as discussed in the last 
chapter, may not be recognised because it is seen as irrelevant or forgotten.   I tried to 
be aware of my dual roles throughout the study by using a reflexive approach.  My 
choice of data analysis which requires consideration of the researchers’ response to 
the narrative helped in this process. 
Kim, the nurse with whom I had previously worked most closely, emphasised her 
individual approach to care, and at one point distanced herself from me  
you and I would do things differently  to the same end point 
and probably reach the same end point but we would go 
about it in a slightly different way . 
I was surprised by this, and think on reflection it was because I struggled to make the 
familiar strange. 
4.9.2 Reciprocity 
The importance of reciprocity was something I had to learn as a researcher, working 
as a nurse I had seen my role as providing care within a relationship.  As a researcher 
I was not sure what, if anything, I was providing for my participants. Ben-Ari and 
Enosh (2012) point out that the conventional way of understanding power relations 
in research is as a dichotomous relationship.  Relations are viewed as asymmetrical, 
in favour of the researcher, who holds the power to develop knowledge, using the 
researched.    The potential for exploitation afforded by this position has led to 
attempts to shift the unequal balance by empowering the participants.  Another 
response is to address the shifts within the power enacted in relationships.  The 
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person who is participating has knowledge during the data collection period and 
knowledge is jointly created.  They suggest that reciprocity provides a better solution 
than equality with both researcher and participants receiving different gains.  For the 
participant this may be telling their story to an empathic listener, contributing to new 
knowledge, to help others, or being able to assert a marginalized voice.  This may be 
especially relevant with people with dementia whose voice can still be marginalized.  
Two of my participants with dementia and two carers stated that they hoped it would 
help someone else and one carer expressed the opinion that  
as I say it’s actually helpful for me. I think that’s one of the 
big things is when you’re trying to cope with something, with 
a member of your family being no well is nobody seems to 
listen. Nobody, nobody seems interested 
Joint interview Lesley and Graeme 
I can accept Ben-Ari and Enosh’s argument but still found it difficult to process 
emotionally.  As they suggest  
Possibly scholars and researchers who emphasize equity are 
driven by feelings of guilt and discomfort in overbenefiting 
from the exchange, and by collective guilt over abuses of 
power by other researchers 
(Ben-Ari and Enosh, 2012: p6) 
With Graeme this guilt and discomfort surfaced following a concern I felt during one 
interview, that I was just using him for my study.  Following discussion with my 
supervisor I realised I could offer him something and took him out for lunch.  He 
found it difficult to go out alone and told me what a chore it could be for him to 
cook.  Although this helped, it still caused me difficulties and is discussed further in 
the next chapter (Section 5.5).  There were a number of occasions when participants 
asked me questions about dementia, and I answered from my clinical knowledge, but 
felt that I should not be doing this.  My socialisation into viewing a researcher as 
objective caused me to struggle with these issues. 
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4.10 Data analysis 
The process of gathering and analysing data contributed towards what Birch 
describes as ‘my journey of self-discovery’ (Birch, 1998: 171).  Like many aspects of 
the research process, analysis is not a discrete element but continues throughout, 
from the initial contact, transcribing, data gathering and writing up. 
The analysis I chose to use was voice centred relational method (Brown et al., 1989, 
Mauthner and Doucet, 1998, Doucet and Mauthner, 2008).  This is a narrative 
analysis that was developed out of an ethic of care approach and identifies multiple 
voices. 
4.10.1 Narrative analysis 
Riessman (2008) suggests that there are 3 main types of narrative analysis 
 Thematic analysis 
 Structural analysis 
 Dialogic/ performance analysis 
Thematic analysis concentrates on the themes that emerge from the data, with little 
emphasis on how the narrative is spoken or written, or the local contexts of the 
narrative.  Structural analysis is concerned with the way the narrator uses speech to 
convince the listener.  Dialogic/performance analysis stresses the importance of the 
social context in which the narrative is performed in interaction with others. With 
thematic and structural analysis the voice of the interviewer is absent from the text 
but with dialogic/performance analysis the voice of the interviewer is important, as 
they are ‘implicated in the storytelling’ along with the reader. In comparison to the 
other two categories it is ‘rather a broad and varied interpretive approach to oral 
narrative that makes selective use of elements and adds other dimensions’ 
(Riessman, 2008 p105).  These approaches often use a wider definition of narrative 
than approaches such as structural analysis. 
A dialogic/performance approach analyses how identity is constructed within 
performance and can be used in individual or group interviews. I used a relational, 
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voice centred analysis which belongs within a dialogic/performance type of analysis 
(Riessman, 2008).   
4.10.2 Voice-centred relational analysis 
Analysis was based on the voice-centred relational method of analysis as devised by 
Brown and Gilligan (1992) and developed by Mauthner and Doucet (1998).  This 
analysis is underpinned by an ethic of care understanding (Mauthner and Doucet, 
1998).   Voice relational method was developed by  Brown and Gilligan (1992) as a 
way of analysing the data from their longitudinal psychological study of adolescent 
girls.  ‘Voice’ is the ability to make one’s own feelings and experiences known and 
heard (Clare and Shakespeare, 2004).  Brown and Gilligan viewed the approach of 
adolescence as a crossroads between childhood and adolescence.   
A listeners’ guide was developed, informed by both clinical and literary theory, 
which acknowledges the interactive nature of the research relationship, and the multi 
layered nature of narrative.  It involves a number of sequential listenings which allow 
the multiplicity of voices of the narrator and listener to be heard.  Using this method 
Brown and Gilligan (1993, 1989) identified psychological and political resistance in 
the adolescent girls.  They exhibited psychological resistance to the dominant culture 
by struggling to ignore their feelings and exhibiting confusion.  Political resistance 
was identified in their struggle to express emotions and openly disagree with others. 
Confusion can be something that people with dementia struggle against and 
Shakespeare & Clare (2004) suggest 
For the person with dementia in contrast it seems that the 
focus of ‘psychological’ resistance is to fight against 
developing confusion 
(Clare and Shakespeare, 2004: 227) 
The method requires four readings or listenings of the interview data. Gilligan et al 
(2006) feel that the use of listening, rather than reading guide recognizes the active 
involvement of the listener as well as the speaker. 
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It assumes that there will be simultaneous voices from the same participant ((Balan, 
2005).  In the separate listenings of the data, the listener attends to different voices.  I 
used a checklist developed by another student based on  the work of Brown and 
Gilligan (1993, 1989, 2006) and Mauthner and Doucet (2008, 1998) to assist with 
analysis (See Appendices 7 & 8).  I changed ‘cancer victim’ in her original and 
replaced it with ‘person with dementia’.  Data analysis is often a mystical part of 
research; I like the structure of the different readings, but also the flexibility of 
acknowledging the interpretation of the researcher.  Although the readings or 
listenings are separated, they are not meant to stand alone, and I found they did in 
fact all build on each other in an iterative process. The development enabled me to 
keep the narrative of one person together.  I found it to be a time consuming but 
worthwhile process.  It was similar to my approach to clinical work, although as a 
clinician one does not have the luxury of immersing oneself in the data to such an 
extent.  It resonates with the values I tried to bring when working of seeing the 
person as a whole, rather than just the diagnosis. 
There were however difficulties at times in following the speech of some of the 
people with dementia.  This led to some degree of difficulty in my part in knowing 
how to analyse parts of the interviews and possibly resulted in more creativity than 
analysing a conversation with someone who does not have dementia.  People with 
dementia can be disadvantaged in a conversation with ‘normal’ speakers as they are 
less able to follow the conversational rules (Shakespeare, 1998).  An example of this 
was apparent in joint interviews when although an attempt by the carer to correct the 
person with dementia can be seen as silencing them, it can also be seen as rescuing 
them and allowing them to continue.   
I was not seeking to obtain an objective truth.  This approach was an appropriate one 
to my study because it is a narrative approach to data analysis. As discussed earlier, 
along with many nurses, I am aware that my clinical practice has involved me 
listening to and interpreting stories, especially latterly of people with dementia.  It 
resonates with my belief in the multiplicity of voice and I like the fact that the 
narrative is kept intact rather than immediately reduced by cutting it up.  As it was 
developed to allow the voice of groups who are marginalized to be heard, it would 
 
Research design  104 
seem an appropriate approach to hear the voice of other such groups.  I am aware of 
two previous studies with people with dementia that have used this method.  Proctor 
(2001) interviewed four women with dementia about services and analysed the data 
using voice relational methodology.  It fitted with a person-centred approach towards 
people with dementia and identified issues of gender and power.  The other study 
used voice relational analysis along with conversational analysis to examine how 
people with a recent diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease and their spouses negotiated 
living with the diagnosis.  The researchers set up conversations between both parties 
lasting only 5 minutes and then analysed them.  Although the conversations were 
extremely short they enabled the researchers to begin to identify the voice of the 
person with dementia, the voice of the relationship and the societal discourses about 
dementia (Clare and Shakespeare, 2004). 
4.10.2.1 1st reading 
The first listening consists of two parts.  The first part focuses on the overall story or 
plot.  It asks us to attend to what is happening in the plot and locate the narrator.   
What are the main events, who are the protagonists, are there any recurrent themes, 
words or metaphors?  I created word clouds to identify the words that were used 
most frequently in the interviews.  An example of a word cloud is attached 
(Appendix 9). 
The second part of the first reading is the response of the listener to the story.  This 
allows the reader or listener to reflexively examine their response, from ‘the 
privileged position of interpreting the life events of another and to consider the 
implications of this act’ (Brown and Gilligan, 1993 p15).  There has been a common 
assumption that people with dementia are unable to speak for themselves and often 
other people are asked to speak for them.  This approach assisted me in thinking 
about how my feelings may affect my interpretation. An important aspect of this part 
of the analysis process for me became the reflexive element.  I found it relatively 
easy to question myself during the course of this activity but much more difficult to 
write about this process, and put myself into the data analysis.  After all I was a nurse 
with some aspirations to academia, and academic writing is in the third person; 
writing about myself feels self-indulgent.  Again this demonstrated my difficulties in 
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extricating myself from my socialization.   Perhaps my writing about my own 
emotional reactions contributed to the disempowerment of an already disadvantaged 
group.  In my role as clinician I felt powerful, I have knowledge, but in my role as a 
researcher I was less sure.  I found it easier as the research went on, to see the shift in 
my role from listener to interpreter.  
4.10.2.2 2nd reading 
In the second reading the listener attends to the voice of the self or selves who are 
talking.  Focusing attention on how the person speaks of themselves allows space for 
the participant to speak before the researcher allocates the data to ‘either our own 
ways of understanding or into the categories of the literature in our area’(Mauthner 
and Doucet, 1998 p130).  It allows the ‘I’ to speak before the researcher speaks for 
the participants.   
Sabat (2001) describes three aspects of selfhood in which Self 1 is the self of 
personal identity and the site of a continuity of self.  He cites the use of personal 
pronouns such as I and me as evidence of this. 
In the second reading, the researcher goes through the transcript and identifies all the 
times that the participant uses ‘I ‘as a personal pronoun.  While listening to how the 
person was talking about themselves, I used a coloured pencil to underline where the 
person uses I or me.  The first person pronouns ‘I’ and ‘me’, as well as ‘we’ and 
‘you’, when it seemed to be used for the first person, were underlined along with the 
verb, and other words that seem significant.  Some researchers have done this and 
then taken them out to produce I-poems’ (Balan, 2005).   
There is obviously a degree of flexibility and interpretation involved in this stage, 
some other researchers have strictly used ‘I’ but it seemed to me that other words 
could be describing the Sense of Self 1 as defined by Sabat.  I am persuaded by the 
argument of Edwards & Weller that  
‘taking account of people’s different speech patterns to 
produce you-poems or me-poems, or indeed we-poems, is 
equally enlightening about senses of self’  
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 (Edwards and Weller, 2012: 208) 
I wrote I- poems for each participant.  These ‘I’ phrases were cut and pasted in the 
same order as they were spoken in a separate I-poem document.  They were split into 
stanzas based on what seems to be a change of subject or mood.  What is retained in 
each phrase and how this is split is a subjective decision (Balan, 2005).   I found the 
I- poems especially helpful in attending to emotional issues.  This was probably 
because of the focus on how the person is talking about the self, which as a mental 
health practitioner may well be something I have been trained to pick up.   A 
disciplinary background will mean that different functions of a narrative will be 
privileged over others (Rauol et al., 2007).  The other reason it picks up on emotional 
issues is that this is what poetry does; it engages the reader and writer in feeling as 
well as recording experience. 
As Edwards & Weller point out 
 'in contrast to a stress on the creation of meaning through 
thematic analysis, its initiators pose I-poems more as 
concerned with assessing meaning in relation to self’  
(Edwards and Weller, 2012: p204) 
This process seemed to me to pare down the data to the essential emotional meaning 
of how the person thought of themselves.  The longest I- poem by far was the 
interview that had the most emotional content and was the most difficult one for me.  
This second reading of the data was the one on which I spent the most time.  One of 
the things it did not pick up was humour, so it is important that the narrative is kept 
together as this can be seen in the whole readings.  Extracts from all the I- poems are 
used in the case studies in the following three chapters. 
The I-poems were created directly from the words of the participants and were not 
written in the same way as well-crafted poetry; however I found that the Poet 
Laureate Carol Ann Duffy’s words were still germane 
Poetry, above all, is a series of intense moments-its power is 
not in narrative.  I’m not dealing with facts, I’m dealing with 
emotion 
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(Duffy, 2005-2010) 
4.10.2.3 3rd reading 
In the third and fourth readings I followed Doucet and Mauthner (2008) and read for 
the way the participants experience themselves in relation to the wider society in 
which they live.  Gilligan et al. (2006) read for contrapunctual voices in the third 
reading but I was interested in listening for identity following Sabat’s (Sabat and 
Harré, 1994, 2001) concept of Self, and the Doucet & Mauthner reading was more 
appropriate for this task. 
In the third reading I concentrated on how people talked about their relationships, 
this could be with friends, family, colleagues, other people with dementia, health 
professionals in the case of people with dementia and people with dementia in the 
case of mental health nurses.  Again these instances were underlined with a different 
coloured pencil in the interview text.  
4.10.2.4 4th reading 
In the fourth reading many researchers have listened to how participants position 
themselves in relation to dominant discourses within society.  Sabat’s (2001) Self 3 
is the self that requires co-operation from other people.  It consists of the social 
personae that we construct e.g. father, teacher, a competent person and is therefore 
the most vulnerable in the person with dementia, who may not be accorded these 
personae by society or indeed those with whom they are in relationships.  I listened 
for the cultural contexts and social structures (Mauthner and Doucet, 1998) within 
which people were speaking.  For my respondents this was mainly in the way they 
viewed dementia or old age, and for the mental health professionals it could also be 
about the health care system. Sometimes this method resulted in sections being 
underlined with a number of different colours. 
I used the method with all of my participants.  This method has been used with 
people who struggle to be heard within the dominant discourse of society but also 
with professional groups such as nurses and with couples of a person with dementia 
and their spouse (Balan, 2005, Letvak, 2003, Clare and Shakespeare, 2004).   
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When I analysed the joint interviews I did this separately for the couples apart from 
Jeanette and Simon who I saw together on each occasion. Their interviews were 
noticeably more co-constructions than the other joint interviews and it made sense to 
keep their contributions together.  I did split them up at one point, but ended up 
analysing it as a joint interview.  When I produced the I- poems for these interviews I 
distinguished between their contributions by italicising one of them. 
4.10.3 Dancing with the data 
From all these readings of each person, I wrote triadic cases that included the voices 
of each of the participants in the triad.  This process of organizing and making sense 
of the data as individual cases was followed by a more interpretative phase.  I had 
keep field notes throughout the data collection and the voice centered analysis, which 
was a mixture of reflections following each contact, and also any developing 
thoughts on interpretation.  At this point I used the visual and written data as a more 
hermeneutic process, to understand the whole, by making sense of the parts (Simons, 
2009).  This involved immersion in the data, making mind maps, physically moving 
it around, being surrounded by the visual material and engaging intuitive and 
cognitive ways of knowing, including the research issues of identity and multiplicity 
of hallucinations (Appendix 10).  Narrative understandings of hallucinations of 
people with dementia and carers were related to narrative identity.  The nurses in the 
study held together multiple understandings.  Finally I developed a way of 
understanding hallucinations utilizing the theory of liminality. 
4.11 Conclusion 
Data collection was not always easy or comfortable for me; it often caused me to 
rethink my assumptions as a mental health nurse and my relationships with people 
with dementia.  My data analysis method helped me to address some of my 
assumptions but I recognise the impossibility of distinguishing them all especially at 
this stage (Mauthner and Doucet, 1998). 
The case-study structure and narrative analysis allowed me to attend to the narratives 
of individuals.  It enabled me to examine how people narrated their experiences 
within the contexts of their lives and relationships.  People did not always talk 
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directly about their hallucinations, but the content of their narratives was a reflection 
of how they made meaning of their lives with hallucinations and dementia.  The three 
case studies follow, they are not truth or reality, but they are my narratives of my 
interpretations of the cases.  In the cases that follow I have tried to avoid any 
academic references, as I want the people to be able to speak for themselves, albeit 
within the confines of my narrative.  I have retained much of the linguistic 
formations of the participants, but also using extracts from I- poems, I have extracted 
parts of their dialogue.  The cases are written in the order that I interviewed people 
and I have tried to write them to give a flavour of the voice-centred analysis process 
but also the development of emerging interpretative ideas.  I have included 
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5 Graeme, Lesley and Kim 
In this chapter I present the first case, that of Graeme who has dementia, his 
daughter, Lesley and Kim, Graeme’s community mental health nurse.  They are 
presented separately although they refer to each other throughout the chapter.  The 
final section of the chapter is a reflection of a conflict that arose for me during an 
interview with Graeme causing me to consider whether I was a nurse or a researcher. 
I have not presented the cases as four separate readings but I hope the readings are 
apparent through the case descriptions.  Extracts from the I- poems are used 
throughout. 
5.1 Graeme’s realities: ‘a hypochondriac a wimp or 
completely mad’ 
sometimes I feel fine and I can just go ahead and do things 
but most times I feel I cannae and whether it's as I say 
whether it's being a wimp or a hypochondriac or just off my 
head I don't know.  I cannae I can not fathom it out how I live 
my life 
I knew Graeme from the past, I had met him at various services set up by an ex 
colleague and I, for people with dementia.   When we first met he lived with his wife 
but she had since died.  He now lived alone and had two daughters living locally with 
whom he had regular contact. He is in his seventies. 
 I knew that he had had a diagnosis of Lewy-body dementia.  A few months prior to 
our research contact the certainty of this particular diagnosis had been questioned, 
and he had been told that although medical professionals accepted that he had some 
type of dementia, they were unable to give it a specific name.  
The year before I started my PhD I had spoken to him about my interest in this area 
and he had vividly described a variety of hallucinations.  Some were recurrent but 
others had happened only once.  A large cat with a fluffy tail was a frequent ‘visitor’ 
to his house; he knew this was not real but was very tolerant of its presence as it did 
not cause any problems.  It just sat on the settee.  It seemed apparent that some of his 
hallucinations were more frightening, such as when he had seen people massing in 
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his hallway like a political rally.  Hallucinations were in fact the first indications that 
he was having any difficulties.  He described occasions when his wife was still alive 
and before his formal diagnosis when he would ask her who the people were in the 
house. An example of this type of episode was that he had returned home one day 
and seen two old women making the bed.  He asked his wife who they were and she 
told him there was no-one there. 
Before I began my study he had accepted that his hallucinations may not be what 
other people were seeing.  He described how he had learnt if he saw something 
unusual to walk out of the room to try to establish if he was hallucinating.  He would 
try to work out logically if a situation could be correct.  He gave an example of 
seeing a group of ex-neighbours in his living room; he went into his kitchen, made 
himself a cup of tea, and reasoned that the people in the living room were not there.  
He reached this conclusion because the children he was seeing would now be in their 
thirties rather than the age he was seeing them. 
During my research contact with him he was more concerned about other aspects of 
his dementia that he was finding distressing than his hallucinations.  During my 
interaction with him his physical health deteriorated causing him difficulties.  
Hallucinations may be the more extreme manifestations of his dementia, as they do 
not fit in with most people’s views of reality, but for someone like Graeme they did 
not present the greatest disruptions to his life. 
5.1.1 Negotiation 
In some ways our earlier relationship made me less anxious about my first ‘research 
interview’.  However, my role was now different and I was not sure how we would 
handle that change.  I think it just offered me different challenges.  I was fairly 
certain that he would agree to be part of the study, partly because we had previously 
discussed his hallucinations but also perhaps because he knew me.  When I went to 
discuss the study with him he told me ‘if I can help just one person’.    He launched 
into a description of an episode of hallucinations using the term ‘hallucinations’ 
spontaneously.  This had happened approximately two years ago when he had gone 
away on holiday to a convalescent home for the industrial group he had worked with 
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in the past.  He had woken up during the night and seen people with Doberman dogs.  
He had been frightened by the episode and embarrassed at causing upset to other 
visitors.  As a result of this experience he had telephoned his daughter and asked her 
to take him home because he knew that another episode of hallucinations would 
probably follow.  He will no longer return to this environment because of this 
incident. 
My second visit was to discuss signing the consent forms.  I was struck by the 
contrast with my previous visit.  This time he told me I had got him on a ‘bad day, a 
bad week’; he had had a difficult holiday and described himself as doing ‘stupid 
things’. I felt intrusive and concerned that he had been too polite to tell me not to 
visit.  He said he still wanted to participate in the study and by the end of my visit he 
seemed noticeably more cheerful, telling stories of past achievements, such as doing 
a degree late in life and his previous sociability.  This highlighted the need for 
process consent during my study and became the pattern for my on-going contact 
with him.  Ethical issues are likely to be negotiated throughout the research process 
and the integrity of the researcher is the prime guarantee of ethical research (Murphy 
and Dingwall, 2007).  One off informed consent is not enough to achieve well-being 
and this issue is perhaps more important in a study involving people with dementia.   
In subsequent visits I telephoned on the morning of each pre-arranged contact to 
check that he still felt able to see me that day; there were days when he told me he 
was not feeling up to seeing me. 
5.1.2 The setting 
Extracts from field notes 
There is a religious head on the outside of his door.  I entered 
the hallway and was struck by how narrow it is.  There are a 
hoover and a mop in the hall.  He had presumably been doing 
some housework, but I was aware how in that narrow space 
something like a hoover appeared out of place and cluttered 
the space 
We go into his living room.  He always sits in a large chair 
by the window facing the TV and his music centre.  The wall 
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facing him is covered with religious pictures and pictures of 
his family.  I sit in a chair beside him as I feel it is easier to 
talk to him there, rather than from the other side of the room 
On the way out of the house in the hall I was again struck by 
its narrowness and that there were photographs of his family 
and his degrees framing the walls.  I remembered his story of 
frightening hallucinations of people in the hall and wondered 
if the people in the photos had been the people he had seen. 
Graeme struggles with how to trust his own knowledge and the uncertainty of living 
with dementia.  Hallucinations have become a part of his life and he has learnt how 
to cope with them but he finds it difficult to know what is real.   
5.1.3 ‘I don’t know, I don’t know’ 
How does he know and what knowledge counts?  Is it the things he sees or is it what 
other people tell him? Sometimes he does not know how to make sense of what he 
does.  He uses the word ‘know’ frequently throughout the interviews, using in almost 
equal numbers ‘know’ and ‘don’t know’.  He struggles to understand what is 
happening, frequently questions himself.  There are at least 18 times in the second 
interview when the ‘I’ is prefaced with an interrogative word ‘what have I done’ 
’why did I’ and the word ‘maybe’ is repeated 49 times.   
In reading for the ‘I’ I listen to the feeling, acting and knowing ‘I’ as the protagonist 
of the story.  Knowing was countered with ‘not knowing’.  He is more often 
confused, less sure, can’t remember.   An I- poem crystallises the way he talks about 
himself.  He starts with the voice of uncertainty ‘finding it harder’ then ‘I don’t 
know’ six times.  He silences himself rather than making mistakes ‘I’m just 
accepting’ ‘I keep myself away from situations’.  The voice of certainty is silenced 
by the voice of uncertainty; he suppresses his own certainty by acceptance ‘I just 
accept it’.   
I still have them 
I’m finding it harder 
I don’t know, I don’t know 
I feel, I just accept it 
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I’m getting more I don’t know 
I’m in the house 
I’m usually in the house myself  
I feel, I used to see 
I don’t know 
I’m having a hallucination 
I find it harder 
He finds it more difficult to know for certain and contrasts this with his life pre-
dementia when he was certain and would argue for his own position. He can argue 
with the TV, it does not tell him he is wrong but not with other people, he needs 
more time now to make sense of things.  He is more likely to accept the certainty of 
others who have told him he is wrong.   Before dementia he had certainty, now he is 
unsure.   His dementia is affecting his sense of identity, he frequently says ‘I used 
to’. 
Locating himself in time he compares himself with his past and with a possible 
future when he will be oblivious to the pain of his current confusion.  He describes 
how he and his brother are very alike and his brother may be a connection with the 
Graeme who has changed  
we were very alike. Both in looks and wer nature 
A central metaphor is going to another place.  This can be ‘lovely’ as when he went 
away spontaneously for a few days’ holiday, and can be something he does to cope 
with his hallucinations.  It is also something he thinks may take away the emotional 
pain he currently feels 
maybe be better if I get to the stage where I don’t know at all 
what’s going on then it wouldnae bother me 
5.1.4 A shrinking world 
His world has shrunk because of this uncertainty, so that he spends longer in the 
house alone ‘I’m usually in the house myself’ and relates to a smaller number of 
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people; his interactions are now predominantly with his family.  He avoids going into 
environments in which he would previously have spent time, such as the pub.  
Sleeping consumes a larger proportion of his time.   Home is more secure than the 
world outside ‘I’m better keeping myself in my ain wee cosy corner’.   
The voice of the ‘I’ is often about coming home.  Outside he feels he may be making 
a fool of himself and other people can see him lose things.  This is not an easy 
decision and he becomes frustrated and blames himself for avoiding situations  
sometimes I feel fine and I can just go ahead and do things 
but most times I feel I cannae and whether it's as I say 
whether it's being a wimp or a hypochondriac or just off my 
head I don't know. 
A number of times he says ‘I’m not lonely, I like being alone’ this however contrasts 
with his previous life when he enjoyed going out to pubs and concerts.  He has been 
forced into this position by his dislike of making mistakes; ‘I felt, I was inadequate’ 
and ‘I try to avoid getting into situations’. 
He can still articulate strong feelings inside the house when he argues with the TV 
but outside, the struggle to know seems to take so much effort that he supresses 
them.  The feeling ‘I’ is often the voice of acceptance almost as if he has given up ‘I 
just accept it’  ‘I think my mind gets so tired’.   
5.1.5 Shifting boundaries 
He struggles with the multiple realities he experiences, which have slippery 
boundaries.  The voice of not knowing does not know what it all means.  This 
uncertainty extends to what is happening to his body: what has happened to his 
walking stick which he has lost, his body is having difficulty knowing how to hold 
on to things.   
He is preoccupied by the differences in his experience, and what other people see as 
reality.  He tries to establish what is happening, knowing his experience can differ 
from consensus reality, and relies on his daughters for establishing the reality of 
situations 
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and Lesley says no you used that money for such and such. 
Graeme’s voice is the voice of uncertainty, his version of events is untrustworthy and 
so he accepts the knowledge of other people above his own.  This is evident when he 
and his daughter are together, ‘maybe I was maybe I’ve got mixed up again Lesley’.   
On the other hand he wants other people to believe him; he says  
I’m going to get CCTV put up in the house cos nobody but 
nobody would believe the things that I do.  
He summons even more people to support his narrative, saying to Lesley ‘it’s a pity 
your mum isn’t here’.  Perhaps the community nurse could bear witness too ‘in fact 
Kim will maybe remember about it cos (wife) told Kim’.   
5.1.6 Living in relationships 
He has a sense of himself as living in relationships, with his strong sense of 
attachment to his family.  These are the dominant connections in his life.  He is a 
widower, although his wife was still alive when his hallucinations first began.  His 
daughters provide him with both practical help ‘Lesley on a Sunday sometimes 
brings my lunch down’ and ‘Bridget usually does a big shop for me’, and also 
feelings of security.  His wider social circle has shrunk, but his family remain 
important and it is interactions with them he discusses most, both with his daughters 
and granddaughters.  These relationships were brought up spontaneously by him 
rather than in response to any questions by me.  His relationships with his family 
remain a core part of his identity, although he is more reliant on them now to tell him 
what is right  
Lesley will tell you about these things. She’ll say no dad that 
is the way things are. 
When I interview his daughter Lesley, Graeme echoes what she is saying about his 
hallucinations and uses her to corroborate his version of events. 
In many ways his relationship with his daughters is a reversal of the usual parent 
child relationship and is commonly described by carers of people with dementia, but 
he does not express any negative thoughts about this.  He is able to talk to them 
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about his feelings and seems secure in his relationship.  The way he talks of his 
relationships with his granddaughters is different, he talks about their activities and 
shows his pride in what they are doing, these relationships resemble the cultural 
norms of grandparent /grandchildren interactions. 
5.1.7 Living in society 
People as they get older are expected to get serious illness, but his anticipated 
narrative has been interrupted at a younger age.  He struggles with the way that the 
expected narrative of his life has been interrupted by illness and now it is not even an 
illness that can be diagnosed with certainty by medicine.  He had previously been 
given a diagnosis of dementia with Lewy bodies, but this has changed.  It has been 
decided that this is not the correct diagnosis, although doctors are unable to give him 
a definitive alternative.  Although he goes to doctors for their professional 
knowledge he also realises that they are unable to give him certainty ‘they don’t 
think that I’ve got what they thought I had’ and ‘there’s something going on but they 
can’t put their finger on it’. 
He is aware of how dementia can be viewed within society and does not divulge his 
diagnosis to everyone, only certain of his neighbours know.  He maintains his social 
etiquette to neighbours, when a neighbour comes to the door, the interaction which I 
overhear sounds empathic and interested in her difficulties, but when he returns to 
the living room he tells me he has no idea what she was talking about.  He avoids 
situations where he may be shown to make mistakes, not wanting to get into 
situations where he may ‘make a fool of myself’.  He does, however, have to balance 
this with a need to ask for help from family, but also from people like bus drivers.   
He expresses a popular societal view of dementia with ‘if I get to the stage where I 
don’t know at all what’s going on’, but this is not currently his experience of 
dementia.  This view would be frightening to many people, but to him at this moment 
it would eliminate the distress he feels, and he sees his dementia as a personal, rather 
than societal difficulty. 
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Although he sometimes focuses on his deficits rather than his abilities, which is the 
way dementia is constructed in society, he is critical of cognitive tests that are a 
standard way that people with dementia are categorized.  He does not see it as 
indicative of how he functions  
asking me who the Prime Minister is I could tell them almost 
every Prime Minister frae Gladstone and Disraeli 
He resists the voice of the person with dementia who is confused, by explaining that 
he can answer these questions.  Another way he resists, is describing that when he 
has time he can work out that he has not always been wrong, despite having possibly 
assumed that he must be wrong in the heat of the moment. 
One might anticipate that he may benefit from mutual support with others in the 
same position, but he tells how meeting other people with dementia had made him 
feel inadequate.  Comparing himself to others with dementia he has met through an 
advocacy group, he finds himself wanting, they ‘seemed to be much more capable 
and adequate at dealing with what they’ve got to deal with’.  
He contrasts his position with that of others with a chronic illness ‘there’s poor 
people suffering frae motor neurone disease or Huntingdon’s or whatever’.  This 
voice is a dominant one within society that supresses the individual voice of 
suffering, as others are always worse off, he has no right to complain.  People with 
an illness like this are meant to be heroic and fight off their adversities.  There is also 
a resisting voice, which says that this ‘doesn’t stop my difficulties’.  It may reflect 
the dominant societal view of older people as having lived their lives but again he 
shows some resistance to this voice  
I know as we get older and things happen, but I mean I’m no 
that old.   
He judges himself as wrong to feel the way he does. He silences his right to talk 
about sadness ‘I say get a grip of yourself Graeme think of other people that are got 
real difficulties in life’ 
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5.2 Lesley:  ‘A dad’s never scared’ 
Lesley is one of Graeme’s two daughters, she does not live with him but has frequent 
contact, phoning him daily and taking him to appointments, as well as sorting out 
any mail which comes in.  I offered her the option of talking to me separately or at 
her dad’s house, and she chose the latter, saying she had nothing to say that she 
would not say in front of him.  We met at his house during her lunch break from 
work.  I was struck by the warmth expressed between Graeme and Lesley; there was 
a strong sense of emotional attachment between them that has not been changed by 
dementia. 
5.2.1 A changing relationship 
Lesley tells the story of change in her relationship with her dad.  Her role has 
changed so that she is now providing practical help for him, as well as emotional 
support.   There is sadness at the changes, and nostalgia for the previous balance in 
their relationship, but there are also benefits for Lesley  
I mean in your day Dad you could be quite arrogant if 
somebody, if you disagreed with somebody, well you know 
that… whereas now if somebody says to him no I don’t 
agree, it’s quite good for me because he’ll say to me this is 
what I think and I’ll go to him well you know.   
Although it is difficult for her to see her dad being scared, there is a grown-up voice 
here. 
5.2.2  Family relationships 
There has been a change in their relationship but there remains a strong relationality.  
She addresses him warmly, and calls him Dad throughout the interview. They both 
act co-operatively in trying to work out the reasons for his hallucinations.  She assists 
him with his narratives 
Lesley you’re getting your story the stories are all getting 
muddled up 
Graeme oh again here I go 
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They both acknowledge that there are difficulties for him in knowing what has 
happened and she is positioned by both of them as someone who keeps him in touch 
with the details of what has occurred 
Lesley see you get this. All right where was this where did 
that happen? 
Graeme Dublin 
Lesley it didnae happen in Dublin 
Graeme was it no that’s where I thought it happened? 
When Graeme talks of the emotional impact of his dementia, and a possible future in 
which it may be better when he is no longer able to remember, Lesley allows him to 
finish, but does not engage in this conversation.  This is not far into the interview, 
and as it was set up to get her perspective, and she obviously has a lot to say, it 
would be foolish to assume that she sidesteps his emotional responses.  She has 
previously acknowledged his anxious emotional response to hallucinations as being 
distressing for both of them. 
The category ‘we’ is used for close family as this affects the whole family. It shifts 
from the ‘we’ of herself and her sister Bridget, who experience the greatest 
emotional impact of seeing the effort it all costs their dad  
that’s where Bridget and I struggle cos it’s our dad.  We’re 
like we need to, it’s like helping somebody with a stammer. 
You can see that it’s painful 
to the ‘we’ of husband and herself, who provide practical support ‘we said to my 
mum look we’ll take my dad away for a day’.   
Other members of the family are safe, as they do not cause him anxiety, but don’t 
have quite the same emotional ties as her sister and herself, so can respond without 
the same emotional cost.  
and I think that’s where my husband’s good cos he obviously 
sees my dad as his father-in-law not as his dad 
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5.2.3 What is a dad? 
Lesley has seen aspects of her dad that she had not previously known  
I think the fear 
I think that’s a big thing 
I think my dad being scared 
I’ve never seen my dad scared 
I think for me 
I mean 
She both knows, and does not know her dad, a dad should be in control and it is this 
change that is difficult for her 
and it was a lack of control and I think that’s a big thing for 
my dad my dad’s always…had a good self-control with 
regards his thoughts and what he does and how he responds 
to situations……… then all of a sudden not being able to 
make decisions and not being able to understand things 
Her sense of a ‘dad’ includes being in control, not fearful, able to make decisions, 
certain of his views, strong, a political guide, sociable and someone with whom you 
can have a trusting relationship.  All these things are compromised in her current 
relationship with her dad because of his dementia and hallucinations  
it is about you know I’m the child but it is about my dad 
having to say to me  ‘what do you think?’. 
5.2.4 Trust 
He is no longer able to trust his own knowledge and she has to explain what is real; 
she denies his perceptual reality and his temporal sequencing, but not his emotional 
reality.  Trust is a recurrent word in this interview - his trust of his own knowledge 
and also his trust of her.  How can she get him to believe her?   
Lesley struggles to make sense of the disruption in her relationship with her dad.  
She talks about the lack of trust but then retrieves the relationship by saying that he 
doesn’t mean it  
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I do feel there’s an issue with trust and it and I know he 
doesn’t mean it. 
She chooses to walk away from conflict when she knows it is irreconcilable at that 
time  
but if if he has an argument me I’ve seen me just walking out 
saying no that’s it I’m no listening to it. 
5.2.5 More uncertainty 
The’ I’ that is speaking is the voice of uncertainty as Lesley is living through the 
experience of her father’s dementia and hallucinations and trying to make sense of it. 
Lesley uses the phrase ‘I think’ a lot suggesting she is not sure about what is 
happening with her dad all the time.  She is living with uncertainty and spends a lot 
of time trying to work out what is causing his behaviour  
but it’s taken me 2 days to make sense of something you 
know and it’s and it is it’s the second guessing and no being 
sure 
It can be a tightrope working out what is safe to say to him, and needs to be done by 
someone who knows and understands him  
you have to be so careful and so sensitive to lessen to reduce 
the risk of him going ‘there is something going on you know 
there are people in the house’  
She gives examples of her Uncle, Graeme’s brother who is able to respond with 
humour  
my Uncle is very witty  and …… my dad’ll say well there 
was a cow trying to get into my(.)  bedroom window you 
know this cow was and my Uncle turns it into humour. 
People at mass, however, who are outside the family are not able to use humour, they 
tell him these things happen to everyone.  He sees this as a denial of his difficulties.  
Family members have had to learn to gauge their use of humour.   Lesley describes 
an incident when she and her husband took Graeme away for the day and his son-in-
law’s attempt at humour backfired as Graeme had been unable to take in the 
subtleties and had taken him literally. 
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5.2.6 Shrinking world 
I am surprised by the view they both expressed that a restricted social environment 
helps him to function, having always assumed that people who are socially isolated 
need more social stimulation.   Graeme’s social circle has become smaller and so 
demands on the family have increased 
you look at they photographs and you see my dad and how  
sociable he was and how welcoming he was and things like 
that my dad has a very limited circle of people he’ll mix with 
now. 
there’s a dozen by the time you count family Dad there’s a 
good 12 people that he can say things to but outwith that I 
mean people that he sees at parish I mean when I was at mass 
on Sunday and they’re like where’s your man where’s your 
dad I says no he was very tired yesterday so I think that’s him 
like he couldn’t say to them if he said to them if he said to 
them what a night 
It is mainly family with whom it is safe to socialise, otherwise he becomes anxious 
about his responses. Lesley believes this anxiety increases his hallucinations.  
if he went if he does something sociable and it’s not in a safe 
environment..he will have a hallucination 
They both valued a service provided by social care at the council that was 
personalised and flexible to his needs, but feel day care would not work for him. 
Lesley see a day centre’s no good to my dad 
Graeme no I wouldnae go I’d get myself (the gaol) 
Lesley if he went to a day centre we would have a rise in 
hallucinations…..if he went if he does something sociable 
and it’s not in a safe environment 
She believes that spending time with other people with dementia has been anxiety 
provoking for him, rather than supportive 
Dad you used to have to go into the toilet and breathe 
because you couldnae cope with the social environment never 
mind about being incompetent and being different and being 
all the rest of it.  Social environments and especially since 
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you’ve withdrawn from all these things you actually cope 
better 
5.2.7 Hidden work 
Lesley situates herself and her sister in the position of carers.  She is also situated in 
that position by services, but she becomes angry at the expectation that they do not 
need any help.  A one to one service which she and her dad valued was taken away 
from them  
nobody seems interested but I think it’s about time you know 
I mean the big thing for me is these guys that you had 2 hours 
a week were interested were supportive …….it took pressure 
off me.  
She was able to have ‘quality time’ with her dad as in a father-daughter relationship, 
rather than having to do the unseen work with him, of which other people are 
unaware.  She speaks with the voice of injustice, acknowledging her own care needs, 
which are not being met by the statutory services. 
She tells the story of the day to day difficulties of keeping her dad on track, work 
which is invisible to others who see him as someone who copes well 
my dad can present quite well but it’s taken me 2 days to 
make sense of something 
5.2.8 Making sense 
Lesley accepts the medical view of dementia as a disease or syndrome and at times 
struggles with the authoritative view of science  
I don’t know if this is the science behind it 
As I say this is maybe the science the brain sort of can’t work 
it out 
Although she looks for explanations, she gives multiple reasons for his hallucinations 
- they can be caused by tiredness, change in routine, his dementia and also his 
memory difficulties.  Equally appropriate responses are time and patience, limiting 
his social activities and humour. 
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She sees her dad’s dementia, not as the societal view of dementia of total 
disintegration, but as differing from the norm 
There seems to be this high functioning autism like my dad’s 
dementia is like high functioning autism  
But this does not negate the effect it has on him ‘It’s got this terrible impact on him’.  
This is not something immediately obvious to other people who do not know him, it 
is hidden, and impacts on her as a daughter 
My dad can present quite well…but see my dad’ll do things 
and I think do you know something it took me 2 days to get 
him there but then other people will think well done Graeme  
well done () but it’s taken me 2 days to make sense of 
something you know and it’s and it is it’s the second 
guessing and no being sure and (0.1) I know they say it about 
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5.3 Kim:  I find the brain fascinating 
This interview took place at 8am in a medical centre where Kim has an office.  Kim 
is an experienced community mental health nurse who knows me well, having 
worked with me for a number of years.  She is a specialist dementia nurse and has 
been involved with Graeme over a number of years.  I see her as a bit of a maverick, 
and I know she finds it difficult to conform to management decisions that she sees as 
inappropriate.  She has, however, been instrumental in setting up a number of new 
services for people with dementia.  It was obvious from the interview that we know 
each other, and in many ways have had the same views on a number of issues. 
5.3.1 Being in practice 
The overall story is about the practice of an experienced practitioner, the complexity 
and multiplicity of working as a community mental health nurse with people with 
dementia, and especially people who have dementia and hallucinations.  She uses 
clinical stories to illustrate the sophistication of her work, and the skills she uses.  
Dementia becomes part of people’s lives, as do hallucinations, but they are not the 
entirety of their lives, and it is possible to teach people to cope with aspects of it, but 
it takes time and skill in assessment. 
She tells of the relationship she has with clients especially Graeme.  There is a theme 
of the intensity of relationships in which both individuals work.  The words ‘people’ 
and ‘person’ are repeated, distancing herself from suggestions of ‘patient’, and 
suggesting that she considers people as individuals, rather than as part of a 
homogenous group of people with dementia.  She acknowledges that when there are 
more people involved, as in a staff group in a care home, a consistent therapeutic 
approach is more difficult to achieve. 
There are tensions between her desire to be an individual, and the constraints of 
being subject to the demands of the larger organisation.  Although she acknowledges 
that she is part of a service providing health care, there is also a refusal to be 
straightjacketed into the confines of the organisation.     
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when I have my first interview with people with dementia it’s 
almost a non-clinical visit, if that makes sense to you, 
because I’m not there to fill in forms,. I’m there trying to get 
to know the person, the official form-filling etc. comes in 
later  
She is confident in her skills as a practitioner.  She emphasises her ‘creative’ 
approach with people that is not part of her training or experience  
Liz: You say that you take quite a creative approach – where 
does that come from? 
Kim: That’s me   
There are a number of references to using herself as an individual.   
I think it’s probably because it’s how I run my life and this is 
going to sound as though I’m quite prescriptive here but 
about what I do  but I try and get people to look at everything 
that’s going on in their life 
‘Work’ is a word that is repeated throughout the interview, both in relation to herself, 
but also to the person with dementia.  The relationship is not just social, but some 
sort of work is being done in her interactions with people.   
The phrase ‘you know’ is repeated by Kim 32 times in the interview.  Brown and 
Gilligan (1993) propose that repeated use of ‘you know’ suggests that the 
interviewee may be unsure that the interviewer shares that knowledge.  Kim mainly 
uses this phrase when talking about specific interventions she makes with people 
with dementia who are referred to her. She uses it 14 times in her description of her 
work with Graeme; her knowledge here about him is based on her relationship with 
him, which is different to mine.  I am an ex-colleague who has done the same job but 
perhaps I do things differently and at one point she distances herself from me  
we are all individuals because you and I would do things 
differently  to the same end point and probably reach the 
same end point but we would go about it in a slightly 
different way   
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5.3.2 My response 
Kim is an experienced mental health nurse who has been working with older people 
with mental health problems, then specialising in dementia care for over 20 years. I 
know her fairly well, having done a similar job and worked collaboratively with her 
on a number of projects.   We have a similar approach to many of the issues 
discussed during this interview.  I recognise her sense of fascination and her 
enjoyment of discussions with Graeme, which I have also experienced. 
Her story begins and follows a pattern I recognise.  It is the work of an experienced 
practitioner, starting at the beginning of a referral, with an initial feeling of not 
knowing, leading on to an assessment process, the need to establish a relationship 
and then a treatment plan.  This is the way that most nurses would set about working 
with someone.   
I understand her sense of frustration at the system.  I too have experienced having to 
balance the demands of the organisation with wanting to provide the best care to 
individuals, who do not always follow the prescribed route. 
I was surprised that she did not discuss the shifting nature of hallucinations, which is 
my experience of hallucinations.  She adopts the line of working through how real 
hallucinations are likely to be.  She suggests that mostly hallucinations need attention 
from the nurse.  I am not as convinced by this view, as I think they can sometimes be 
a harmless activity that can be a way people stimulate themselves, when they may be 
bored. 
5.3.3 Three voices: confidence, creativity and dissonance 
For this reading I made an I-poem, and then read the poem for the voices that I heard.  
I identified three voices in this way.   
5.3.3.1 Confidence 
The strongest voice coming through was the voice of a competent and confident 
nurse.  Focusing on the voice of the ‘I’ in this interview shows a thoughtful 
practitioner.  An I-poem constructed  in a part of the interview describing  her own 
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work with individual people in which she is confident and in control, uses the 
collaborative ‘we’ and verbs of action 
The voice of confidence has few doubts about her practice.  The uncertainty at the 
beginning when she uses ‘I suppose’ and ‘I think’ is not about her abilities, but about 
not yet knowing the person who has been referred.  This voice tells what she does as 
a practitioner from referral, getting to know someone and building a relationship with 
them, to the work she engages in collaboratively with the person.    She tells the story 
of this process with Graeme 
Me trying to get a handle on 
When I visited him 
I knew 
The conversations that we had 
I knew that there was something 
I couldn’t always work it 
Made me think 
More than I was led to believe 
The referral I’d had 
 
Once I recognised 
I was able to then start 
I thought was  
I actually had to work on em again 
I had to revisit the diagnosis 
 
We really 
I would say cracked it 
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That’s what I mean 
The work that we did 
That’s what I mean 
We took a step back 
We took each episode 
We just really work through it 
We talked about it a lot 
We talked  
This voice is empowered and reflective.   She is confident in her knowledge and 
knows she can tell me things about her practice ‘What else can I tell you?’ 
5.3.3.2 Creativity 
Another voice is the voice of the creative individual.  Although she is a mental health 
nurse, she is also an individual who may do things differently from her peers 
We are all individuals 
You and I would do things differently 
We would go about it in a slightly different way 
This is why she enjoys being a community mental health nurse; it enables her to 
work individually with the person with dementia. 
When it’s me and the patient 
We’ve made our ground rules 
We’ve got our contract 
This is what we’ll do 
We’ll change things 
 This contrasts with her thoughts about the difficulties for care homes in getting all 
members of staff to collaborate in a consistent approach 
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I think that makes it worse 
I find most staff are prepared to try things 
I think that’s the starting point 
I do think staff in care homes 
I think that’s one of the biggest challenges for staff 
I do think 
I find more so in care homes 
I’m asking them to work in a particular way 
That’s what I mean 
This voice also tells of her reasons for enjoying the job, her fascination with 
dementia and the brain which allows her to use her creativity in flexibly working 
with people 
That’s me 
I find dementia  
I find the brain fascinating 
I think what happens 
I don’t think anything is clear cut 
I’m just prepared to try anything 
I never harm anyone 
I do ask people 
 
5.3.3.3 Dissonance 
The third voice is a voice of dissonance, where the creative competent practitioner 
has to work within the confines of a system with which she does not always agree.  
She acknowledges the tensions, not to question her own values, but to find ways of 
subverting the demands of the system. 
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I’m not there to fill in forms 
I’m there trying to get to know the person 
She is not always prepared to fit in with the system but keeps what she is doing quiet 
I’m not quite sure 
How it goes down with my colleagues 
 
5.3.4 Working in relationships 
In the third reading I focussed on how Kim talked about relationships.  The 
relationships she spoke about were predominantly with people with dementia, then 
with their families, colleagues and other people with whom she worked including 
staff in care homes. 
She describes a collaborative relationship with the person with dementia, where both 
parties together achieve change.  The word ‘work’ is repeated 58 times throughout 
this interview; the relationship is not a social one but a working relationship.  
Initially the balance of work is tipped towards the professional as she has to work to 
try to clarify what is happening for that person 
‘but it’s about really working out what it means to that 
person..then I would hope that I could work with the person’. 
It is then the turn of the person with dementia to work with her, when she talks of 
Graeme she says 
‘I’d probably say out of all the people I’ve seen over the 
years Graeme probably worked the hardest and followed 
everything that I suggested’ 
She tries to identify the things that someone values as being the aspect of their life 
that they will both work on.  She illustrates this through a model of 3 aspects of life  
I try and get people to look at everything that’s going on in 
their life and split things into three.  There are things that you 
can do and they’re not a problem and you can carry on doing 
them and there’s no issue there, and there are things that you 
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do that are becoming more difficult but quite frankly you 
don’t need to do, and there are things in the middle that are 
important and are difficult and something needs to change in 
order for that to keep going.  So you’ve got the first third 
which is not an issue at all the third third which are things 
you can actually do without and then you’ve got  the things 
that are really important and that’s what people often want to 
work on because they want to keep that part of their life 
going 
It is not always easy to understand what is happening for the person with dementia 
especially if they are experiencing hallucinations.  She achieves this by talking to 
them and getting to know something about their lives.  Even then it may not be clear 
but may be something an experienced practitioner ‘picks up’.   
through the conversations I have with people it sometimes 
takes time before I can actually pick up that I think there is 
something which is not quite right because a lot of people if 
they had if the hallucinations have been a part of their life 
Her main aim is to help people through transitions such as coming to terms with 
diagnosis and other changes in their lives.  She also believes that people with 
dementia can adapt to change and cope with their life as someone with dementia for 
longer, although only in the earlier stages 
you can help somebody to make changes in their lives and 
you can help people to recognise what’s happening to them. I 
honestly do believe that they cope better and for longer but it 
has to be done as early as possible  
Although people with dementia can be taught skills to help them adapt they are not 
able to carry these over into different situations, when another change happens this 
needs to be addressed again. 
I tend to find with people with dementia if I can teach them 
one thing the difficulty is, because of the damage that is 
happening in their brain that those skills are not transferable 
to another situation so it’s almost like you have to start again 
She finds reciprocity in her work, she enjoys it because she finds the brain 
fascinating but in the case of Graeme she also finds their conversations fascinating 
despite sometimes being irrelevant to the issue at hand. 
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we ended up talking about oh everything to do with politics 
and nothing to do with the issue at hand  because the 
conversation was very stimulating. It was kind of hard for me 
to get back on track (laughs) you know.  I went in there very 
focused and the conversation just became something 
completely different and I would go away and I would say at 
the end that’s not what we started out to do but it was really 
interesting but we’re going to have to do this again (laughter) 
The people she sees are all different and live in diverse situations so she needs to 
have a flexible approach to her work.  It may conflict with the expectation of the 
NHS that requires certain procedures.  She links her style to her own creativity. 
She often works with staff in care homes to try to achieve a difference for the 
individual residents.  This is more of a challenge because she is not able to control 
the situation.  In these situations she sees her role as trying to change culture through 
teaching.  She is the dementia expert in these situations and is trying to help them to 
work in a certain way.  She is removed from direct caring here and acknowledges 
that there are difficulties for a staff group that she as a lone practitioner does not face. 
trying to get a consistent approach happening is difficult  
It is also difficult for them to understand the differing realities of people with 
dementia who hallucinate as they care for too many people.  It is not easy for them to 
adjust between individuals. 
5.3.5 Working with dementia and hallucinations 
Kim works within the mental health care system and when she talks of dementia it is 
as a collection of diseases that are diagnosed, and are progressive. 
it’s a whole mix of people that I would see, and covering the 
whole range of all of the dementias and all the age groups 
and all the stages that people go through 
Dementia has a neuropathological cause 
I find the brain fascinating and I think what happens to the 
brain when it develops dementia makes the brain even more 
fascinating 
 
Graeme, Lesley and Kim 
  138 
A diagnosis is important.  She works with people immediately post diagnosis to give 
them information about the illness and to help them to come to terms with it.  People 
like Graeme are diagnosed with or given the diagnosis of a specific type of dementia.   
first of all he was diagnosed with dementia with Lewy-bodies 
Being unsuccessful in reaching a diagnosis is a failure of the expected role of 
medicine and its contract with the patient. 
this is 7-8 years em you know since his original diagnosis 
and of course in that time the diagnosis of Lewy-body hasn’t 
isn’t his diagnosis, so he also had to learn to come to terms 
with the fact that he didn’t have that and he had something 
that we couldn’t give a name to, which was very difficult   
Hallucinations in dementia can be part of the disease and can evolve with the brain 
damage  
something changes and that’s usually as the dementia 
progresses and the hallucinations become distressing 
There is a suggestion of a definite singular reality that is the ‘common sense’ view of 
reality and that may be different from the reality of dementia and hallucinations.  
People who hallucinate may, however, have ‘merged them into their real life’.   
People like Graeme may respond to a logical argument, they have the  
ability to recognise for whatever reason that it something 
can’t be real for instance somebody who sees 100 people in 
their back garden but if you actually measured out the back 
garden 100 people couldn’t get in there 
Although he was aware that ‘strange things were happening’ they ‘were very real’ to 
him.  He distinguished between ‘the realities of life and the reality of dementia’. 
Although Kim uses a disease model to explain dementia, she is clear that people are 
individuals and will respond in different ways 
it is very individual because it’s different for everybody’ 
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Dementia is just a part of their life not its’ entirety and her role is to enable people to 
maintain their lifestyle as far as possible  




Care is shared in this case study; Lesley and Graeme are involved in the long term 
care relationship of father and daughter.  Kim is involved in caring professionally for 
Graeme and also Lesley, with her recognition of the role of family carers.  
Caregiving is complex and collaborative, based on relationships, reciprocity, 
professional knowledge, negotiation and resources.   Graeme is responsive to care 
from both his daughter and his community nurse, responsibilities are negotiated and 
fluid.  
There are slippery boundaries and uncertainty for Graeme and also for Lesley.   
Hallucinations and dementia can be unpredictable and they both have to navigate 
temporal slippages.  Kim is more certain of hallucinations and dementia with her 
professional knowledge, uncertainty for her is the personal knowledge of the person 
with dementia which exists on first meeting them. 
They all approach hallucinations as something that can be challenged, Kim has 
taught Graeme techniques for this, which he uses and he also asks for Lesley’s 
knowledge and assistance when he struggles to find ‘reality’. 
Graeme was the first person I interviewed in this study and our contact led to my first 
conflicts in the field.  The following section addresses some of the unexpected 
difficulties I encountered.  
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5.5 How to be a researcher: how do I know? 
Attention to reflexivity has become an integral aspect of qualitative social research, it 
is expected that the researcher acknowledges their own position within the creation 
of knowledge (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003, Finlay, 2003).  A voice-centred 
relational method of data analysis builds a reading for the researcher into the first 
reading.  The interpersonal context of my research relationship with Graeme resulted 
in some unanticipated requirement for reflexivity in my study.  I will begin by 
located myself in relationship to Graeme, and then discuss a specific incident within 
one of our interviews that caused me to question some previous assumptions. 
5.5.1 Situating myself 
I knew Graeme from the past and I felt comfortable with him, knowing some of his 
life history.  Although this was my first research interview, my knowledge of his 
situation meant that I did not need to ask for clarification about his family, nor some 
of his hallucinations.  I like him, we share similar political views and I was amused 
by his description of shouting at a political debate on the TV.   I was, however, 
unsure of our research relationship, I did not know how to be a researcher but I did 
know how to be a nurse.  He brought me his medication to show me how many 
tablets he was taking and talked to me about his community nurse and psychiatrist, 
acknowledging my relationship with both of them, and positioning me as a nurse.   
He is a person with dementia and I do not currently have dementia, but I do have a 
lot of experience as a nurse working with people with dementia.  I am conscious that 
I used skills acquired in clinical practice, in relating to him, such as allowing him 
time to tell his story.  Listening to the recording I sound more Scottish with him, in a 
subconscious attempt to relate. 
I do not share his hallucinations, but have a similar difficulty in knowing them; I see 
them as a slippery concept.  His uncertainty about how he knows, mirrors mine, how 
do I know?  He talks a lot about sleeping and I wonder if there is any connection 
with hallucinations.  He has said he sometimes finds it difficult to distinguish 
between hallucinations and ‘reality’. 
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I see people in the hall …there’s probably naebody there and 
I don’t know if it’s because I’m overtired 
He reiterated that he is happy being alone and is not lonely but this confused me.  I 
am certain that his world is shrinking as he restricts his social interactions mainly to 
his family.  I was also concerned about his description of his experience of feeling 
inadequate at a group to which I had accompanied him in the past.  I find this 
difficult to hear as it reflects on my previous experience of advocacy of this group.  I 
am sad that things are becoming more difficult for him. 
This sense of sadness is much stronger for me following the second interview when I 
found it overwhelming.  It raised issues for me about my previous work, had this 
been of any value when dementia seemed to be such an awful experience with an 
inevitable decline.  I also felt abusive, that I was just making him sad for the sake of 
my study.  I wondered if I had become too removed from practice and now see it in a 
rosy glow.  I remember feelings of sadness in practice. 
I am obviously attached to Graeme, we have had a relationship over a number of 
years and I feel powerless that I cannot make his situation better.  When I listen again 
to the interview I am very aware of my need to end it on a positive note and not leave 
him feeling bad. 
Following the interview I discussed my experience in supervision, and my supervisor 
suggested that I should possibly look for a way of providing some sort of reciprocity 
to him.  I suggested to him that we go out for lunch.  He had told me about his 
difficulties in making meals and that it helped when his family took him out for 
lunch. 
I wrote the following notes in the days following the interview. 
5.5.2 Notes on emotional impact 
‘Do we risk appearing foolish to our colleagues (and a lay 
audience) when we admit to naïveté, ignorance and /or 
uncertainty, that is when we let slip the cloak of authority that 
traditionally has set us apart from the people we study?’ 
(Hertz, 1997) pxvi 
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I am a skilled mental health practitioner; I say this possibly to reassure myself.  One 
of the courses I studied during my MSc was reflexivity.  At the time I thought it was 
interesting enough but nothing new to me, if truth be told I thought it was a bit of 
navel gazing.  Of course I am used to dealing with people’s emotions and I know 
how to interview people with dementia; I have spent much of my career doing 
exactly this. 
5.5.3 Extract from interview 
Graeme I said a silly a really really silly thing to Lesley and 
Bridget (daughters).  I said it’ll maybe be better if I get to the 
stage where I don’t know at all what’s going on then it 
wouldnae bother me but because I know that silly things is 
going on. I’m doing I just I just cannae cope.  It’s just so 
frustrating, that’s why I cancelled going to Berwick, because 
frighten’s no the right word, fighten’s no the right word it’s 
concern that, and it’s it’s no other people it’s myself.  I’m no 
I’m no er because as I say most people are understanding and 
try and help but there’s only a few people that I would trust 
and see I start to feel sorry for myself I mean, the now I’m 
feeling sad and sad’s the word 
Liz mhmm mhmm 
Graeme sad’s the word.  I, it’s no feeling sorry for myself I 
feel sad that it’s come to this 
Liz right 
Graeme that I cannae go and do what I used to be able to do 
and I know, I know as we get older and things happen but I 
mean I’m no that old and I’m no 
Liz yeah 
Graeme it’s just that my whole personality, personality and 
character has so totally changed I find it difficult to cope with  
5.5.4 Extract from Field notes 
I felt uncomfortable during much of the first part of my visit 
when he talked about his sadness.  Partly I felt I may be 
making things worse for him by making him talk about it.  
People are often wary of this type of response when talking to 
people with mental health problems but I did not experience 
this while working as a community mental health nurse.  
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What is this about?  Do I see myself as therapeutic as a nurse 
but not as a researcher?  Do I worry about upsetting people 
for no good reason?  Is this a reflection of how I value my 
study? 
This feeling became more visceral for me in the days following the interview I 
started to feel almost abusive in the way I was using him.  Why was I suddenly 
feeling like this? This experience brought me up sharply I was surprised and 
confused, I had paid lip service to reflexivity but suddenly I needed to re-visit it.  
What does this mean, being both subject and object of my study; I wondered how it 
would look.  I spoke to other experienced mental health nurses who had done 
research degrees and discovered that they tell similar stories of trying to negotiate 
boundaries between being a researcher and a practitioner. 
Liz Bondi (2005) argues that a range of emotions can be experienced in a research 
study from excitement and passion but those seen as negative are the ones which are 
problematised.  Emotional responses are accepted as multiple and fluid until 
something occurs to upset feeling rules.  I had accepted my upbeat feelings of relief 
and happiness that Graeme wanted to speak to me at all, to help in this study and 
worried that he may change his mind at any minute. 
Graeme had said that there were only a small number of people with whom he feels 
safe, and had included me in that number.  I fluctuated between feeling flattered that 
this was a reflection on my ability to establish a relationship with someone with 
dementia, and feeling slightly uncomfortable that I was using skills from practice in a 
dishonest way.  As Jennifer Mason reminds us we can suddenly become too close to 
the experience of our research participants and ‘surely that is intrusive: a bit like 
stalking?’(Mason, 2011: 15).  The boundaries appeared to be blurred between myself 
as practitioner and researcher in an unexpected way. 
Graeme’s expression of feeling in this interview could be viewed as very telling of 
his experience of living with dementia.  It has proved to be useful data both within 
that context, but also as an illustrative narrative of a novice researcher.  Birch and 
Miller (2000) both believed they had gathered ‘good data’ during their studies  
involving self-disclosure.  Somehow these interviews had been more authentic and 
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revealing of the self.  Each, however, experienced different reactions to the idea that 
the person they were interviewing found the encounter therapeutic.  One of them 
found this to be uncomfortable, the other did not.   
I come from a world in which the predominant research narrative is that of objective 
medical science, and it is easy to forget that respondents will situate the researcher as 
much as the researcher situates the respondents  (Hertz, 1997). The way people 
define the identity of the researcher can become apparent in the way that they talk 
(Silverman, 2001).  The way they attribute meanings to the researcher selves will 
affect the way they receive them. What did Graeme think about my role, despite 
knowing that I was doing research and was currently a student, he knew my 
background and knew me as a nurse before this research study.  He almost certainly 
still identified me as a nurse, there had been times during our contact when he 
discussed his medication and he asked about whether I had seen his community nurse 
or consultant psychiatrist.  Rheinharz (1997) identified over twenty selves when 
analysing her field notes which fitted into 3 main categories.  We bring different 
selves with us into fieldwork and also create selves within research as research based 
and situationally created selves.  Graeme knew the self I brought as nurse, colleague 
of Kim and also a friend of someone whose mother his wife knew.  I bring or create 
in the field someone who listens.  
Graeme I find it difficult trying to explain to people and 
there’s only the likes of yourself or Kim or my family that I’d 
be comfortable talking about it 
 Extract from interview 
Oakley (1981) in her seminal paper about interviewing women describes the idea of 
a ‘proper interview’ as a masculine paradigm.   It aims to collect data from a passive 
interviewee, and emotions would get in the way of ‘real science’.  Although this 
chapter was written 30 years ago, the suggestion of objectifying the person being 
interviewed seems to be an idea worth considering in this instance.  I know that my 
voice will be heard but how can I enable his voice to be heard too?  Is this even 
possible when I will always be the person making the choices about what is heard. 
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Should I be even trying to get this self-disclosing voice heard though, this is 
supposed to be research not a therapeutic interview.  If I accept the voice-centred 
relational method of analysis, my emotional reaction has to be acknowledged as a 
source of knowledge (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003).  I do not have a diagnosis of 
dementia, and have spent much of the last years of my career trying to challenge the 
belief of dementia as an illness that destroys people’s identity, is that why I reacted 
so strongly to him expressing the idea that perhaps it would be better when, and if, he 
no longer realises what he is doing.  Does this negative concept of dementia really 
reflect how I feel about it and thus negate my professional practice? 
The issues in this encounter seem to be about me as a researcher and how the 
boundaries are being crossed with my nurse self.  Emotional labour where work 
involves feelings has been identified in a number of occupations including nursing 
(Smith, 2008).  I felt like I knew the feeling rules (Hochschild, 1983) as a 
practitioner but not the feeling rules needed to be a researcher.  There has been a 
growing body of work on the sociology of emotions but the impact of emotions on 
the researcher remains an underwritten topic (Hubbard et al., 2001).  There are a 
number of reasons suggested for this, including the continuing dominance of some 
aspects of positivism and the belief in objective science.  Fieldworkers may be 
expected to utilise subjectivity to establish relationships, but emotion is suspect in 
science, so mixed messages about emotions abound in even qualitative research 
(Kleinman and Copp, 1993). Coming from a world of psychiatry, this remains a 
factor affecting my experience. 
I found myself conflicted yet again, between the different roles of nurse and 
researcher.  Should I have silenced Graeme to make me feel more comfortable?  I do 
not think I did anything different from the way I would have reacted as a nurse; I 
allowed him to express his feelings and knew at the end of the interview he was no 
longer distressed.  I also telephoned him the following day to make sure he was not 
upset.  For Graeme there was a continuous questioning of reality; maybe I have to 
learn something from this analogy. 
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Clinical supervision at this point enabled me to engage with the ghosts that haunted 
me, behind what Doucet describes as the ‘gossamer walls through which researchers 
construct knowledge’ (Doucet, 2008: 1).  As I reread and listen to the interview I am 
still shocked when I reach the point at which he says it may be better when he 
reaches the time when he is oblivious.  It challenges my belief in equity; I feel it is 
unfair that this decline is happening to him.  I continue to wonder what this extract 
was about, the reflexive aspect of situating myself emotionally continues.  
Reflexivity is integral to the voice centred relational method of analysis but I was 
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6 Dave, Joan and Alex 
6.1 Dave’s realities: ‘a hallucination is a sort of up 
market dream’ 
Dave lives with his wife on the fourth floor of a private block of flats.  Their living 
room is a large room with a lot of natural light.  It faces out to the front of the 
building onto large mature trees and a small building site. The kitchen at the back of 
the house overlooks a golf course that is separated from the grounds of the flats by 
more large trees and a high wall.  Dave sits in an upright chair at the end of the living 
room where he can easily see out of the window.  He has mobility difficulties and the 
chair is designed to make it easier for him to get up and down. 
He was diagnosed with Parkinson’s 20 years ago.  I recognise the involuntary 
writhing movements of dyskinesia, which can be associated with Parkinson’s.    
Because of the Parkinson’s, his face can seem a little expressionless and I find it hard 
to read the emotional nuances, so initially I find myself surprised by sudden flashes 
of dry humour.  His voice is very soft and tends to disappear, making it difficult to 
follow at times.  There are a number of occasions when I have to tell him that I have 
not heard what he has said.  He sometimes loses track of his story and at one point he 
says he has lost his place.  He has been to courses run by speech therapists and learnt 
a number of tricks to aid communication. He knows that he needs to practice these 
skills and tells me that he notices the reaction of other people. If they are yawning he 
says he realises his voice is disappearing.  I needed some time to tune in to the way 
he communicates.  Despite these difficulties Dave is very keen to talk and to tell me 
about his experiences. 
He has recently been diagnosed with dementia and according to the community 
mental health nurse who recruited him to my study; he has vivid hallucinations that 
he is happy to discuss.  My interviews required a flexible approach.  Mostly I spoke 
to Dave alone, but his wife returned towards the end of my two individual interviews 
and I interviewed her with Dave present on a further occasion.  He has carers who 
visit to give him lunch on the days his wife goes out.  The twice I visited coincided 
with the tail end of the carer’s visit.  When I was to interview him for the first time, 
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the carer had only just given him lunch; they had been late because they were tidying 
the garage.  I did not record the first half of our conversation to give him chance to 
eat his lunch.  This was a slow process and he in fact told me a lot about changes in 
his life during this period. 
6.1.1 Extract from field notes of Interview 1  
The door was opened by the paid carer who told me that 
Dave was having his lunch as they had been busy tidying up 
the garage.  I went through to the living room and Dave 
joined me, the carer brought through his lunch.  The consent 
form was lying on the table; his wife had completed the parts 
which did not need a signature. I discussed the consent 
process again and he said he wanted to go ahead.  The carer 
came through to join us for lunch so we chatted generally.  
The carer asked about what I was doing and I explained.  
This led to a discussion of retirement and Dave said he 
couldn’t imagine working full time again as somehow the day 
just disappeared.  When he was a young man he used to be a 
‘night owl’ and would often work from 10.30pm – 3 am as 
well as being at work.  Now he found it difficult to finish the 
crossword and to read the paper. 
I was aware of his need to finish his lunch so did not think I 
should start the interview, although he seemed to want to start 
telling me things.  We tried out the recorder and this led to 
discussion of a course he had attended to enhance his speech 
because of the difficulties from his Parkinson’s.  He had 
found this helpful but intense, requiring practice like all skills 
‘not like riding a bike’.  He has friends who will point out to 
him when his voice is becoming quieter.  His conversation 
had started out quite positively, we discussed my studies.  
Then I asked him about his career as a teacher, which he 
obviously relished.  He had also done other learning, such as 
a course in Hungarian. 
He then spoke of the difficulties he experienced.  He feels 
that his skills have been wasted for example he used to be 
good with his hands and had collected many tools over the 
years but now he cannot use them.  He gave examples of 
difficulties in doing simple things like making a cup of tea, 
which he has done four times a day for years.  He now ends 
up putting cold water in the cup or putting water in the coffee 
jar rather than the other way round and he becomes frustrated 
at being unable to correct this mistake. He knows it is wrong 
but can’t work out how to fix it, Another example he gave 
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was of dropping a pea onto a shiny table and instead of 
picking it up with his fingers or a knife, spending a lot of 
time chasing it around the table with a fork, leaving a mess of 
sauce then realising that people were wondering what he was 
doing.  He was disappointed that I had not recorded this 
conversation due to me waiting for him to finish his lunch   
Dave tells me the story of what he sees.  In the word cloud, ‘see’ is the most 
prominent word in the first interview.   He starts by telling me that he has always 
been imaginative, then moves on to his perceptual difficulties, what he could see, and 
how to an extent his vision was corrected with glasses.  What he sees then becomes 
more fanciful, he sees his family in the house and he sees people outside in the trees.  
He also shows me what he sees; taking me to the window to show me what is in the 
trees. 
The other story he tells is one of difficulty in doing things he has previous taken for 
granted, such as calculations.  This is a theme that is continued from before the 
recording, when he told me how he felt his skills were now wasted.  He tells me how 
‘pissed off ‘ he is with the consequences of not being able to distinguish what he 
sees, especially that he is no longer allowed  to drive. 
Parkinson’s disease disrupted the expected path of his life but it was something he 
learnt to live with, the reality was not as bad as may have been anticipated.  In the 
same way his dementia, which is a later diagnosis has not so far proved as difficult as 
the disease he may have dreaded, had someone previously told him he might get 
dementia.  He distinguishes between the two at the beginning of the third interview 
and then is unable to separate them ‘I’m having trouble separating the effects of 
Parkinson’s and dementia’. I am struck by his use of terms such as ‘not part of the 
masterplan’ and ‘my version of the illness’.    
Although changes to his lifestyle have been necessitated, they have not been so 
difficult to cope with.  He is not sure what the future with dementia will be like but 
having managed Parkinson’s he seems optimistic that he is up to the challenge of 
dementia.  The later part of the interview is about the distinctions between reality, 
hallucinations and dreaming.  It can be difficult to separate dreaming and 
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hallucinations and imagination in the same way as it can be difficult separating 
Parkinson’s and dementia, this is his version of the illness. 
 I am surprised by what I see as his playfulness with regard his hallucinations.  I 
think they would fit DSM lV criteria as hallucinations but he relates them to 
creativity and imagination, which had not occurred to me.   He seems playful in his 
approach to what he sees outside.  His wife tells me he had described a full cricket 
match taking place in the trees; she asks him if this is still happening and he tells her 
that the cricket season has finished. 
6.1.2 ‘My version of the illness’ 
He rejects the dominant understanding of his two diagnoses, that they are 
overwhelming and tragic ‘there are some that thinks that would be bloody awful’.  
His view is that   
with the modern medicine available Parkinson’s is lessened. I 
think and I’ll wait 10 years if I last that long and tell you how 
the dementia has done.   
His ‘version of the illness’ is the one that he and his wife cope with.  Comparing 
himself to some other people he realises ‘how badly off some other people were and 
that maybe we weren’t so bad after all’.  
This voice talks of both change and continuity. He compares his life in the past and 
now: ‘I used to be’ but ‘now I get my mashed potato cut up’ but he rejects being 
identified as the disease, and asserts his right to be an individual with the disease ‘we 
had my version of the illness’ and talking about an episode of hallucinations ‘this is 
my experience’.  Although both Parkinson’s and dementia have affected him and 
restricted his life 
My mind’s not as sharp 
I can’t get the letters 
and 
I can’t get my body to do 
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What I want it to do  
He has an accepting voice about these changes and says ‘I don’t dwell on it’.  He was 
able to express his agency throughout, was not overwhelmed by the unexpected onset 
of Parkinson’s disease and is confident in his sense of self 
I was able to carry on 
we were offered early retirement 
I was able to take 
I wasn’t earning any or significantly less 
His desire is to continue as an autonomous actor making lifestyle choices  
I’d rather know 
What I’m going to do 
I would rather choose 
When I can say 
Despite the changes which have been wrought on his lifestyle by illness ‘we learnt I 
think to cope’.  He is optimistic about the future, describing himself now, following 
prescription of anti-cholinesterase inhibitor medication as 
I feel as if it’s not that bad 
I’m not so forgetful 
I’m not so cack-handed 
I I don’t know 
I mean 
I’m getting dressed 
It’s easier to put my socks on 
He compares himself with others and thinks he is managing equally well  
I was at a lunch yesterday 
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I as far as I was aware 
I was able to keep up 
His view of his core nature remains unchanged ‘my nature in general is’ and ‘that’s 
my particular philosophy’. 
He talks of himself as active in helping me with my study 
If I'm not telling you 
Tell me 
I would rather tell you 
Many of the verbs he uses are verbs of action, describing how he goes about doing 
things ‘my mind breaking down a problem’.  Some of these strategies are no longer 
working for him   
I was a little perturbed 
I not read the clues 
I couldn't answer them right 
I I cannot do simple arithmetic 
I have to pass it on to somebody 
I can't even divide by two 
 Despite the changes he experiences, there is a strong sense of continuity in the way 
he talks about himself, things are explained with reference to himself in the past ‘I’ve 
always had a vivid imagination’ and ‘my mind is the type of mind’.   
The ‘I’ who speaks sees things and illustrates this by telling what he sees, he also 
shows, he goes to look out at the trees where he often sees people in trees and points 
out what he is seeing.  When I tell him I am unable to see what he describes he is 
unfazed by this 
Dave: but I’m quite sure you can see 
Liz: no I can’t see that 
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Dave: no? 
6.1.3 The great masterplan 
Dave and his wife had anticipated a different retirement to the one that was 
interrupted by Parkinson’s disease.  The vocal and politicised professionals of his 
generation, especially prior to the latest recession, expected a long and active 
retirement when they would be much fitter and more prosperous than previous 
generations.  
He lives with his wife and talks about her in the relaxed manner of a long-standing 
relationship.  He says of her ‘she’ll be on at me not eating my lunch again that she’s 
spent hours slaving over a hot stove no it’ll be my fault don’t you worry’.  This is a 
humorous reference to a relationship in which he is comfortable.  He describes her 
reaction to him bringing in 4 cups of tea because he has seen other members of the 
family in the room ‘Joan says what the hell have you made all that tea for?’ 
Dave regarded his relationships as positive although much of our interviews are 
about him as an individual.  He starts our third interview talking about himself as 
part of a couple, their expectations for life when they retired that turned out 
differently to the reality  
it’s obviously not what we not part of the great masterplan..of 
life when we were 20 odd you know what we thought would 
happen..when we were coming up for retirement 
Dave is less active in the joint interview but it was organised as an interview with 
Joan rather than a joint interview.  He agrees and disagrees with her without any 
obvious difficulty.  It is their relationship, that he predominantly dwells on and he 
reiterates that accord is important to him 
I don’t think that there’s any what may be called disharmony 
about it 
I think there’s to me it’s an important aspect of it that there 
could be arguments and quarrels 
Although he says 
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I sometimes don’t accept it in that I think she’s wrong 
A couple of seconds later he says 
But I’ve accepted she can’t see them and therefore they 
probably are hallucinations 
He has to struggle with the differing realities and finds himself in the position of 
capitulating.  The harmony is important and maintains the relationship 
You’ve always been supportive you know you’ve not always 
seen my point of view as to what you may not agree with it.  
You may not see and you don’t and think I shouldn’t see 
whatever it is I see 
His health is not something that affects only him; he allocates joint ownership to it. It 
is not just him who has his version of the illness but ‘we had’ it.  He perceives an 
equity in their relationship despite his difficulties; they dealt with the reality of 
illness as a couple ‘as far as it’s concerned Joan and myself just dealt with it’ and ‘it 
doesn’t cause disharmony between us’.  His hallucinations do not cause dispute 
between them. 
Other family relationships are discussed in the contexts of either hallucinations or 
dreams. His children feature in his hallucinations of people in the house; his daughter 
appearing regularly.  He describes hallucinations of his son experienced during the 
night.  The following day he apologized to the neighbours for the behaviour of his 
son and his friends 
he tended to bring his friends around at 2 o’clock in the 
morning all in their cars and all sitting in the neighbours’  
drives because they’d got the wrong one and their usual 
teenage carrying on 
This fits with the predominant Western tradition of parents being responsible for 
children until adulthood but there is a disjuncture in his experience.  His initial 
response as a father of teenage children was redundant as he recognises that ‘I was 
thinking of him as back at school’.   
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It is members of the family like his daughters who he ‘sees’ in the living room, 
whereas outside he sees strangers.  There is nothing strange or unusual about 
members of the family visiting, what is strange is that when he returns from the 
kitchen having made them cups of tea they have disappeared.  His mother appears in 
a dream and reassures him by ‘magicking’ things which are disrupted back home. 
He obviously has less day-to-day dealings with the organisation of his medical needs 
than Joan, and he talks of the medical profession in general, who become entangled 
in a hallucination.  When he is awaiting discharge from hospital he thinks that 
the nursing staff had put me in prison 
Again there is a disjuncture between his hallucination and social expectations of 
nurses and he discovers that ‘people were being sympathetic’. 
Friends were discussed before the recording started, when he talked about his speech 
difficulties.  He has friends who will point out to him that his voice is getting lower 
enabling him to correct this.  He has obviously been involved in the resident’s 
committee as he illustrated his difficulties in calculation now, with an illustration 
from an incident affecting the residents. 
Friends and neighbours provide practical support 
it also generated a lot of help from people, neighbours, 
friends all made a little sometimes a big contribution to 
making life easy..nothing major just little things in life; a bit 
of baking something, or come down for your tea tonight, save 
you cooking 
6.1.4 External reality 
Most people conceive of a single everyday external reality.  Despite the dream like 
quality of his hallucinations Dave also uses common-sense logic to experiences in a 
way that to me does not seem to fit. An example is that I visited one very windy day 
and wondered if the movement of leaves and branches would affect what he saw.  
When I  asked him if this made any difference to his hallucinations of people in the 
trees, he adopted a matter of fact approach and told me ‘it’d be a silly hallucination if 
a boy came out in this weather and started to climb trees’ 
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For Dave there can be a distinction between ‘reality’ and what he experiences when  
I discovered that in reality 
I woke up 
I was being kept in a nice comfortable bed  
I was sitting 
I hadn’t been out 
There is a dividing line between dreaming and reality here and ‘I had transposed the 
dress from the hallucination to reality or reality to a hallucination’ again suggesting a 
distinct divide. 
He says ‘I tend to see’ but other people’s reality can seem to be more reliable than 
his own and proof is difficult to find 
I don’t know 
I don’t 
I would say 
I can’t give you any evidence 
I’m not surprised 
I suspect it is 
I can’t offer you any 
He says that he has had to reject his own reality at times 
Liz: and when I tell you that I can’t see that do you think that 
it must be something that you’re just seeing 
Dave: I’ve come to accept that it is but it’s very difficult 
because sometimes it’s so real 
The responses from other people can give him a clue that he is not experiencing the 
same things as them.  He describes hearing music and asking the neighbours about it 
the next day ‘funny looks all around’. 
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6.1.5 Certainty 
Dave speaks with the certainty of experience 
I still maintain 
As far as I’m concerned 
If I may come in 
This can be with regard to whether he needs help 
I don’t need help 
I don’t need reassurance 
I know 
I can logically work out 
It is also when he talks of perceptual experiences that he knows differ from those of 
Joan.  In this extract she has asked him if he experiences hallucinations when he is 
staying at his brother’s house 
I will see 
As far as I’m concerned 
I went out to remonstrate 
He describes ephemeral, intangible episodes often with a similar certainty 
I’d define them as dreams 
They don’t worry me 
If I waken up 
They stay with me 
I can remember 
As the fact that he is no longer allowed to drive 
Firmly entrenched in my mind 
Strongly influenced my life 
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I can’t drive 
I mustn’t drive 
It annoys me 
I just have to accept it 
This voice of certainty can, however, let him down 
I can distinguish 
I will constantly speak to them 
A blank back at me 
Until I realised 
He is not always certain 
I’m disturbed sometimes 
I can’t remember now 
I had to get on a train 
I was left to take the fares 
I won’t argue 
I’ve never established 
This uncertain voice has difficulty in distinguishing between hallucination, dreaming 
and ‘reality’ 
I got all sorts of complications 
In my hallucinations 
In my was it a dream 
 
I cannot be absolutely sure 
I’m dreaming 
I don’t know 
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He cannot trust himself, his reality fluctuates enough ‘to make me wonder’.  His 
experiences become uncertain and so he describes them as dreams 
I have a dream 
If I can describe it 
I can’t explain 
I’m dreaming 
I’m not able to distinguish 
I don’t know 
This uncertainty can cause anxiety ‘I was in a small panic’ and so he found 
reassurance from his mother 
I spoke to my mother 
I did that 
My mother appears 
My mother said to me 
I put away the slightly disturbing imaging 
 He describes the difficulty he can have in ‘separating as I said reality and 
imagination’ and ‘I cannot be absolutely sure whether I’m dreaming or 
hallucinating’.  ‘It’s a bit of a mixture’ and he explains a hallucination as ‘a sort of 
upmarket dream’.   
He associated his hallucinations very much with his imagination, telling me  
I have always been able to I suppose think laterally and create 
situations I enjoyed acting 
in response to me asking him to tell me about his hallucinations.  He then goes on to 
justify this  
I think it's necessary to say this first because I know some 
people don’t have that capacity.  
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It is only recently that these things have been renamed hallucinations, since he 
became involved with the Community Mental Health Team 
I’m trying to think about my first impressions of what are 
now called hallucinations 
 Previously they may have been related to his ability to ‘given any situation I can 
make up a story’. 
The way he describes his hallucinations reminds me of the way I have thought about 
my dreams and how difficult it can be to tell them.  I know the feeling of trying to 
tell something so ephemeral that slips away as you try to grapple with it.  I am 
surprised by his slippery boundaries between dreams and hallucinations as I have 
assumed they are very different concepts. 
He ended up telling me about dreams.  I was not sure if he thought that his dreams 
were hallucinations and he said he was not sure of the difference.  I wonder at the 
experience of reality for him and Graeme of dreams and hallucinations being closely 
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6.2 Joan’s realities: ‘just part of our lives’ 
Joan is Dave’s wife.  She asked me whether I wanted Dave to be present during our 
interview.  I told her it was up to them and they decided he would stay, with the 
option to leave the room or fall asleep if he felt bored.  In fact after a short time Joan 
was including him in the discussion about his experiences and it became a three way 
conversation.  She had said that she was happy to say anything in front of him and is 
very matter of fact about his experiences, having no difficulty in disagreeing with 
him about what he sees.   
In this joint interview I hear how both Joan and Dave, two people in a long term 
relationship have adapted to integrate hallucinations into their life together.  As Joan 
says ‘I mean they're just part of our lives’; they are not a major disruption to their 
day to day lives. 
In the interview Joan switches between talking to me about Dave in the third person 
and talking to him in the second person 
But obviously Dave sees them no matter what I say. 
Sometimes you seem to see things for a long spell 
She explains something to me, and then includes him for clarification. 
When listening to Dave and Joan together, Joan starts by telling of her uncertainty; 
she is uncertain about what he experiences, but she is certain that it is different to her 
‘reality’.  Dave enters with a ‘but’, despite her uncertainty he has the certainty of 
experience.  As she says ‘I don’t know’ he says ‘I still maintain’ and having been 
ignored as she returns to uncertainty he comes in a second time more assertively with 
As far as I’m concerned 
If I may come in 
They agree the uncertainty of an episode in hospital when he became acutely 
confused 
Joan: I can only remember 
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I think that’s really 
Dave: I had 3 or 4 days 
I just wasn’t aware 
They both agree that hospital admissions cause disruption and she concurs with his 
description of his post discharge experiences as  
it was nightmares it definitely it was real nightmares and you 
just did not know where you were and then you just speaking 
a load of rubbish most of the time and that was at least I think 
a week after 
She uses popular imagery of madness when describing his behaviour in hospital 
You were completely bonkers then weren’t you?  Absolutely 
round the twist absolutely round the twist for 3 days 
This was a different degree of reality disjuncture to seeing horsemen on the golf 
course. 
6.2.1 Mediation 
Joan acts as a mediator for Dave with me, ensuring I can hear him by reminding him 
that his voice tends to get softer ‘you need to speak up Dave’ and reminding him to 
stick to the point  
You don’t know that Dave anyway that’s nothing to do with 
hallucinations 
She also uses her knowledge and experience of an event to clarify.  Dave told us of a 
hallucination whilst staying at his brother’s house.  Joan has not heard him tell this 
previously so is making this clearer for both my benefit, and her own satisfaction  
Joan: And this happens when you’re sitting where, in his 
lounge or in the bedroom? 
Dave: in er the sunroom 
Joan:  looking out at the sea? 
She helps him when she is aware that he is unsure of what she is saying 
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you’ve always said that you’ve hallucinated more since you 
went on to the what are the combined Sinemet and whatever 
the other one was em what’s it called Entacapone since you 
started taking the red one 
In this extract there is no pause and no verbal clues that Dave is not sure of which 
tablet Joan is talking about, but Joan’s personal knowledge of Dave allows her to 
assist him without him needing to ask her. 
Personal knowledge and humour is demonstrated as part of this long standing 
relationship in their discourse.  Joan checks with him about his experiences, and a 
sense of humour is evident from both of them.  She also helps me to understand by 
clarifying with him.  She reminds him of the medication he now has, ‘that’s the one 
that Alex (community nurse) gave you the memory one the small patch’. 
Joan knows, and reminds Dave of the chronology of events in their lives together.  
She also provides reassurance and a reality check for Dave 
I don’t turn round and tell him he’s a silly old fool and 
there’s nothing there 
I’ll just say where is it you see them and I’ll say no Dave 
there’s nothing there.  It’s a man playing golf it’s not a horse.  
I mean quite often he will call me through you know if I’m in 
a different room 
She also mediates with health services.  She describes telephoning to organise 
hospital appointments, and then how a previous hospital experience had been so 
disruptive to him that she had to tell healthcare staff how to care for him 
yes because the he had another foot operation about 4 or 5 
years ago and for some reason they kept him in the day bed 
area and that was really bad because all he could see all the 
time was people walking around with masks and gowns and 
you were completely bonkers then weren't you absolutely 
round the twist absolutely round the twist for 3 days until I 
really let loose and I said you have to get him back into a 
ward you know and actually they got you you got 1 of the 
wee rooms and within 6 or 8 hours he was compos mentis 
again he knew where he was he knew what was happening 
you know and I thought so last time he went in I said to 
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(name of surgeon) he has to go to the ward and they were 
very good you got a single room again 
This empowered voice that has individual knowledge of Dave, and is active and 
assertive in fighting for what he needs when he is in hospital is easier to identify in 
the I-poem of this extract.  With this voice Joan acts as his advocate to ensure that he 
is receiving better care 
I phoned up 
I must’ve phoned 
I really let loose 
I said you have to 
I thought 
I said to Dr 
This voice is informed by her personal knowledge of her husband and her day-to-day 
experience of living with him. 
6.2.2 Knower 
She has intimate knowledge of Dave as husband, father and grandfather.  There is 
obvious humour in their interactions built of a long-standing relationship.  Although 
she is joking she uses a stereotype of someone who is mad by saying 
I don’t think he’s ever going to er turn around with an axe 
and try and get rid of me 
The hallucinations are part of the family life even the grandchildren are involved in 
responding to them 
They now accept that Dave will see things that they know are 
not true and they the older ones will actually say to you won’t 
they? 
This family knowledge of his hallucinations help Dave to distinguish between the 
reality of seeing people on horseback across the golf course, and the consensus 
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reality of other members of the family, and so the grandchildren care for their 
grandfather when Joan is out shopping 
We came back and the first thing he (grandson) said to me 
was ‘it’s alright I looked after grandpa.  I told him there 
weren’t any children jumping off the balcony’ 
Hallucinations are so much a part of family life that family members are often 
included in the hallucinations.  When Dave has hallucinations of people in the house 
it is family members he sees. 
There is a tension between what is consensus reality and Dave’s reality.  Joan uses 
common sense reasoning to try to deal with this 
I obviously don’t agree with him I try to say how can 
children possibly be up those trees?  They couldn’t climb up 
the trees, try and try and reason and bring sense into it 
6.2.3 Not knowing 
In the second reading I hear the voice of uncertainty as she repeats ‘I don’t know’ 
eleven times 
I don’t know 
I mean 
I just have to say 
I mean 
I don’t know why 
I don’t know 
It is a puzzle that will not be solved ‘not in our lifetime’.  This is the voice of the 
individual with different perceptual experiences, who finds it difficult to make sense 
of hallucinations.  She repeats ‘I mean’ during this interview, which suggests to me 
that a normally articulate woman is having difficulty in making sense of what her 
husband is now experiencing.   
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She tries not to negate his reality but is clear that she will not collude in it ‘I 
obviously don’t agree’ and  
I’ll just say 
I’ll say no Dave 
She does not always know that he is hallucinating, there are no outward signs and 
she relies on him to tell her 
He doesn’t always tell me when he hallucinates 
Another way of her knowing, is when he acts on them, for example making tea for 
family members he sees in the living room, or he asking her to look at something to 
see if what he sees is actually there.   
She does not know, as she cannot imagine what he experiences.  Dave’s experience 
of reality is unimaginable 
No way I can picture 
If I close my eyes 
I still can’t picture 
I often I wonder 
I’m sure it won’t make any difference 
She cannot understand how he remembers a hallucination and describes it so vividly  
How can you remember all this Dave it’s nearly a year 
since…..you can remember that clearly…..you can’t 
remember things that happened yesterday but you can 
remember hallucinations? 
The words ‘dream’ and ‘hallucination’ are both prominent in a word cloud of the 
interview but in separate word clouds for each of them Joan uses ‘hallucination’ 
more and Dave uses ‘dream’ more.  Dave finds the boundary between dreams and 
hallucinations more confusing,  it is difficult to name the experience so he settles for 
the term ‘dream’, which both Joan and I may understand ‘let’s call it a dream just 
now’ and ‘let’s stick to the dream if I can define it as falling asleep at night’. 
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She disputes his view that his hallucinations are part of a spectrum with dreams 
So they’re dreams maybe rather than hallucinations? 
But she sees a possible association between him sleeping and hallucinations 
 and I don't know whether you see more when you first 
waken up because you've been thinking about it or dreaming 
about it I don't know 
A dream is ‘just’ a dream; it is commonplace and something we all do whereas 
hallucinations are different.  They are more exotic.   
Waking and dreaming may however have a fuzzy boundary and become a liminal 
space in which hallucinations occur 
I don’t know whether you see more when you first waken up 
because you’ve been thinking about it or dreaming about it I 
don’t know 
She looks for explanations and excuses his mistakes, when he tells me of difficulty in 
finding his room during the night she says ‘it’s only in the last 9 months or so we’ve 
swapped rooms’ so despite us discussing how he sometimes transposes one flat for 
another he is rescued by blaming his memory.   
She looks for the explanation in organic changes in the brain 
They’re very strange…it’s not as if you can say that part of 
the brain’s got a blockage or something that’s causing it 
For both of them there is a difficulty in knowing what a hallucination is.  Joan is 
clear that dreaming is different.   She looks for reasons for this to be happening, one 
of which is the psychiatric term ‘hallucination’.  This word is used throughout the 
interview but sometimes Dave’s experience may not fit what she sees as the 
definitive classification.  When Dave thinks he has to collect their daughter  
that’s not really a hallucination I don't know what that would 
come under you know what that would be be classed as  
 Later on she says 
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I think the only thing that sometimes worries me about the 
hallucinations is and hopefully it'll not go down that route is 
if Dave really does think he has to go and collect one of the 
children and he physically goes and gets the keys when he's 
not allowed to drive.  He's not insured that worries me 
This may not be a hallucination but in terms of her anxiety it becomes a 
hallucination. 
Drugs may be the cause  
you’ve always said that you hallucinated more since you 
went on to the what are the combined Sinemet  
Or drugs may be the answer; he has recently started taking one of the 
Anticholinesterase Inhibitors 
Do you think it’s actually helped with the hallucinations?  I 
think it’s helped with the memory 
She knows but she does not know. 
Near the end of the interview I am struck by Joan saying  
maybe sometimes it’s better to have hallucinations than think 
about things that are actually happening   
This seems to be the only time that there is a suggestion of sadness about the changes 
that Parkinson’s disease has made on their lives.  It appears to contrast with the 
matter of fact way that the rest of the discussion has been about the hallucinations 
just being part of their lives. Difficulties are minimised as they become just part of 
life but the phrase ‘maybe sometimes it’s better to have hallucinations than think 
about things that are actually happening’ perhaps tells of a less than easy relationship 
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6.3 Alex’s realities: ‘I can think of a chap’ 
I interviewed Alex, Dave’s community nurse in his office.  When he suggested that 
Dave might be willing to participate in the study, he told me that he had a long 
history of Parkinson’s and now as far as Alex was concerned Dave had dementia 
with Lewy Bodies.  This is a source of dissent between himself and the geriatrician 
who thinks that the diagnosis of Parkinson’s is adequate.   
Alex is an experienced mental health nurse who knows me well.  He speaks to me as 
a fellow professional who understands the nuances of people with dementia and 
hallucinations.  I too am a mental health nurse with many years’ experience and I 
understand and identify with the way he tells stories of individual patients to 
elucidate his thoughts.  It is the way I have chosen to write this research study.  This 
illustrates the issue of the insider position in my research. 
6.3.1 Story teller 
Alex understands dementia as a medical problem with a history, ‘you’d know from 
clinical records’.  It is progressive, has stages ‘the sort of stage of dementia that 
people are at’ and a symptomatology.  So  
the sort of stage of dementia that people are at and how do 
they articulate what they’re experiencing varies and so 
somebody who had a history of, had maybe visual 
hallucinations or olfactory hallucinations as their disease 
progresses  
He uses clinical cases to tell stories of the distinction between biological knowledge 
and individual expression of illness.  Cases illustrate and make disease process 
interesting, they are used throughout medicine.  He uses direct speech to dramatize 
his stories as in his description of  a lady who sees schoolboys visiting her.  Alex 
repeats ‘they were cheeky young lads’ bringing the scene to life and drawing the 
listener, me, into the story.  He is a competent and entertaining story teller.  He 
positions himself as a medical professional in his use of case illustrations 
 I remember another chap 
I pleaded and won my case 
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I haven’t seen that again 
I asked him about it 
You couldn’t treat with anti-psychotics 
This is a story of the heroic nurse who fights for the patient to be prescribed 
Donepezil in spite of rationing, and is proved right.  It is one of a number of 
examples he uses to tell of his experience.  Although he admits this is a one-off 
experience, there is certainty in this extract.  When he tries to recall in general, he 
changes from the first person ‘I’ to the second person ‘you’ ; the generalised other.  
My interpretation of this shift is that this is something shared.  I too am a mental 
health nurse who may be unsure. 
I couldn’t actually give you a number 
You can guess 
You can maybe guess 
You know 
You’d know 
You can only second guess 
You can guess 
I suppose for me 
His knowledge is gleaned through cases; he illustrates through people he has known 
rather than abstractly and he also thinks that way.  He searches to remember people 
he has seen in care homes when I ask him whether people hallucinating is something 
that causes problems in care  
I can’t remember 
I have 
One may pop into my head 
Give me long enough 
I might think 
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I’m thinking 
I have visited 
I can’t think 
He uses illustrations of people he has known with other difficulties and wonders if 
the way staff think of them is transferrable to hallucinations. 
6.3.2 The Expert 
He positions himself as an expert, a detective and an educator.  He is a detective with 
people with dementia; it is not always obvious that someone is hallucinating.  A 
community mental health nurse needs to ‘unpick’ what is happening, based on 
’observation yes of how somebody behaves’ but   
the issue is if it affects them functionally; how they are within 
themselves if they’re scared or angry.  If it’s something that’s 
comforting then that’s kind of nice. 
Hallucinations are often associated with an increase in other symptoms associated 
with dementia 
it was definitely a symptom of things getting worse.  The 
more intense they got it was clearly correlated between what 
she was functioning and managing independently and how 
em and how her symptoms of dementia were becoming more 
apparent; her disorientation, her short term memory, her 
affect, symptoms of recall and cognition were clearly 
correlated to the intensity and the nastiness of the experience 
and it was kind of I don’t know which comes first but this 
they certainly come they are certainly related 
Here cognitive decline is placed centre-stage (Hughes, 2011).   
Dementia does not only affect the person who has dementia but also positions 
relatives as carers ‘they will often have family carers’.  He sees his role as an expert 
and an educator with carers.  This is the way to help carers  
so often a bit of carer education in terms of  looking at how 
the person with dementia feels and how they interpret that  
Other care professionals like GPs and care home staff can do the wrong thing 
 
Dave, Joan and Alex  174 
I remember the GP saying to her “don’t be stupid there’s 
nobody in your attic” which didn’t really help but in as much 
as it became quite confrontational 
Care home staff can use the jargon ‘hallucinations’ wrongly and do not have the 
expert detection skills of mental health staff 
I’ve seen staff interpret it as that when it’s clearly not been to 
me that that’s the case.  Oh they might say’ they’re saying 
they’re doing this or that’  and I’ll say ‘yeah but they’ve also 
got a rip roaring chest infection and they have a delirium so 
we know people experience this kind of thing with delirium 
but we have to treat the delirium and then we’ll see what’s 
left’.  Lo and behold they are no longer experiencing or 
describing things   
He sees himself as fighting against the value judgments of society as manifested by 
care home staff whose assumptions about sexuality in older people may get in the 
way of catering for their needs. 
the behaviour is more than acceptable it’s in the interpretation 
of the behaviour  I digress but an overt expression of 
sexuality there’s actually nothing wrong …. it’s more down 
to your own set of values about how older people express 
their sexuality   
6.3.3 Complexities 
The stories he tells often concern the complexities of living with hallucinations.  
Hallucinations are not a static phenomenon, which would be easier because 
enjoyable hallucinations should be left alone. He tells the story of a man who sees 
‘little dogs that ran around the house’ that were a source of pleasure for him  
he would then chuckle away and laugh at the antics of the 
little dogs however it became a problem when the little dogs 
were getting into the bed at night while his wife was in bed 
and he was inadvertently whacking her 
He describes a textbook definition of different sensory examples of hallucinations 
but we know it may be different.  When describing hallucinations in general a 
textbook definition will have to suffice but a particular person can deviate from this. 
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Despite his definition of hallucinations, when he talks to me a fellow community 
mental health nurse he is less positive about their boundaries  
I’ve seen people who have I’m never sure if they’re 
hallucinating or not or but they are misinterpreting or rather 
superimposing incidents from the past that are very vivid 
Here there is less clarity and definiteness, hallucinations do not have to fit into the 
textbook definition.  The definition is vulnerable, it is not necessarily set.   
GPs and care home staff misuse the term hallucinations, but when he is talking to me 
about hallucinations, it is clear the term may not be clear cut.  Hallucination is 
however a psychiatric category and as a fellow mental health nurse I can understand 
the nuances.   
I agree with him about the difficulty in deciding what is, and is not, a hallucination.  I 
have always found this a slippery concept in my practice, and I am not always sure 
what is a misperception, or memory, or hallucination.  It is my experience that they 
can slide over the boundaries, often without me being aware of the changes.  The 
way he uses the diagnostic term hallucinations inclusively with me as a fellow 
professional, validated my decision to include the term in my recruitment criteria as I 
was fairly sure that we would share a similar understanding.  Probably if I was a 
researcher from a different background the data generated would have been different.  
We jointly construct the category of hallucinations and dementia. 
6.3.4 Dilemmas 
Although there can be an assumption that medicine is objective, clinical medicine is 
not value free.  He describes how quality of life is affected by both dementia and by 
side-effects of medication and a medical professional struggles to assess where the 
best position lies.  It seems to be a decision of medical professionals though, rather 
than an inclusive discussion with all involved.  
Alex talks of the everyday dilemmas of clinical practice; these are often dilemmas 
which are shared by the clinical team he identifies with 
You couldn’t treat with anti-psychotics 
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We’d knock him for six 
Do we make him stiff 
Do we let him experience those 
And 
How do you manage that 
It’s you know 
How do you modify that 
You know 
Do you like reassure her 
That’s the approach we took 
The dilemma voice asks questions and mainly uses ‘we’ instead of ‘I’.  These are the 
dilemmas that are faced by mental health professionals with people who hallucinate.  
They are not a dilemma when someone is not distressed 
Why would I want to treat with something 
You take away a source of pleasure 
We don’t always know, and it is impossible to know what someone responds to in 
the later stages of dementia, one can only make a guess based on observation of 
behaviour and previous history. 
6.4 Summary 
Dave and Joan situate the hallucinations in the context of a relationship, from Joan’s 
comments about them being a part of their lives to Dave’s checking with her when he 
is unsure of the reality of something he sees.  All three of these participants have a 
view that hallucinations are not necessarily a negative experience; they may provide 
entertainment in a situation in which there is a lack of alternative stimulation.  For 
Dave hallucinations can be entertaining and for Alex too they can provide an 
entertaining story for fellow colleagues.   
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Hallucinations are not meaningless and lacking in context as in diagnostic categories 
but are situated within a narrative life. 
There is doubt and certainty within all their stories, knowledge is never clear-cut and 
the boundaries are ambiguous. 
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7 Simon, Jeanette and Alison 
The interviews with Simon and Jeanette differed from the previous cases.  They were 
interviewed together on two occasions and so I have chosen to analyse and write 
them together. 
7.1 Simon and Jeanette: the sort of thing I would 
probably incorporate into a drawing 
Simon lives with his wife Jeanette in a spacious modern flat.  He was my final 
participant and I was extremely relieved when he was suggested as a recruit by his 
community nurse.  I had been struggling to reach my target of three cases.  He has 
only recently been diagnosed with dementia.  He and his wife have an active social 
life and often spend time in their other house which is in a rural area some distance 
away. 
7.1.1 Extract from field notes  
These field notes were written after my first meeting 
He answers the door and explains that his wife is on the 
phone.  He shows me into the living room, there are three 
copies of the health education booklet ‘Coping with 
dementia’ lying around the room.  I assume this means that 
he is aware of his diagnosis but wonder why he has got three 
separate copies.   Do people just send them or give them out 
automatically without checking and what does it mean to 
have them prominently on view?  We chat generally while 
waiting for his wife.  When she arrives I explain the purpose 
of my study.  Simon points out that he has had only two 
episodes of hallucinations when he was in their other house 
in the country.  I ask if he remembers them and he says yes in 
fact he has drawn them.  I am excited by this as I am 
interested in visual representations of hallucinations.  I check 
what they call the experiences and they both say 
hallucinations.  Simon asks about my academic history as if 
checking my credibility. 
As I am about to leave, Simon says he thought medication 
was involved as he remembers Alison the community nurse 
mentioned a placebo.  I am convinced that Alison 
understands the study and would not have mentioned a 
placebo, his wife tells him this was not the case and I was 
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fairly certain I had been clear in my discussion.  My heart 
sinks as I think he will not see my research as useful and will 
not wish to participate.  I leave my leaflet and arrange to 
telephone them in a few days to give them time to discuss it 
and decide whether they want to participate.  I feel 
pessimistic, convinced that they will refuse.  
 I telephoned them a few days later as arranged, and was surprised that they say they 
will participate.  This made me more vigilant about process consent throughout my 
contact.  We arranged an appointment in 2 weeks as they are busy socially and 
Jeanette told me they are trying to maintain their social life.  I wondered if they are 
feeling that medicine and a diagnosis of dementia are beginning to take over their 
lives. 
Simon and Jeanette decided that they wanted to be interviewed together and so I 
conducted two joint interviews.  In some ways I found these interviews more 
difficult than those with Dave and Graeme.   
7.1.2 Co-construction as creative imagination 
Simon and Jeanette co-construct his experiences of hallucinations and dementia.  
They either minimize the experience ‘but you can see things in almost everything 
you look at’ or account for it as a feature of his special artistic gift. 
Simon tells the story of his hallucinations as part of his artistic imagination.  They 
are associated with the ‘loosening’ of his artistic style, so providing continuity with 
his previous self.  He knows they were not real but  
you know when you’re sitting down to draw a fantastic 
scene? ..It’s the sort of thing that I would probably 
incorporate into a drawing like that but I never was under any 
illusion that they were actually for real 
They are attributed to his imagination and a source of artistic inspiration, like ‘a sort 
of scene from a pantomime sort of thing’. 
Jeanette also resists the societal discourse of hallucinations as abnormal; utilising 
rather the discourse of the creative inspiration to explain them. It is an extension of 
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something he always had; not a problem but an augmented sensitivity to visual 
stimuli 
you’ve been drawing and painting all your life but this is 
different.  I find it difficult to put my finger on what it is but 
it seems as though you know from clouds and trees and 
buildings just what you’re looking at it just seems to be 
heightened and you’re also very easily distracted by the you 
know any visual thing, but it is, I mean it’s not an 
hallucination it is actually what’s out there 
I was interested in how they both especially Jeanette, saw these experiences as 
something fascinating and a result of heightened visual perception that contributed to 
his artistic experiences.  This had never occurred to me before.  I found the fact that 
he had drawn the hallucinations fascinating as I am interested in visual 
representations.  Is this like the driven artist?  His hallucination of a hare on a 
motorbike especially caught my imagination. 
Simon rejects the pathologising of his hallucinations when he says  
but you can see things in almost everything you look at 
so hallucinations are not something that reflect a mental health problem, but are the 
result of imagination. His hallucinations fluctuate ‘it’s like shooting stars and things 
rather than stories that’s in colour’.  He associates them with a change of 
consciousness like dreams that happen during the day  
they’re not really dreams in the sense that they happen at 
night when you’re sleeping 
 although this then becomes fuzzy and ‘I’m not sure about that now’.   The 
boundaries begin to get blurred. 
7.1.3 Medical science 
Simon positions me as a health care professional ‘I’d just been interviewed by er one 
of your colleagues’.  He uses medical terminology to seek information ‘do you get 
cases where it does disturb people?’  Jeanette sees hallucinations as something that 
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when associated with other symptoms, is a medical problem that needs to be taken to 
a general practitioner 
you’d had a lot of difficulty and I think it was because of the 
hallucination on top of that that we thought we’d better you 
know and so it was just seen by the GP as part of you know 
need to be referred back to the psychiatrist 
Both Simon and Jeanette look for an explanation from science, and especially the 
pathology of the brain.  Jeanette asks  
Do they know why people with Lewy bodies have 
hallucinations what the mechanism is? 
And ‘is it some sort of disturbance in the visual area’.  Simon uses a more visual 
metaphorical example to try to understand the workings of the brain  
is it is the brain is it a bit like the starfish on the coral sea 
between  Australia and New Guinea where you see all these 
black starfish came along erm and wrapped themselves 
around every bit coral and destroyed the whole coast 
Although they try to normalise the experiences, ‘it’s not something we tell other 
people though is it’.  Jeanette questions ‘but is it that we feel it may put other people 
off’?  In this exchange the implications of his diagnosis on others is made clear 
Jeanette: the nature of your diagnosis really disturbs some 
people 
Simon: oh yes some of the family er extended family sort of; 
yesterday my condition is not mentioned by anyone when I 
was there anyway 
Simon is cognisant that having a diagnosis of dementia can result in any behaviour 
being blamed on the dementia  
Simon: but er but just with (our) condition or my condition 
you just blame it on to 
Jeanette: the dementia 
Simon: the dementia whereas it’s probably nothing to do with 
dementia it’s just that you’re annoyed 
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7.1.4 Hallucinations become a problem 
At the time of first seeing his hallucinations, Simon accepts them, it is only later that 
he starts to think they may be strange.  They only become something else when a 
health care professional shows an interest in them.  A section of Simon’s ‘I’ poem 
starts off in the passive voice 
I was first being interviewed 
I mentioned 
Something which amazed me 
I didn’t think 
I said to the person 
Interviewing me 
I suddenly became aware 
I went more or less past him 
As far as I was concerned 
I think 
I was out in the garden 
I went out 
I can’t remember precisely 
I was walking 
I suddenly became apparent 
Initially, although they were something that captivated him, they were benign and 
did not have any further significance.  Someone else decided that they were of 
interest to the medical profession and he started to lose control of them.  The initial 
use of the passive voice hides the focus from the performer who is an unnamed 
doctor.  This happens again as he starts off with certainty  
I thought it was quite amusing 
I thought I was just dreaming 
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But I 
I would probably incorporate into a drawing 
I never was under any illusion 
I was looking at 
I found it amusing 
I told people about it 
I was leaving the interview 
Asked me 
It was something amusing that he as an active agent could use in a creative way, until 
someone disagrees with him and he has to rethink.    When he talks about his 
diagnosis of dementia, it is easier when he has less control.  He expresses doubts that 
he should feel this way 
I mean that’s one of the strange things about this whole thing 
is that for most of the time since I first became aware of it 
I’ve felt very happy. I feel that I shouldn’t, it’ll maybe change 
Instead of his experience being denied by the medical profession, in this case it is 
Simon who resists it.  The word ‘dementia’ is never specifically used in our first 
interview, although it is implied.    Simon recognizes that despite his diagnosis he is 
feeling content.  That he feels this is wrong, acknowledges the societal discourse of 
dementia as a deteriorating illness.   
Jeanette views Simon’s increased visual acuity as balancing the other problems  
as opposed to you know the difficulties you’re having the 
things that you’re not able to do as well as you used to be 
able to do 
Although it is something to do with his heightened visual perception about which  
I feel 
We can have a little discussion 
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They can only have a little discussion as there is still the larger question of his other 
difficulties 
I didn’t feel panicky 
I just 
We had already been dealing with 
So I did know 
We were aware 
I did know 
We had to go and see the doctor 
They are aware as a couple that Simon’s experiences may not be acceptable to 
others.  They use ‘We’ to start discussing this 
It’s not something we tell other people 
We haven’t 
Although Simon says he would not mind discussing it with friends they have not 
done this.  He is aware that their larger family group silence such conversation 
My condition is not mentioned  
When I was there anyway 
Such discussions are left to medical consultations where they are legitimate 
that was why we went to the GP, because, but it was also 
because of the other things you were getting quite confused 
with, and you had a fall because we were at (place name)  
and the week in (place name) you’d had a lot of difficulty, 
and I think it was because of the hallucination on top of that 
that we thought we’d better you know and so it was just seen 
by the GP as part of you know need to be referred back to the 
psychiatrist 
It is only towards the end of the first interview that Jeanette is able to acknowledge 
that she can be negatively affected 
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I hadn’t appreciated 
When we went to 
And for me 
I didn’t know  
I was experiencing this anxiety 
They are however able to cope with this  
So long as we don’t have too many challenges 
This is a different voice from the voice which minimalizes and finds it fascinating 
We have found it interesting 
Haven’t we 
Simon is less inclined to acknowledge the impact of his dementia on Jeanette, than 
she is; on one of the occasions he does, he returns to the impact on himself 
well like yesterday we had ups and downs and ups and downs 
all day long so I was exhausted at the end of it 
In this section he normalises it 
the difficulty is knowing whether it’s due to just normal 
living and having fights about something or other that every 
partnership probably succumbs to from time to time 
Jeanette however directs him back to his fluctuating functioning 
I wasn’t thinking about that so much but I think there are 
days when you’re struggling more than others that’s what we 
were talking about 
Simon is the person who is experiencing the dementia and hallucinations and so 
although for Jeanette it is something they can observe and discuss together 
we have found it interesting haven’t we the you know not just 
the hallucinations but your dementia in some ways isn’t it  
She is aware that it has the main impact on him 
 
Simon, Jeanette and Alison  189 
how it’s affecting you you know the observation of that that 
sometimes sometimes you’re OK with some of the things 
then you’re not you know and then you’re OK again isn’t it 
7.1.5 Living in relationships 
This is a joint interview and so is seen within the long standing joint history of a 
relationship.  There are stories that are known to both, that can be seen as family 
stories.  Towards the end of the second interview Simon tells a story of himself as a 
young boy  
my first crossing swords with authority was when I was a 
wee boy about 4 or 5 and my mother sent me.  
This is obviously a frequently told anecdote as Jeanette joins in with ‘it was your 
fare’ and she uses it humorously to sustain enduring aspects of his identity ‘and so it 
carried on your whole life’. 
Simon talks of himself mainly as an independent, autonomous self in relationship to 
his hallucinations which are private and internal.  He uses his life with Jeanette to 
check out the temporality and site of events.  Jeanette provides cues for Simon such 
as ‘can you remember it Simon?’ and  
you said to me you were passing a on the street where there 
was a display of fruit….and there was a face on the apple 
Jeanette talks of herself much more in relation to Simon, as evidenced in her use of 
‘we’ throughout much of the interview.  She uses the inclusive ‘we’ frequently in the 
interview to describe the private we of herself and Simon.  Simon uses it only three 
times, once to include his ‘cat’ hallucination, once to include all of us in the room 
and once for himself and Jeanette, when he echoed her  
We enjoyed 
We were laughing about it. 
The effect of dementia within an already existing relationship means both have to 
adjust to the impact.  Despite finding the hallucinations interesting, she also sees 
them as difficulties that are associated with ‘the falls and there was a lot of things 
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happening… and you were quite mixed up with other things’.  She then keeps track 
of medical appointments  
he had already seen Dr (name) and had a memory test  in the 
February and she had she said that you had mild cognitive 
impairment at that point so we were aware that there were 
problems. 
She slips effortlessly between addressing me and including Simon in the discussion 
by her change from ‘he’ to ‘you’. 
She positions herself as a helper for both Simon and me, with a puzzle to be solved 
looking at what you struggle with and then it’s like a puzzle 
trying to find something that will make it easier for you to do 
it. I think that’s something that it’s quite interesting in some 
ways to you know his experience of it  isn’t it you know the 
reading because you can read but you get very tired and 
things at night reading  and er you know you were getting 
frustrated because you couldn’t finish a book and you’re 
dipping in and out and that but  you know with the audiobook 
She switches in this extract between ‘he’ and ‘you’ including both me and Simon.  
She also assists me, earlier on when I have not understood Simon’s attempt to try to 
get to grips with the physiology of the brain by using an analogy of a starfish. 
She gives him cues to correct his sequencing of events.   When he gets lost with 
telling me where the first hallucination occurred she assists him.  She tries to 
orientate him without disempowering him.  She attempts this a couple of times, 
telling him she was there, then she describes where they were.  Her voice can be seen 
as one of rescuer but she is in danger of silencing him, she says 
I remember you telling me 
I don’t think I was there 
I can’t think 
She knows she was not there but chooses to appear as if she is unsure.  This does not 
work as he repeats 
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You weren’t with me 
I don’t remember 
In another instance she explains in more detail what has happened.   
We were lying in our bed 
We’ve got Velux windows 
You were telling me 
Did I see the little man? 
Jeanette too was slightly hesitant using ‘I think’, ‘you know’ and ‘quite’ as if not 
totally committing to her story. 
They acknowledge that his anxiety can affect them both  
Jeanette: you’re quite kind of anxious and I hadn’t 
appreciated how much until you start you know…. you were 
much more relaxed that it was much better for you that whole 
thing wasn’t it  
Simon: and for you 
Jeanette: and for me (laughs) I didn’t know that I was 
experiencing this anxiety at second hand 
She quickly silences her own needs as an individual and returns to his needs 
you did the same thing when you were on the motorway 
because you’re quite anxious  about it now aren’t you so 
these things help don’t they  
And then them both as a couple 
so long as we don’t have too many challenges in one day 
At only one point in the second interview she silences him  
Jeanette: I think maybe because Simon was doing so much 
art that you know 
Simon: I’m genuinely trying to explain to you what  
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Jeanette: yes but I think you’re very aware of the visual 
thing anyway and I would say that in the last year that you 
have a heightened visual perception  
7.1.6 Parity 
Although they are co-constructing their account, they do not always manage to 
maintain equity in their account.   The second interview began with Jeanette telling 
me that Simon had had a further hallucination.  This interview starts out with some 
confusion on the part of Simon about the experience mentioned by Jeanette prior to 
me recording.   Jeanette has defined the topic of the conversation initially.  He is 
disadvantaged by not recalling the incident and she provides cues which he is 
eventually able to follow evidenced by their repetition of ‘I think’.  Jeanette’s words 
are in italics in this section 
No I can’t 
You said to me 
I think 
 I think 
I mean I’ve 
Both employ a voice of uncertainty throughout the interview using ‘I think’.  He 
manages to regain control of the conversation when he says with certainty 
I’ve you know 
 I wakened 
I’ve told you 
 
I’ve not seen a thing  
I mean 
I just get into my bed 
I put the light off, I’m out 
At another point in the interview, Jeanette has started with 
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We have found it interesting 
Haven’t we 
Her attempts to promote parity are rejected.  Simon silences her joint ownership of 
dementia with 
We had ups and downs 
So I was exhausted 
I’ve discovered  
Why I was getting so er getting confused 
I was putting where it says 
She tries to direct the conversation again with 
I wasn’t thinking about that 
I think that there are days 
But he silences her again with 
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7.2 Bringing a community nurse and researcher 
together 
Following the first interview Simon had said he wanted to know what I was writing 
about him 
7.2.1 Extract from field-notes (2nd interview) 
Simon had asked to see what I was writing about him so we 
agreed initially that he look at the transcript of the last 
interview.  I had sent it to them a few days previously.  They 
thought the transcript was accurate and Simon that said 
nothing further had happened since my last visit.  His wife 
then said that he had had a further hallucination so I asked if I 
could record the conversation 
On reflection I wonder if I was just paying lip service to his desire to read what I 
wrote about him.  I do not think that I had worked out what I would do if he did not 
like something I had written.  Perhaps I was being disingenuous to his request; I 
assumed he wanted to read a transcript rather than to read my interpretation of the 
interviews, which is a different story from the one he tells me. 
7.2.2 Talking about dementia 
I found myself less at ease with Simon than my previous two participants.  I felt at 
one point in particular I was floundering to know whether to mention the word 
‘dementia’.  On my first visit to discuss the study, I was aware that three copies of 
the health promotion booklet ‘Coping with dementia’ were lying around the room.  
Although critical of this oversupply, I assumed this meant that he had been given a 
diagnosis and was comfortable with that.  When he says  
I mean that’s one of the strange things about this whole thing 
is that for most of the time since  I first became aware of it 
I’ve felt very happy I feel that I shouldn’t it’ll maybe change 
I again assume he is talking about his diagnosis of dementia and ask how long it is  
since you got any sort of a since you went to see the doctor 
I suddenly pull myself up from mentioning dementia, which gets me into more 
trouble 
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Simon: since I went to see the doctor about what? 
Liz: about (0.2).you must’ve seen the doctor to talk about the 
em strange thing that happened 
It is left to his wife to rescue me although she does not mention dementia either.  She 
rescues both of us as we skirt around the ‘dementia’ label 
Jeanette:  We were in 
Simon: Did I go and see Dr  (name)? 
I don’t remember 
Jeanette: We went to see the doctor 
When we came back 
I think we realised 
In the following interview I found myself in the position of answering questions from 
them both about dementia and hallucinations.  I was not sure if I should be answering 
them, but I had the information they wanted, and on balance it seemed to me that it 
was ridiculous to pretend otherwise.   
Again I struggled with my insider/ outsider roles, during the data collection period 
this was a complex relationship for me, presenting challenges throughout the study.  I 
have little doubt that being a nurse affected the interviews, but I was not always 
ready for the challenges that were thrown at me during interviews, a more 
experienced researcher would have faced some of these situations previously and 
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7.3 Alison: I find it all very interesting 
7.3.1 Extract from field notes 
Alison is the community mental health nurse for Simon and 
Jeanette.  Before this interview she had participated in a focus 
group for professionals which I had run.  She had been on 
sick leave when this interview took place but had suggested 
that she was interviewed during this time at her home.  She 
met me at the train station prior to the interview and had 
asked me about how my research was going and a few 
questions about how Simon was as we walked to her house.  
She appeared interested in the research and as she had not 
seen Simon for some time she was also interested in how he 
was doing.  This conversation resembled a colleague to 
colleague exchange.  It was also in the informal setting of her 
home with her dogs interrupting as opposed to an office, 
which made it more relaxed. 
We have both been employed to do the same work.  I relate to her enthusiasm, and 
fascination with hallucinations, and her experiences as a mental health nurse.  I also 
identify with her strategy of checking out physical causes of behaviour first with 
people who may hallucinate.  This was how I would practise in clinical settings.  She 
looks for a reason, as I am doing with this study. She tells a story of how a mental 
health practitioner works with people with dementia and hallucinations and makes 
sense of their experience.  Her role as a mental health nurse is complex and she needs 
to utilise a number of skills, including establishing relationships, and analysing a 
situation to make sense of the reasons for behaviour 
it was kind of picking that apart what made her think that that 
was happening 
Alison is a thoughtful practitioner who sees her work with people as an on-going 
challenge  
he wasn’t sure if it was a visual thing and I kind of thought 
maybe I should know a bit more about visual things 
7.3.2 Detective work 
Alison talks of what Atkinson (1981) calls detective work, having to ‘pick things 
apart’.   To help someone a nurse needs to try to understand  
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It was trying to find out from her you know time of day. Was 
it dusk, was there particular lights?   You know speaking to 
the daughter about what kind of street lights because 
obviously it’s during the day when I’m there.   What sort of 
street lights come through the window? And trying to pick 
that apart 
When she is unsure about explanations for experiences of hallucinations, she thinks 
there should be an answer ‘I should know a bit more about visual things’.  She 
speculates on possible reasons for differing reactions to hallucinations ‘Do you think 
it’s something to do with em the level of intelligence people have?’ 
She looks for other explanations for the distress that some people experience, it may 
be to do with education, control or insight  
He’s aware that they’re hallucinations 
She has a personal responsibility to learn more to be a more effective practitioner 
I wasn’t sure 
I kind of thought 
I should know 
7.3.3 The man I looked after 
She discusses the case of Simon and his hallucinations and makes sense of his 
experiences by comparing him with other people.   
he’s quite animated when he talks about them he seems to 
find them quite stimulating, interesting and that’s like 
somebody else I had involved with in the past they found 
them very, they enjoy talking about them 
They are ‘the gentleman I looked after’ and ‘a woman who was in a care home’.  She 
is an active participant, when in relationship with people with dementia and has a 
specific role as someone who is there to help.   
She is a well-trained competent nurse who values spending time with and listening to 
individual patients 
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I think I told you 
The most interesting case I’ve had 
I sat with her 
I could kind of speak to her 
Alison describes the importance of establishing good relationships with people.   
the other guy that was really fearful of it was so real to him 
he wasn’t able to see that it was a hallucination and there was 
only a couple of us in the ward that he trusted enough to say 
could you come and look at this and we’d say it’s not there 
and he would accept it whereas if we weren’t on, it would be 
very difficult for him and he would often act out on things em 
so that’s a big part of it it’s understanding that it is isn’t real.   
This can also be satisfying for the nurse  
I felt quite privileged I suppose that he had that sort of 
relationship with me that I could say to him no there’s 
nothing there and that would work 
The most important relationships to Alison during this interview are the ones with 
people with dementia, and within her role as a community nurse; these appear to be 
fairly exclusive, with carers identified as sources of information.  She describes 
previous relationships, working in a hospital ward where she expected staff to follow 
care plans and spend time with patients.   
the staff didn’t know how to cope with it and they continually 
medicated him when I had said you don’t need to you just 
need to explain it to him but they had continually gone back 
and they had so many PRN
2
s it was never PRNs when I was 
on 
This was the man with whom she felt privileged having a good relationship. 
The relationships that are memorable are often those with a bizarre presentation 
                                                 
2
 P.RN: pro re nata.  Term applied to medication that means it is administered as necessary, at the 
discretion of the nurse. 
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the most interesting one I’ve had was a woman….. and I’d 
never seen that before and it was horrible things like your 
parents have died and it was very unpleasant things that she 
was finding distressing 
They are also the people who you are unable to help who haunt you 
it’s when you see people really distressed and you can’t do 
anything about it 
Relationships with people are important, and when knowledge is uncertain and you 
are unable to effect change, this is when she is most reflective 
I don’t know 
Patients that you really remember 
You can’t quite 
In your own head 
You can’t quite make sense 
The ones you think about 
You haven’t 
I suppose 
In this passage she uses ‘you’ instead of ‘I’, this may be because she is positioning 
me as a fellow professional and including me in this uncertain knowledge, or that she 
thinks I perceive myself as a fellow practitioner.   It is often the memorable patients 
who are discussed by professionals in clinical conversations.  She slips into using 
‘you’ not ‘I’ on a number of occasions when she is talking of uncertain knowledge.  
Mostly though her uses of ‘you’ are when she talks of the practical realities of 
clinical work, when the voice is a certain competent practitioner 
The other one I had 
You know 
You know 
If you sat and talked to her 
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You know 
When you sat down 
You know 
7.3.4 We like to sort things out.  Don’t we? 
Alison values knowledge, learning is important to her  
When I’m there 
I’d advised her 
I think that’s something 
I should know more about 
 ‘Interesting’ is repeated 19 times during this interview suggesting that she finds the 
work stimulating, meaning enthusiasm for learning comes naturally  
I find it all very interesting I find it quite fascinating actually 
how the brain works in that way 
Her fascination motivated her to do more training 
Actually inspired me to go on 
And do my psychi 
After doing my general 
I do I do 
I think Lewy Body is really interesting 
Listening for the voice of ‘I’, the researcher should hear the sense of self of the 
participant.  The main voice I hear in this interview is that of a reflective practitioner 
who is grappling with the uncertainty of knowing the experience of someone else and 
what it means to hallucinate. 
I mean 
I tried to rationale 
I think 
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I don’t know 
I remember 
I don’t think 
And another man I was involved with 
We went up 
I’d told his wife 
She acknowledges that knowledge can be uncertain 
I think 
You know 
How do you work out? 
You know 
You know 
She tries to imagine the experience of hallucinating, which is difficult but then 
compares it to a personal experience of hallucinating when she was unwell.   
I don’t know I mean 
I have when I’ve been really unwell 
I saw the Grim Reaper 
I was too physically unwell 
She is quick to resist this, however, by reiterating that she was too physically unwell, 
distancing herself from people who have a psychiatric diagnosis. 
7.3.5 Specialist practitioner 
Despite her uncertainty and reflection she positions herself as a specialist practitioner 
in relationships with care homes.  She expresses her disapproval of their use of 
medication, by questioning them about how long it took to work.  She then ‘proves’ 
to them that medication does not work instantly, and therefore this was not the cause 
 
Simon, Jeanette and Alison  202 
of a change in someone.  Her values about using medication inappropriately are 
evident in this interlude 
The woman’s that frail 
She looks for reasons for care home staff practice and identifies their workload 
staff are all too busy doing care tasks to actually find that sort 
of time 
but there is also a conflict between her specialist skills and their views 
because there was a bit of a kind of feeling from the staff that 
she didn’t need it 
so the person with dementia continues to be distressed 
when I go to the staff they go really she’s never said anything 
and I thought well it’s just because they don’t ask you know 
what I mean they don’t get into the kind of how are you how 
are you feeling and then she would just come out with this 
stuff that was always very distressing 
Although she has the specialist knowledge it is the staff at the care home who have 
the power to decide the care. 
7.3.6 Diagnosis as a slippery concept 
 The contextual background to this interview and to both our work is psychiatry, 
which includes diagnosis, reality and normality, but in practice these concepts are 
more fluid than this would suggest.  Alison uses the principles of biomedical 
knowledge to think about hallucinations.  She uses diagnostic criteria, although they 
are not mentioned specifically  
they were considering kind of re changing her diagnosis but 
it’s really hard to pick apart the visual stuff so I think that’s 
something I should know more about. I think you know is I, 
when does it, how do you work out the difference with 
something like that because of her sight? Is it what’s the 
name of that syndrome Charles Bonnet you know is it that or 
is it you know more to do with the dementia? 
She challenges the use of the specificity of diagnostic criteria  
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say sometimes working out is it an actual hallucination or is 
it a delusion or an illusion and sometimes being able to 
actually pinpoint what it is.  Sometimes it’s very clear cut and 
sometimes it’s not 
She describes the variety of hallucinations, from those she defines as common, for 
example seeing children and animals, and believing that family pictures have come 
to life 
Cats and dogs are quite common things for people to see isn’t 
it? Children, the other one 
that happens quite a lot doesn’t it people in pictures come to 
life? 
Talking to family pictures is abnormal, unless someone is in the immediate stages of 
bereavement.  There is also at the other extreme the very unusual  
she said that she could actually see the letters it wasn’t 
somebody telling her she was reading the words as she says 
they’re there and I’d never seen that before 
People with psychosis are often fascinating and bizarre to those of us who do not 
have these experiences, and Alison admits that she finds it all interesting.  She uses 
the term ‘bizarre’ seven times, and at one point talks of an experience as 
It’s quite eerie I think because you know I remember visiting 
him he was in a care home and he said there’s a little boy 
standing behind you it was quite eerie 
This suggests altered states, ghosts and dreams, which to me become slippery 
concepts.  Immediately following this passage she mentions her own experience of 
hallucinating ‘The Grim Reaper’ during a period of physical illness. 
It is not just clinicians who are fascinated by these experiences but other people 
he came to one of our  dementia group and told everybody in 
the group and none of them had any experience of 
hallucinations and he told them in great detail about the 
people that were living in his house and they were fascinated 
by them  
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She challenges the assumption that hallucinations are negative experiences, as in her 
clinical experience this is not always the case.  Negativity might however be 
anticipated 
It’s funny that people see them as maybe not as a positive I 
think that’s maybe a bit strong as a positive but maybe as an 
interesting thing and they kind of make them more stimulated 
in a positive way  
Liz: Yes I know exactly what you mean 
Alison: Which is not what you’d expect 
For some people she thinks they may serve a different purpose 
it’s seen as a very negative thing but actually the  people I’ve 
had dealings with find them interesting and stimulating 
The positive and negative aspects to hallucinations can change 
And that’s what changed for that other gentlemen that was in 
the care home was that because they didn’t go away in the 
ways that when he tried to make them go away that he started 
to believe that they were real 
Discrepancies with these realities are dealt with by discriminating between 
frightening hallucinations, and those that may be seen in a more positive light. 
I’ve looked after people on the ward where their 
hallucinations were horrible and were a very negative thing 
And 
they kind of make them more stimulated in a positive way 
She feels a responsibility to act, when they are causing people distress, but not when 
they are benign 
I suppose when they’re not distressing I don’t worry about 
them too much it’s when you see people really distressed 
The professional will intervene in the perceptions that cause distress or a negative 
experience. 
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Yes to sort out these things that were difficult or just to have 
the reassurance that it wasn’t happening 
It is the professional who has the power and the voice in these encounters.  It is not 
always easy to work out what is happening; perhaps the person with dementia can be 
powerful through silence 
I’m sure with some people that you’ve interviewed that I’ve 
interviewed that haven’t  been totally honest about it because 
they’re maybe not quite sure  
Alison uses a common-sense reality despite the evidence that it does not always fit 
with the differing realities of the people with dementia she sees.  Psychiatry often 
uses a scientific approach and she talks about having to ‘pick things apart’ to 
understand them.  She looks for causes such as damage to the brain using diagnostic 
terminology like Lewy Body dementia.  This is not however visible and 
hallucinations are not always associated with functioning  
at that point he was functioning really well there was nothing 
to suspect he was managing his money going out to the shops 
driving his room was full of terrorists 
Although hallucinations have slippery boundaries, diagnosis is a specialist function, 
belonging to someone with specialist psychiatric knowledge, nurses in care homes 
are not competent to diagnose 
a lady in a care home who was convinced her husband was 
still he had died and she was convinced that he had come 
back again and he was having it away with a woman in the 
bay next door who was a nun and had 10 children and there 
was every time you went there was the staff would say you 
know she’s not having any hallucinations 
7.4 Summary 
Simon and Jeanette co-constructed the narratives in these interviews and 
contextualised Simon’s hallucinations within his identity as a creative person.  A 
medical explanation was secondary to their understanding of the experiences but it 
was enacted as the reality of hallucinations within the medical setting of a medical 
interview. 
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For Alison, Simon’s hallucinations are of interest, not a problem to him .  She deals 
with a multiplicity of hallucinations and they are interesting to her too.  She positions 
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8 Stories of hallucinations 
Stories have to repair the damage that the illness has done to 
the ill person’s sense of where she (sic) is in life 
(Frank, 1997: 53 Italics in original) 
In the previous three chapters I examined the individual stories of my participants, as 
triadic cases. In this chapter I draw together case study findings to demonstrate the 
centrality of narratives in understandings of hallucinations.  The expansion of the 
interest in narrative inquiry in health and illness has contributed to understanding the 
complexity of not only illness narratives, but also to the way narrative is used 
throughout medical practice (Hydén and Brockmeier, 2008).  This study contributes 
to this understanding by adding hallucinations and dementia.  Hallucinations are 
woven into stories, demonstrating contextualised understandings.  These challenge 
the decontextualized meaning that exists within psychiatric definitions of 
hallucinations.  Demonstrating the contextual explanations of hallucinations focuses 
on the multiplicity of realities of hallucinations in practice. 
The first section reviews the use of narrative within illness research and begins to 
address how my participants used narratives within this study. 
8.1 Using stories 
All the participants in my study used stories to talk about hallucinations, the stories 
that they told were multiple.  Hydén (1997) distinguishes three uses of narrative that 
are commonly identifiable in research about illness, in social science. 
 Illness as narrative – illness is expressed through narrative  
 Narrative about illness- narrative is used to convey knowledge and ideas of 
illness 
 Narrative as illness- a person is unable to narrate because of illness 
The first use was evident in the discussion of hallucinations and dementia by my 
participants with dementia and their carers.  They used narratives to integrate 
hallucinations and dementia into their lives and to create a new social reality.  
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Although people with dementia may fall into the third category, the people in my 
study were able to narrate their illness experience, albeit sometimes encountering 
difficulties.  I found with Hydén (2013) that they were ‘creative problem-solvers’ 
and were often assisted by carers when difficulties arose.  The narratives of 
professionals fell into the second category; they used narratives to discuss their 
knowledge and ideas about illness. 
8.1.1 Order 
Stories are a way of knowing, they are used to create order; events are selected and 
put into a sequence.  Storytelling constructs a coherent linear whole from nonlinear 
temporal reality.  Although all my participants had differing understandings of 
hallucinations and dementia, their stories were comprehensible and sequenced. 
8.1.2 Context 
Stories are used to create a context for illness.  Nurses are used to telling stories 
about their patients; it is a daily part of their job.  Alex started a number of stories 
with ‘I can think of a chap’.  Normal uncomplicated cases are written up and 
forgotten, it is the complex stories where variations and anomalies abound that are 
remembered and re-recounted.  Hunter (1992) writes about the stories of doctors, and 
nurses are no different in this respect,  they tell stories to other colleagues.  It is a 
means of conveying experiential knowledge in medical settings and can be used as a 
way of establishing the narrative identity of the storyteller.  Kim tells the story of her 
‘creative’ methods establishing both herself and the person with dementia as an 
individual 
If their life needs to be improved in any way that’s what I’m 
there to help them do and that’s why it is very individual 
because it’s different for everybody 
Although the initial focus of interviews with the professionals in my case studies was 
the specific person with dementia, I also asked them in general about how they 
managed hallucinations.  They would inevitably start to tell stories of other 
individual people they had known, to illustrate hallucinations.  Narratives about 
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illness are ways in which medical staff convey ideas and knowledge about illness 
(Hydén, 1997). 
Clinical stories from my past were instrumental in my desire to undertake this 
research; I can clearly recall people with whom I have had a clinical relationship who 
puzzled me.  
As Alison says 
it’s these types of patients that you really remember isn’t it 
the ones that are just something that you can’t quite in your 
own head you can’t quite make sense of the ones you think 
about a lot what was that about 
Stories illustrate mismatches between knowledge of disease and knowledge of 
illness.  As Hunter (1992) points out unsurprising events are minimally recorded, it is 
where there is an anomaly that it is worth telling.   
Unlike in other types of nursing, performance for mental health nurses mainly 
involves talking and observing, there are no physical examinations involved.  Asking 
people what they think, results in them interpreting realities, asking them and 
observing what they do results in performing realities (Mol, 2002).  The nurses’ use 
of specific cases to illustrate their points could be seen as them doing their own 
ethnography. 
Although the ‘anecdote’ is disparaged in this day of evidence based medicine, Hunter 
(1992) argues that it has an often unrecognised place in the transmission of 
knowledge.  Stories of individual patients serve as a reminder that clinical care is 
about the particular person’s experience of disease. 
Nurses mediate and negotiate with a complex network of others who may all have 
different expectations.  Social aspects of living with an illness are added in to make a 
singularity.  Various realities are added up and a treatment decision made in a 
specific context.  Kim talks about  
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if it’s me that can do it that’s fine or if it’s somebody else but 
often includes other members of the family or friends or 
places they go 
8.1.3 Stories as creation of self 
 The work of people like Somers (1994) changed the focus of understanding of 
identity from a fixed essentialist explanation to a storied interpretation.  She explains 
narrative as the method we use to know and understand our world.  This results in a 
narrative identity in which stories can shift with time, and it is embedded within 
relationships.  Narratives are the means by which people construct their identities 
within particular social settings (Holstein and Gubrium, 2000).  Narratives have a 
role in sustaining identity and people have a creative capacity to maintain continuity 
(Richardson, 1997), they may also use disruptions to describe a change in life course 
(Hydén and Örulv, 2009).    
Nurses used stories to create a professional self in my study.  Their stories created 
them as competent and specialised practitioners, distinguishing them from other less 
knowledgeable nurses.  One of the nurses told of a care home where staff did not 
recognise that someone was hallucinating because they did not take the time to listen 
to them.  The mental health nurse has discarded the reality of the care home staff.  
They even felt competent to challenge doctors  
but staff often use terms like hallucinating or saying that 
they’re delusional or that they’re psychotic you hear these 
terms used and GPs will sometimes use these terms when it’s 
clear that that’s not the case but people are just genuinely 
anxious or worried about something 
Standards may conflict with the practice of the individual nurse.  Kim tells me that 
she may be unconventional in her method of seeing people 
I tend when I have my first interview with people with 
dementia it’s almost a non-clinical visit if that makes sense to 
you because I’m not there to fill in forms I’m there trying to 
get to know the person the official form-filling etc comes in 
later 
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Stories were used by my participants to order events and create context for them.  
They were also used to create narrative selves, professional selves for the nurses and 
often continuing selves for people with dementia and their carers.  Continuing selves 
were maintained by integrating hallucinations into their sense of self as the next 
section discusses. 
8.2 Normalising hallucinations 
Bury’s (1982) concept of biographical disruption suggests that one of the ways 
people cope with chronic illness is to integrate it into their lives in order to achieve a 
sense of coherence of identity.  My participants with dementia and their carers often 
used this narrative continuity to understand hallucinations.  Sometimes they were 
integrated into their past identity, explaining them through their previous 
understandings and sometimes they worked hard to integrate them.   
8.2.1 Hallucinations as continuity 
Dave and Simon located hallucinations in continuations of aspects of their self.  They 
both understood their experiences of hallucinations within important attributes of 
their narrative history.  Dave’s hallucinations are an extension of his imaginative 
capacity 
I've always had a vivid imagination I have always been able 
to I suppose think laterally and create situations I enjoyed  
Dave 
Simon has been creative and enjoys painting and so for him, hallucinations are a 
source of inspiration for his creativity.  He used the experience as something to be 
drawn.  This is demonstrated in his illustration of one of his hallucinations (Figure 
5). 
Simon and Dave both described these aspects of hallucinations, as did their partners.  
For Simon they were a continuation and a flourishing of his artistic creativity, and a 
source of inspiration.  Both he and his wife described the loosening of his artistic 
style and their interest in the visions that he saw.  Hallucinations are normalized 
within his artistic talent.  Dave’s descriptions of plays in trees were equally 
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imaginative.  His hallucinations had started as an entertainment, he tells me of his 
first hallucinations, which were musical hallucinations that he could control, 
changing the genre at will.  There is ‘a little coterie of comfortable hallucinations’ 
but he also has had less comfortable hallucinations.    
Graeme incorporated some hallucinations within the context of his life now.  The cat 
just sat in the living room.  When I asked if he approached it he told me he had no 
need to because it sat there doing nothing.   
8.2.2 Memories 
Everyone was agreed that hallucinations had some meaning within the context of a 
life.  People with dementia in this study engage with their hallucinations rather than 
understanding them as an external experience.  For Simon and Dave this is a positive 
interaction.  Graeme negotiates the reality of many of his hallucinations.  When his 
hallucinations appeared to feel incongruous, he worked to re-interpret them.  Both 
his community nurse Kim and his daughter Lesley helped in this work. He uses 
linear time through his life course to work out whether something is a hallucination.  
On one occasion he saw two girls sitting in his living room playing a game.  He 
eventually worked out that this must be a hallucination, because they were girls he 
knew from the past, and they were appearing as much younger than they would 
actually be now. 
Carers may be able to locate hallucinations in past experiences of people with 
dementia.  Community nurses often locate hallucinations within a life course. 
Professionals identified past events as contributing to present hallucinations.  These 
may be innocuous like someone going through the motions of fishing or more 
frightening as one nurse described 
this lady had actually been a prisoner of war so she’d had a 
really horrific early years and  one of the things that she used 
to get really distressed by, she lived at the top of a hill and 
lights, car headlights at night, used to come up the hill into 
her housing estate and she thought it was searchlights 
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8.2.3 Hallucinations as dreams 
People with dementia often associated hallucinations with dreaming and spoke of the 
difficulty in differentiating between dreaming and hallucinations.  Dave described his 
hallucinations as ‘an upmarket dream’.  Graeme and his daughter Lesley associated 
hallucinations with tiredness and sleep, Graeme says 
 sometimes I I think I’m maybe half dreaming but I am 
awake but I’ve maybe been sleeping 
Although Simon seemed fairly clear that his hallucinations occurred within a wakeful 
period, he too mentioned dreaming 
the main difference is that em  they’re not really dreams in 
the sense that they happen at night when you’re sleeping 
As a researcher I was struck when listening to the accounts of hallucinations by the 
way that participants discussed the hallucinations. It resembled trying to tell dreams 
when they slip out of grasp during the telling. This is discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
Dave’s ‘hallucinations’ became a ‘vivid imagination’ and ‘dreams’, he says ‘I’m not 
able to distinguish between hallucination and dream’. 
Hallucinations were not totally understood as part of a narrative continuity, nurses 
and carers as well as some of the people with dementia integrated an understanding 
of hallucinations as part of a disease process alongside other understandings. 
8.3 Hallucinations as symptom 
Separating the symptom of hallucinations, from the disease of dementia was 
impossible in the study.  Hallucinations are currently understood within psychiatry as 
a symptom of a disease.  In the context of this study they were identified by me as an 
experience that could happen in dementia.   All the nurses in the study associated 
hallucinations with a disease model of dementia, this could have been expected, as 
they were recruited as specialist nurses who worked within mental health and the 
inclusion criteria specified people with dementia, who hallucinated.   
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8.3.1 Hallucinations placed on a disease trajectory 
Sometimes nurses placed hallucinations along a disease trajectory.  Despite my 
perception that two of the people with dementia in the study had early diagnoses, 
nurses associated the appearance of hallucinations with a decrease in functioning, 
anticipating an inverse relationship  
usually as the dementia progresses and the hallucinations 
become distressing  
It becomes less easy to tell though, as the person in the later stages of dementia may 
be unable to voice their experiences and you have to guess by observation. 
They are surprised when there is a discrepancy between the severity of dementia and 
hallucinations 
at that point he was functioning really well there was nothing 
to suspect 
8.3.2 Hallucinations as disturbance in brain 
The increasing availability of neuroimaging techniques and understanding of 
neuropathology has meant that the causes of dementia and hallucinations can be 
increasingly placed in the brain.  Some of the nurses described the aetiology of 
hallucinations as located in the brain.  The relationship between whatever was going 
on in the brain, acted on the person causing them to hallucinate 
I think what happens to the brain when it develops dementia 
makes the brain even more fascinating 
The changes in the brain and the symptoms that they see in individuals add together 
to produce hallucinations related to dementia.  The changes in the brain are of 
interest to the nurses, but for their day to day contact with patients, they are 
associated with a number of other factors to cause hallucinations in individual 
patients 
so I find it all very interesting I find it quite fascinating 
actually how the brain works in that way and what it must be 
like for people 
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This medical understanding of dementia, as caused by pathological changes in the 
brain was powerful, extending to the carers and the people with dementia in the 
study. 
Medical terminology was used by Graeme he used the term ‘visuo-spatial 
difficulties’ to explain.  Frank would call this decision to tell a story in medical terms 
an ‘act of narrative surrender’ (Frank, 1997: 6). Lesley too looks for medical 
explanations.  She places the cause of Graeme’s difficulties in the brain although she 
is less certain in this knowledge than the professionals.  She acknowledges the 
medical terminology and the expert knowledge of medicine. 
he seems to internalise it it’s like his brain and as I say this is 
maybe the science the brain  sort of can’t work it out ….but I 
don’t know what the animal hallucinations are all about 
In this world of medicine the doctors are the people with the most valued knowledge, 
although nurses too have some of this specialised knowledge.  The brain of the 
person with dementia is the object of knowledge and science is the method of 
knowing.  This was the argument put forward by Foucault in his study ‘The birth of 
the clinic’ (1973):  that the body became object to the medical gaze. 
8.3.3  Diagnosis 
Experiences of the disease label were varied.  Simon had a recent diagnosis of 
dementia and says since he became aware of his diagnosis he has felt happy although 
perhaps he should not 
that’s one of the strange things about this whole thing is that 
for most of the time since  I first became aware of it I’ve felt 
very happy I feel that I shouldn’t it’ll maybe change 
Graeme places his hallucinations within the context of dementia and he and his 
daughter both struggle with uncertainty.  The problem of diagnosing dementia has 
been discussed earlier in this thesis.  Dementia is an umbrella term; it is a syndrome 
comprising a number of different diseases.  The difficulty with this is that although it 
suggests discrete categories of separate diseases, they are not certain (Hughes, 2011).  
It has however become good practice to give people with dementia a diagnosis, it a 
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measure of quality within the Scottish government’s  dementia strategy (Scottish 
Government, 2010). 
Graeme’s identity has been disrupted by a change in medical diagnosis.  He has had 
a diagnosis of dementia for a number of years and it has been more woven into his 
identity than for either of the other two participants whose diagnoses of dementia are 
more recent.  A diagnosis provides an explanatory framework that makes sense of 
symptoms (Bracken and Thomas, 2005).   
In his work on biographical reconstruction, Bury (1982) shows the importance of 
medical knowledge at a time of re-thinking biography in response to disruption.  
Medical discourse provides a possible explanatory framework  (Schneider, 2007).  
Graeme actively uses a medical discourse as it explains some of the things that are 
happening to him and is a preferable account to the alternative, that he is doing these 
things deliberately.  His hallucinations, although they are vivid, are not the most 
salient aspects of his experience of living with dementia.  He struggles when the 
more specific diagnosis of Lewy body dementia is taken away, and is keen to 
confirm that he does have something 
they don’t think that I’ve got what they thought I had at the 
beginning but there’s something going on and they can’t put 
their finger on it…. they definitely think that there’s 
something going on 
A disease requires a redefinition of past, present and future in disease terms 
(Schneider, 2007).  Graeme’s hope for a future time of forgetting is a medical 
discourse that constructs dementia as deterioration into cognitive oblivion.  Disease 
has become a ‘scientific’ explanation for Graeme in the face of meaninglessness, but 
the certainty that he seeks through scientific explanations is contributing to his 
uncertainty.   
Simon and Dave are playful with the hegemony of professional authority in their 
reactions to being told they are experiencing hallucinations.  They acknowledge the 
medical terminology but find it amusing. Someone else named their experiences 
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‘hallucinations’.  Simon describes the moment at the end of an appointment with a 
doctor when his hallucinations become a medical concern 
I found it amusing and I told people about it and laughed it 
was only as I was leaving the interview and that this Dr 
jumped on it and asked me a wee bit more about it. 
His experience is named ‘hallucinations’ at this point.  They had previously been 
‘something interesting’ but during his appointment they became hallucinations, they 
were enacted into being hallucinations in the relationship between the doctor and 
Simon.  The doctor sees the similarity between Simon’s story and other cases of 
hallucinations he has seen (Law, 2004).  A diagnosis represents the universal rather 
than the particular. 
Dave too describes  
because I'm trying to think about first impressions of what are 
now called hallucination 
Simon and Dave assert their own narratives of hallucinations but medical 
explanations impinge on their stories.  
For nurses, the tensions between the textbook definitions of normal disease and 
individual patients in clinical practice was apparent 
yeah there’s lots of things that you could perceive as 
hallucinations and have been seen by GPs or other health 
professionals and have said they’re hallucinating. But 
actually when you, if you get the chance and if you do work 
with them and build up a relationship, sometimes you’re 
never entirely convinced that it is actually a true hallucination 
yourself 
Although they were not always sure if what someone was experiencing was a ‘true 
hallucination’ they did feel secure in their own professional competence. They 
perceived hallucinations as an area of expertise for psychiatry. 
Despite the explanatory hold that medical accounts have on understanding the origins 
of hallucinations, no-one thought that this was the only reality of hallucinations in 
 
Stories of hallucinations  218 
dementia.  Everyone in the study considered living with illness as more important 
than suffering from disease. 
8.4 Living with illness 
Neither the participants who experienced hallucinations, nor their carers identified 
hallucinations in isolation, as a disruption to their lives.  Bury’s work on biographical 
disruption would suggest that dementia may have had a disruptive effect on the 
knowledge and structures of the everyday lives of my participants (Bury, 1982).   
Two of my participants had experienced biographical disruption caused by differing 
illnesses for extended periods. Graeme had had a diagnosis of dementia for a number 
of years, and Dave had an earlier disruption with Parkinson’s.  In this extract we see 
how his taken for granted assumptions were dislodged and he and Joan had to re-
examine their expectations for the future 
it’s obviously not what we, not part of the great master plan 
of life when we were 20 odd you know we thought what 
would happen when we were coming up for retirement, 
where we would be. Actually in one sense it hasn’t made an 
awful lot of difference. 
Dave has already reconstructed his life story to include Parkinson’s, which is a 
longstanding diagnosis for him. Although he says that he thinks dementia may get 
worse, at the moment he will just wait and see, neither dementia nor hallucinations 
cause much more disruption at this stage.   Williams (2000) revised the concept of 
biographical disruption by adding that timing and context can affect how people 
react to chronic illness.  Illness can be normalised in certain circumstances: Dave is 
experiencing dementia and hallucinations within the context of long standing health 
problems.  Graeme struggles with the battle between ill health and the expectations 
of a healthier old age 
I cannae go and do what I used to be able to do and I know I 
know as we get older and things happen but I mean I’m no 
that old 
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For the people in my case studies, hallucinations did not threaten their self-esteem 
although for Graeme, dementia was beginning to threaten his sense of self.  People 
balance both continuity and changes to their narrative identity.   
8.4.1 Shrinking world 
People with dementia may lose control of their space.  Julia Lawton describes how a 
loss of mobility in people with a terminal illness leads to changing ability to 
negotiate space impacting on their selfhood  (Lawton, 2000).  Identity and place can 
be intertwined, not just home, but places that are part of our lives and through which 
we move (Teather, 1999). 
There are a number of reasons related to accessibility that lead to people with 
dementia becoming isolated. These include mobility, way finding and perception 
problems.  For all my participants there was a degree of altered mobility.  Simon and 
Dave have both had to stop driving, which impacted on their identities 
that’s the worst thing is the loss of the car 
Simon 
The loss of the ability to continue to drive means a greater dependence on others that 
can result in friction.  Simon and Jeanette discuss Simon’s anxiety when she is 
driving on the motorway. She does not put this down to his mistrust of her ability but 
it has been difficult for them both.  It can be a loss of autonomy that causes 
resentment for people with dementia 
 Joan: it's not going to change now 
Dave: no but one day the medical profession might see sense 
Different selves may be constructed in different places (Askham et al., 2007) but 
home is normally associated with security and identity.  Graeme’s house is his own 
space; he has religious icons and photographs of his children and grandchildren and 
also his own degree certificates on prominent display.  He sits in a favourite chair 
surrounded by many of these photographs in easy view.  Although he has security 
here even this is slipping at times, when things go missing 
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it’s about a week ago since I’ve lost.. Where is this stick and 
every so often I go and have a search round. The only thing I 
can think of cos I wouldnae be able to go very far … I would 
realise that I didnae have my stick with me, so the only thing 
I think I’ve done is I’ve put it in the bucket 
Graeme’s world is shrinking as he finds it difficult to negotiate crowded 
environments, he is unsure sometimes whether the people and animals he sees are 
real or not.  Visuo-spatial difficulties can be associated with hallucinations in 
medical literature, where they are decontextualized, but Graeme describes their 
emotional impact.  The hallucinations outside the house are distressing to him and he 
associated them with his perceptual difficulties.  He blamed his perceptual problems 
on his dementia.  His previous confidence has disappeared.  One of the reasons he 
cites for not going out alone so often is that he does not want to ‘make a fool of 
myself’.  He restricts his movements to avoid potential loss of self-esteem. He 
ascribes this change, from a formerly outgoing person, to a less confident person, to 
his dementia.  It could be argued that this is contributing to social exclusion but both 
Graeme and Lesley weigh up the disadvantages of this against the possibility of 
increasing his distress including disturbing hallucinations. 
Frank (1997) reminds us that people who are stigmatized avoid social situations 
where they embarrass themselves and so upset others by losing control.  All my 
participants experience some changes in their ability to communicate with other 
people or feeling safe going out alone. Dave has difficulties with his speech and his 
mobility associated with his Parkinson’s and Simon also says he finds it more 
difficult to engage in conversation.  Graeme and Simon restrict their own social 
activity but for Dave it is his physical disability that stops him from going out. 
Dave is constrained by his mobility difficulties from going out alone but he sees his 
most vivid and entertaining hallucination from the safety of his home, looking out 
into public space.  Although the things he sees outside are entertaining they can also 
point to the changes in the world outside.  It has become less safe and predictable-
there are people rushing around on motorbikes, and foreigners moving in.  He 
becomes annoyed when the familiar becomes unfamiliar such as when he gets no 
response from the family members who he sees in his living room. 
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8.4.2 Lack of stimulation 
The worlds of all my participants with dementia have been curtailed by mobility or 
communication difficulties.  The nurses in my study identified people in care homes 
whose worlds have contracted.  This can result in a lack of stimulation.  Carers and 
nurses attribute some episodes of hallucinations to this sensory and social 
deprivation. 
Previous research has found an association between hallucinations and sensory 
deficits especially visual impairment and visual hallucinations (Lawrence et al., 
2009).  Results from a recent study of hallucinations as reported by staff in a care 
home suggested that boredom could contribute to hallucinations (Cohen-Mansfield 
and Golander, 2012).  Dave’s wife Joan identified the losses he had experienced due 
to his Parkinson’s.  He is now unable to leave the house alone and has lost other 
abilities that were previously important to him.  Joan wonders if the imaginative 
nature of his hallucinations could substitute for stimulation from previously used 
sources.   
The professionals in my study also understood hallucinations as a source of 
entertainment for some people.  People who are in care homes may have little else to 
occupy them.  This could be a hint at a chaos narrative, an inability to move on to a 
future that would be worse than a present of imagination and entertainment and 
pleasant memories of the past. 
Jeanette and Joan both considered hallucinations as a possible compensation for 
other losses.  Joan says 
maybe sometimes it’s better to have hallucinations than think 
about things that are actually happening 
She is seeking to minimise the distress for Dave caused by his reduced ability to go 
out and engage the way he used to be able.  This is not so much the concern 
described in much of the literature on loss for carers, but a concern by the carers for 
the impact of the losses on the person with dementia.  It demonstrates an 
understanding for the needs for purpose and creativity, Joan’s care is attentive to 
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Dave, and based on an intimate knowledge of him (Tronto, 1993).  Her recognition 
of her own needs means that she continues to have a social life, sometimes without 
him which can contribute to his isolation.  Good care can be complex in practice 
(Brannelly, 2011). 
8.4.3 Distress 
My criteria for inclusion meant that people who became disturbed talking about 
hallucinations were not included in the study, but nurses discussed people who 
became distressed.  They described distress as a reason to intervene with possible 
medication, if no other intervention worked but it was very much a last resort 
It’s a quality of life issue then why would I want to treat with 
something or ask to have treated that could have all sorts of 
horrible side effects and you take away a source of pleasure 
or comfort for someone 
Decisions about intervention are assessed as to whether or not hallucinations invoke 
anxiety or serve a purpose such as stimulation. 
Threats to identity are often responses to difficulties in giving meaning to events.  
Graeme’s hallucinations had been frightening for him when he was away from the 
security of his home.   He had seen fierce dogs coming to attack him.  He had less 
control in public space than in private spaces and felt safer at home.  Graeme 
understood his hallucinations as part of his dementia and although he accepted some 
of them, there were certain hallucinations he found more difficult.  If he found them 
disturbing he would spend time negotiating with his perceptions to try to understand 
them.  
Lesley, Graeme’s daughter found her dad’s distress one of the most difficult things to 
deal with emotionally  
I think the fear 
I think that’s a big thing 
I think my dad being scared 
I’ve never seen my dad scared 
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Dave does not tell Joan that he is hallucinating unless he wants clarification from her.  
Where there is no obvious evidence of Dave being upset, she does not inquire. It only 
becomes a focus of discussion when they perturb Dave, or if he thinks he has to 
collect his daughter, which might entail him forgetting he is no longer allowed to 
drive.  In situations when he is distressed by the hallucinations Dave is able to ask 
Joan, who can reassure him, and he believes her.  Joan’s worry about him driving is 
about a situation that has never happened but can be a concern for Joan when she is 
out of the house.  This creates a situation of uncertainty for Joan, it is a potential risk 
but  
hopefully it'll not go down that route 
She has not assessed it as something that needs to be acted on at the moment. 
Rauol et al. (2007) in their edited work resulting from interdisciplinary inquiry found 
it impossible to differentiate between categories of illness, disease, disability and 
trauma but they described stories elicited as normative and disruptive.  In this study 
participants distinguished between normative and disruptive stories.  In normative 
narratives, hallucinations were accepted and woven into identity but disruptive 
narratives caused either a re-configuration of identity or it lead to chaos narratives 
For the people with dementia and the carers this was a frightening experience and for 
the professionals a recognition of this fear was the signal for them to intervene.   
8.4.4 Bodily control 
Hallucinations are normally discussed as disembodied.  For Graeme, they become 
embodied; they are part of his visuo-spatial difficulties.  He has become uncertain of 
his body, and he finds himself dropping things more often.  The body which is 
normally taken for granted, is making an appearance by becoming fragmented from 
his idea of his self.  He describes cups of coffee jumping out of his hand and 
struggling to put on a jacket while holding a walking stick.  His bodily sense of self 
is threatened by becoming a communicative body (Frank, 1997) that he does not 
recognise.  His sense of self has previously included bodily control and this is 
disappearing. 
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Hallucinations become an outside force, although both he and his daughter recognise 
there is an incongruity in this 
Graeme: and I think my brain cannae cope with things and it 
makes things up.  It’s no me that makes them up it’s my brain 
(laughs) 
Lesley:  it’s your brain aye (laughs) it’s outside of you 
Graeme’s story of hallucinations is a self/other story in this extract. Analyses that 
place causes on the inside or outside of the self are inadequate and often involve 
more complex relationships.  A cause may be placed outside the self but the illness 
affects many aspects of functioning. 
Dave’s relationship with his body and his hallucinations is different to Graeme’s.  
His difficulty in controlling his body is very evident, looking at him.  His 
Parkinson’s has led to him finding it difficult to sit still but he does not tell a story of 
his body, his hallucinations are contained in his mind and this seems dissociated 
from his body.  His body is, however, very much present to me in his narrative as I 
find myself uncomfortable with his apparent physical effort.  Separating the 
narratives of hallucinations from those of dementia and other disruptive illnesses was 
not possible. 
8.5 Hallucinations in relationships 
All the people within each of my triadic case studies had a relationship with each 
other.  Narratives take place within specific relationships (Somers, 1994, Carsten, 
2007), they are not just co-authored with a researcher.  Two of the carers within my 
study were co-resident spouses and the other was a daughter who did not live with 
her father but was an integral part of his life.  Although Graeme lives alone he 
situates himself very much within a circle of relationships, especially with his family.  
His world has become circumscribed and his family are becoming more central to 
him now that his wider social circle is shrinking. 
For caregivers hallucinations are located within interpersonal relationships.  If 
identity is created in narratives then relationship identity can also be created within 
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narratives.   The carers spoke about the impact of hallucinations within their daily 
lives and within a long term relationship.  As Joan says 
‘I mean they’re just part of our lives’ 
The hallucinations, which occur within the home are a part of Dave and Joan’s 
shared narrative; they are familiar members of their family but his hallucinations of 
the outside world are of unknown people. Even when his hallucinations may be 
dreams they are associated with memories from his past.  This is part of his, and their 
shared narrative identity.  Temporality changes in these instances. Chronologically 
the past becomes more vivid to him than the present.  
Joan’s care decisions are made within their relationship that includes personal 
knowledge developed within a shared narrative identity. In an ethic of care 
framework this could be conceptualized as attentiveness (Tronto, 1993), Joan is 
attentive to Dave’s needs but does not disregard his reality either 
Dave: Yes I think it's fair to say you've always been 
supportive you know you've always seen my point of view … 
You may not agree with it,  you may not see and you don't, 
and think I shouldn't see whatever it is I see men on 
horseback or boys playing in trees 
Joan : well I don’t think any of us who don't have 
hallucinations can understand what it is that you're seeing 
you can tell us you can you can describe the picture 
Dave is responsive to her.  None of the carers disregarded the people with dementia. 
Dave and Graeme will ask their relatives if they are concerned about the reality of 
their hallucinations.  Relatives reassure them when they become concerned about 
their visions. 
All three people with dementia in my study were unsure of the linear temporality of 
some events and were corrected by carers, as in this exchange with Graeme and 
Lesley 
Graeme because it’s one of the favourite things I tell people 
about myself about my walking stick down my sleeve 
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Lesley see you get this all right where was this where did that 
happen 
Graeme Dublin 
Lesley it didnae happen in Dublin 
Graeme was it no that’s where I thought it happened 
Lesley didnae happen cos ((husband)) wasnae with us it was 
Bruges 
Graeme and Lesley both approach the situation with the humour established within 
an existing caring relationship. Sometimes the people with dementia asked for 
factual clarification from carers about the timing of events.  During the time I spent 
with Graeme he would often refer to his daughter  
Lesley will tell you about this 
Sometimes he found his experiences so incomprehensible that he would suggest I 
seek corroboration from someone else to make them more credible.    
Reminiscing is often inter-subjective, occurring within the context of relationships it 
can ‘affirm a social relationship in its deep temporality’ (Lambek, 2007: 220).  
Simon told me a story of an event that happened when he was small that Jeanette had 
obviously heard many times before.  This story had obviously been told and retold 
and within this process had changed to become a joint narrative.  Jeanette helped 
Simon to re-construct the story for me by joining in as a kind of Greek chorus 
Simon: and er gave me whatever it was it cost a penny 
Jeanette: it was your fare 
Simon: that was my fare 
Jeanette: aha it was a half fare 
Simon: that’s right and then the conductor 
This enabled Simon to continue with the story.  A number of times during my joint 
interviews, carers assisted the people with dementia to construct their narrative.  
Hydén (2013) described this as ‘scaffolding’ the storytelling when one of the 
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partners in the joint storytelling asks pertinent questions or offers possible 
explanations that allow the person with dementia to carry on as an active partner.  
Although the people in my study did not have the range of communication 
difficulties he described, this cooperative storytelling certainly happened with all my 
participants. 
Lesley does not live with her dad and so has to work hard to understand the factual 
aspects of what has happened, and when.  It is important for her to make sense of his 
narrative.  This was easier for the co-resident wives in my study, although as I 
described earlier all of the carers provide factual details within shared narratives. 
but it’s taken me two days to make sense of something you 
know and it is it’s the second guessing and not being sure 
Lesley 
For carers it is often more than the need for day to day reminding that they see as a 
change within their relationships. Lesley describes the uncertainty of her 
relationships with her dad.  Although he is not totally lost to her she is not sure about 
his status as a ‘dad’ any more.  Her description of a dad as someone who is strong for 
his family starts to break down as she says ‘a dad’s never scared’.  She balances the 
uncertainty of who her dad now is, with her commitment to their relationship. The 
name ‘Dad ‘is used throughout the interview, in the Word cloud, it comes up as one 
of the three most common words she uses.   
In many ways her dad is the same and very recognisable to her but in other ways 
their relationship has changed causing uncertainty.  He was previously a strong 
person but has now begun to show fear at the hallucinations.  He both is and is not a 
dad.  Ambiguity defines their current relationship. 
8.6 Multiplicity 
The people with dementia and their families negotiate the medical classification of 
hallucinations within their everyday life.  Nurses’ understandings of hallucinations 
are not fixed but comprise a fluidity of different understandings.  This was not 
simply a question of each nurse having a different understanding, but of them using 
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different understandings in different sites.  This resonates with the work of 
Annemarie Mol in The Body Multiple (Mol, 2002).  
Community mental health nurses enacted different versions of hallucinations in 
specific contexts.  They were usually able to switch fluidly between versions without 
them becoming multiple but in a way that integrated them. 
They told clinical stories to discuss hallucinations.  Their stories showed how they 
situated hallucinations within specific situations and made clinical judgements based 
on a specific context.  They use context specific knowledge  
Context-dependent-knowledge and experience is at the heart 
of expert activity 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001 :p71) 
‘Hallucinations’ was used as a term which acted as shorthand between professionals 
including myself, however it was not without its problems.  A closer examination 
highlighted the multiplicity of its use; from the imposed order of DSM, to 
neurological changes within the brain, to the joint understanding developed between 
the nurse, person with dementia and carer.  
8.7 Summary 
To summarise: experienced community mental health professionals are skilled in 
negotiating the complexities and multiplicities of hallucinations through everyday 
clinical practice.  They situate hallucinations within their professional knowledge 
that includes the disease model but they enact hallucinations and dementia within 
each clinical situation with the person with dementia and in the context of their 
relationships with significant others. 
This study shows that by attending to the narratives of people with dementia who 
hallucinate we can gain an understanding of hallucinations as meaningful 
experiences for them.  Previous studies of hallucinations and dementia have 
presented understandings based on de- contextualised knowledge of brain biology or 
epidemiology (Berrios, 1992, Leroi et al., 2003).  The narrative of one of my 
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participants, Graeme, integrated hallucinations into a disruptive illness narrative of 
dementia.   Simon and Dave integrated hallucinations into their biographical 
narrative identity, but not as part of an illness narrative.  No-one used a single 
discourse to interpret their experiences they all used different discourses depending 
on the situation it described. 
People with dementia integrate hallucinations into identity in a number of ways.   
They do this through inclusion in important aspects of their life such as skills or 
interests.  Carers may assist in this.  Shared narratives are collaborative 
constructions; they contribute towards the maintenance of relationships through 
facticity and structural assistance. Hallucinations cannot be seen in isolation from 
other aspects of illness and lives.  Attributing hallucinations to identity is connected 
to the powerful modernist narrative of a continuing sense of self.  As I described in 
Chapter 2, this is threatened by dementia in discourses attributing a loss of self to 
people with dementia.   Hallucinations become a threat when they are anxiety 
provoking to the individual or to their relationships. 
The ability of people with dementia and people with psychotic symptoms to tell the 
story of their illness has been questioned.   Within dementia there may be an 
assumption that the ability to narrate is affected because of its association with 
memory, language loss and lack of awareness (Phinney, 2002).  This can be 
compounded by associations of psychotic symptoms as synonymous with losing 
touch with reality (Lovell, 1997).  This study has shown that it is possible to analyse 
the experience of hallucinations and dementia through narrative. 
Exploring narrative understandings of hallucinations in dementia has developed 
understanding of how people with dementia manage hallucinations by integrating 
them within their lives.  They adjusted by constructing meaning for them through 
their narrative identity.  Hallucinations were assimilated into the self, which was 
refashioned to include both hallucinations and dementia. Previous literature has 
demonstrated how people narratively construct their lives incorporating dementia 
(Phinney, 1998, Phinney, 2002, Beard and Fox, 2008, Williams and Keady, 2006).  
Hallucinations have not previously been included in that framework of maintenance 
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of self.  They are integrated into their narrative identity as both a continuation and as 
a change to their self-identity.  They had understandings within a context of the 
practice of a specific situation.   
Understanding narrative identity as being co-constructed, contributes to 
understanding hallucinations in dementia as an inter-subjective, not just an internal 
experience.  There are often tensions between the different realities enacted and the 
narratives told.  As in Mol’s study this does not lead to disintegration but ‘tensions 
are tamed’ (Mol, 2002: 181).   Realities in care practice are multiple and situated, 
care cuts across the tensions within knowledge leading to a fluid approach.  The 
following chapter will locate the narratives of identity of people with dementia and 
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9 Hallucinations in dementia as liminal 
In the last chapter I examined how people with dementia, carers and nurses all used 
narratives to contextualise hallucinations.  Ambiguity and uncertainty were 
characteristic of many of the stories of hallucinations in dementia in my study.  In 
this chapter I develop a theoretical understanding of hallucinations in dementia by 
proposing liminality as a useful concept to describe and explore these experiences.  
Liminality challenges the fixed boundaries that can divide normal from abnormal and 
‘in touch with reality’ with ‘out of touch with reality’.  Liminality is a time of 
ambiguity and disorientation where normal boundaries are broken down  (Turner, 
1967, 1979). 
In the brief introduction I revisit the theoretical understanding of liminality 
developed by Victor Turner and some of its applications in the field of health care.  I 
apply a sociocultural understanding of liminality to dementia and carers, to explain 
why they may be marginalized.  I then use an experiential understanding of 
liminality to understand the temporal and spatial disruptions that occur for people 
who hallucinate and have dementia.  I also employ liminality to explore the 
emotional components, both distressing and more enjoyable of hallucinations.  In the 
final sections, in keeping with an understanding of hallucinations in dementia as 
liminal space, I propose a role for professionals as master of ceremonies in caring for 
people, and within the ritual of diagnosis. 
9.1 Introduction 
The word liminal comes from the Latin limen meaning threshold.  It was a term 
developed and used in anthropology to describe a stage during ceremonial rites of 
passage.  Van Gennep (1960) described three stages when someone transforms from 
one status to another during rites of passage.  The stages he conceptualised are a 
‘preliminal’ or separation stage, a ‘transition’ and a return to a new status (Turner, 
1967, Felde, 2011).  Turner  further conceptualised the transition or liminal period, 
which he described as a time of ‘betwixt and between’  (Turner, 1967:93-111).  He 
applied the understanding to both small scale and larger societies.  The transition that 
occurred, according to Turner was a process or a transformation. The person in the 
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liminal space is neither one thing nor the other; they have left behind one status and 
have not yet moved on to the next, although they may exhibit aspects of both.  
Liminality is not a static state but a confusion of usual categories, ambiguity and 
disorder.  It can be either positive or negative as society bestows on the person a 
specialised status, it does not necessarily isolate people, they may also experience 
camaraderie in their seclusion which allows them to be themselves without having to 
conform to institutional roles (Turner, 1967, Jackson, 2005). 
Against this background the theory of liminality has been used in the field of health 
in recent years to analyse conditions where the person feels healthy but has clinical 
signs of abnormality.  Examples of this are in the management of raised cholesterol 
(Felde, 2011) and having an abnormal cervical smear result (Forss et al., 2004).  
Liminality has also been used in approaches to chronic health problems for example 
chronic pain (Jackson, 2005), cancer (Little et al., 1998) and mental health issues 
(Warner and Gabe, 2004, Barratt, 1998).  There may not be a resolution to another 
stage, instead people might continually live in a liminal state.  Liminality within 
health studies has predominantly addressed the structural impact of being assigned a 
social category that impacts on the way they are viewed by society.  I would argue 
that alongside this social account, liminality can also contribute to understanding the 
psychological and emotional experiences of hallucinations in dementia. 
9.2 Dementia and hallucinations: liminal persona  
I discussed in Chapter 2 the ways in which someone with dementia can challenge the 
modernist idea of what it is to be a person.  The modern person is a rational and 
independent individual.  A person, who does not fit these criteria, because they may 
see things that others do not, and may require care, does not belong in this social 
category. 
It can be argued that people with dementia are in a liminal space due to their 
ambiguous status, transgressing the dualistic boundaries of both health and illness, 
and life and death.  They do not fit easily into social categories.  Turner describes the 
symbolism ascribed to the liminal identity as ‘structural “invisibility”’ (Turner, 1967: 
96), which may even encompass symbols of death.  Some popular images have 
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assigned descriptions such as the ‘living dead’, to people with dementia (Aquilina 
and Hughes, 2006). 
Barratt (1998) argues that the ‘schizophrenic’ straddles the boundary between a 
person and a non-person, and this perception could equally apply to a person with 
dementia, especially if they experience hallucinations.  In terms of some of the views 
of a self discussed in Chapter 2, they may be neither a person nor a nonperson.  The 
consequences of this position are that people are avoided because they are viewed as 
bizarre and dangerous. 
The work of Mary Douglas (1966), alongside that of Turner, has provided an 
explanatory frame for Barrett’s understanding of the position of people with 
schizophrenia, and Lawton’s (2000) understanding of the fear and anxiety aroused 
towards the dying.  Douglas (1966) explains the crossing of classificatory boundaries 
as a transgression, resulting in ‘pollution’.  She concludes that ambiguities are 
regarded as ritually unclean and are therefore a source of potential danger. 
The work of Kitwood (1997), and many others since, has identified the difficulties 
experienced by people with dementia when they are denied personhood.  The 
professionals in this study indicated that people with dementia living in care homes 
were often misunderstood by staff working there.  Sometimes they did not recognise 
that people were distressed, when the mental health nurses thought they clearly were, 
or care home staff either did not make the effort, or were unable to establish a 
relationship with the person with dementia.  Establishing relationships is central to 
the ethic of care literature (Tronto, 1993, Barnes, 2012).  Understanding of the 
liminal persona of dementia can help to explain the difficulty experienced by 
residents in care homes.  According to Turner ‘neophytes’ as he describes those who 
have been separated from one status but are not yet integrated into another ‘have a 
physical but not a “social” reality’ (Turner, 1967: 98). 
Barrett, in his case for the ‘schizophrenic’ as ‘liminal persona’, ascribes the 
diagnostic inability to understand schizophrenia as further evidence of its ambiguous 
status.  He compares it with dementia, which he describes as ‘neuropathologically 
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explicable’ (Barratt, 1998: 476).  As we have seen in the review of the literature, a 
diagnosis of dementia is only probable, ‘there is no hard scientific boundary between 
disease and normality’ (Hughes et al., 2006:2).  People with dementia may feel 
healthy and live their lives as though they do not have a disease.  The nuns in the 
Nun Study (Snowdon, 2001) sometimes lived without symptoms of dementia, when 
on post-mortem they were shown to have pathological damage associated with 
Alzheimer’s Disease. 
Hallucinations in dementia are also contested, as evidenced by the variance in 
prevalence rates (Bassiony and Lyketsos, 2003).  They present a challenge to 
medicine in that there is a diversity of suggested treatment options.  Unlike 
hallucinations in schizophrenia, treatment with anti-psychotic medication is not the 
usual treatment of choice due to mixed reports of efficacy (Bassiony and Lyketsos, 
2003) and the risk of side effects (Banerjee, 2009).  Jackson (2005) argues that 
people who have chronic pain have an ambiguous status as they transgress dualistic 
boundaries in similar ways to liminal states.  It can be argued that people with 
dementia and hallucinations are in a similar situation.  
When people enter a liminal state they  
May be said to be in a process of being ground down into a 
sort of homogenous social matter in which possibilities of 
differentiation may still be glimpsed 
(Turner, 1977: 37) 
People with dementia have had to fight and continue to do so to be seen as people 
living with dementia rather than as a homogenous group called ‘dementia sufferers’.  
In this study the way in which the people with dementia and their carers made sense 
of hallucinations and dementia within the context of narrative identities, 
demonstrates their refusal to accept this position as liminal personae.  However, their 
selectivity about who they told their diagnosis to showed they were aware of the 
social impact that the diagnosis of dementia retains. 
Arguing that people with dementia and hallucinations can be described as ambiguous 
runs the risk of appearing to endorse the idea that they are non-persons.  I wish to use 
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liminality instead to argue that ambiguous categories can be used to socially exclude 
people who do not fit.  The way that dementia and hallucinations are constructed as 
categories has social implications for people, it positions them within society.  Carers 
too have been positioned as living in ambiguity, and in the following section I 
discuss how this was understood by the carers in my study. 
9.3 Carers and liminality 
Much has been written about carers of people with dementia experiencing a living 
bereavement due to the changes in the identity of the person with dementia.  This has 
been the traditional model of research into carer experience, focusing attention onto 
the deviation of people with dementia from the norm.  It can also create a boundary 
between the experience of the person with dementia and the carer, rather than 
examining the impact of dementia on a relationship 
 All the carers I interviewed describe some changes in their relationships.  They 
experienced some ambiguity as they transgressed the previous roles on which their 
relationship had been built.  In his conceptualisation of Self 3, Sabat (2001) describes 
the recognition from others as essential if a role is to be maintained.  When carers 
experience ambiguity, this can make the Self 3 of the person with dementia 
vulnerable as they may not affirm their roles. 
All the carers supplemented the memory of the people with dementia to some extent.  
Examples were providing the day to day remembering of appointments or assisting 
with temporal sequencing of events. Carers often had to negotiate with statutory 
services, advocating for services for the person they care for.  This failed at times as 
it did for Lesley who describes her anger at the withdrawal of a specialist home care 
service her dad used to receive. She now feels unsupported, as the available services 
are inappropriate.  For Ryan and Runswick-Cole (2008) the lack of recognition of the 
expertise of carers can contribute to their liminal position. This resonates with the 
findings of Galvin et al (2005) of the carer as a liminal figure who builds bridges 
between the private world of a person with dementia and the public world of health 
and social care.  Galvin et al (2005) describe the carer as an ‘intimate mediator’ who 
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has the knowledge and passion for the person with dementia and acts as translator for 
the outside world and also for the person with dementia regarding the outside world. 
The people with dementia and their families who participated in this study negotiated 
the medical classification of hallucinations within their everyday life.  As Joan said 
of Dave’s hallucinations ‘they are part of our lives’.  Although the two wives 
integrated some medical explanations of hallucinations into their understandings, 
they both negotiated them within their life world.  None of the carers placed 
themselves within the discourse of living bereavement but as continuing to live 
within a relationship. 
Although my participants with dementia and carers challenged being positioned as 
socially excluded as individuals, they were aware of the stigma that could be 
attached to dementia.  Liminality provides a useful framework with which to 
understand the structural positioning of dementia and hallucinations.   In the 
following sections I use liminality to understand the psychological and emotional 
impact of dementia and hallucinations.  Liminality has temporal and spatial aspects, 
and I will use these in the following sections to explore the temporal and spatial 
disruptions that can result from dementia and hallucinations. 
9.4 Disrupted temporalities 
9.4.1 Temporal structures 
Time is a fact of social life but it can be understood in a multiplicity of ways as 
Barbara Adam (2004) explores in her comprehensive study.  Lived time is mostly 
understood as linear; this is a way in which humans have attempted to control time 
and the rhythms of the natural environment (Adam, 2004, Adam, 2006).  Time is 
normally structured and ordered by clocks, calendars and sequences of events 
(Shomaker, 1989).  We also live time through repetitions of seasonal and cyclical 
changes, bodily biorhythms and habits and routines (Adam, 2010).  People 
experience time as an extended awareness of the past and future in the present.  
Perceptions of subjective time may change in chronic illness (Little et al., 1998).  
Liminality is a time of ambiguity and the subjective experience of time may be 
disrupted.  
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9.4.2 Chronic liminality 
Recent literature on chronic illness and liminality has begun to explore liminality as a 
way of life rather than a transition (Kelly, 2008, Jackson, 2005, Murphy et al., 1988).   
Kelly (2008), in her study of the impact of AIDS related dementia  explored the 
impact of living with loss and dying as occurring within liminal space.  This 
addressed not just the socio-cultural, but also the psychological attributes of 
liminality.  To understand hallucinations as liminal situates them both within the 
sociocultural context, and within the inner, private context of the individual.. 
In this study hallucinations occur within the context of dementia and they need to be 
considered together as they were presented in the narratives of my participants.  
Dementia is a chronic illness, but hallucinations may change and disappear.  They 
may become more or less frequent, threatening or benign.  Chronic illness causes 
temporal disruption, it disturbs the normal patterns of everyday life (Bury, 1982, 
Williams, 2000).  Illness can threaten previous expectations for the future, causing 
temporal interruptions (Frank, 1997).  When Graeme wishes for a future in which he 
is unable to remember, he is challenging the expected narrative ordering in which an 
imagined future is part of a temporal sequence.  This future he expresses a desire for 
is paradoxical, he is telling a story of self in which his self disappears.  It is the 
unmaking of a narrative temporality.  This presents a challenge to illness narratives 
like the restitution narrative where there is an expectation of a return to health, but 
neither is Graeme’s story a chaos story.  A chaos narrative involves life never getting 
any better, in this story life does get better but by getting worse. 
The routines of people with dementia are often dis-ordered; it may take them longer 
to carry out routine tasks that can be more tiring.  Periods of fatigue in illness can 
dislocate previous temporal habits of being (Irving, 2005).  In my study, both carers 
and people with dementia described tiredness and sleeping longer as factors in their 
hallucinations.  One of my participants described the time and energy he had to 
expend on working out whether something was a hallucination or not.  His life was 
constantly interrupted by difficulties, whether losing things, working out his 
perceptions or normal daily activities.  People who hallucinate may spend time trying 
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to distinguish reality in their perceptions.  People with dementia often become 
isolated within their house leading to changes in their perception of time passing.   
9.4.3 Time and memory 
Memory is normally a process rather than a discrete object (Fernyhough, 2012).  It is 
only when there is some identified difficulty with it that it becomes objectified 
(Lambek, 2007).  Reminiscence is normally an active process, but for people with 
dementia it becomes a discrete problematic entity, symptomatic of disease that needs 
to be regularly measured and indicative of cognitive state.   Time and memory are 
not linear, but the coherence and authenticity of stories of people with dementia are 
often viewed as suspect.  In the previous chapter, I described how people with 
dementia and carers often co-constructed narratives, and when there was a difficulty 
with linear temporality, this was especially evident.  Although memory is notoriously 
unreliable for everyone, people with dementia have more difficulties in configuring 
clock and calendar time, there are more likely to be slippages.   
Shomaker (1989) found liminal time a useful paradigm for the temporal 
disorientation in Alzheimer’s disease and I would argue that it is especially useful to 
understand the realities of people who are hallucinating.  Merleau-Ponty (1962) says 
that memories are not associations but re-open time lost and allow us to re-evoke it 
(cited in Thomas et al., 2004).  The past memories of my participants, and the people 
with dementia that were discussed by the nurses in my study, sometimes became 
more real than events that were happening in chronological time.  What may seem to 
be chaotic perceptions may often have an unseen logic.  In their desire for narrative 
coherence, nurses looked for reasons for particular hallucinations such as memories 
of past events.  These may be traumatic as in the case of the man who had been a 
Japanese prisoner of war and thought he was imprisoned when in a hospital ward, or 
of previous occupations as when someone was reeling in a fishing line. 
According to Ricoeur (1984), time becomes meaningful through narrative.  It is 
through the structure of narrative that human experience of time can be made sense 
of and communicated.  People live and interpret their lives in relationship to time; 
temporality becomes interpretable in human terms through narrative.  Carsten (2007) 
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argued that narrative is consciously used to make continuities, and shared narrative 
memory stabilizes a sense of self within kinship in the West.  If this sense of 
continuity is dislocated because of memory difficulties it can result in discontinuities 
with the shared narratives of others and the possibility of a shattered self.  These may 
be the situations when carers express ambiguity about the person being a different 
person.  In my study, people with dementia were able to locate themselves in the 
present, but sometimes they had vivid memories of the past that risked becoming 
more present than the chronological present.  Disruptions to continuities in differing 
communities and situations led to establishing continuities in other ways within an 
edited collection of anthropological studies (Carsten, 2007).  Loss of memory for 
current connections can lead to a search for connections in time further back, as in 
situations where people with dementia search for their parents.  Although none of my 
participants had lost connections in this way, Dave told of a vivid dream in which his 
mother appeared to reassure him that things would work out.  The nurses also told of 
people they had known who were feeding photographs of children or grandchildren 
at a younger age, perhaps searching for connections with a life where meaning 
involved providing for a family. 
Frank (1997) describes illness as disrupting the narrative coherence of life as a 
sequence, because illness experiences become too vivid to consign to the past.  In 
dementia there can be a disruption of narrative sequencing, resulting in difficulty in 
distinguishing between past, present and future.  Boundaries become leaky and this 
may contribute to hallucinations.  My study adds to Shomaker’s (1989) theorizing of 
temporal disruption as liminal in dementia by adding hallucinations and chronic 
illness to the discussion.  Liminality and biographical disruption enhance 
understanding of the temporal disruptions of dementia and hallucinations, 
contextualizing them, rather than attributing them solely to a biochemical deficit 
without meaning. 
9.5 Spatial liminality 
Liminality can disrupt spatial certainties.  One of my participants described an 
experience that could be described as an alternative spatiality.  He had the feeling 
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that the house in which he was living was somehow alien, although it appeared like 
his house, it was different.  His description of this was fragmentary.  For another 
participant it was their experience of the outside world that was spatially disrupted 
leading to a self-imposed social isolation within the safety of his home.  Discussing 
collective rites, such as those occurring at certain important changing points of the 
year, Turner (1979) distinguishes between everyday public space and space that has 
been  partitioned off as liminal space.  In hallucinations and dementia these may be 
the physical spaces of care homes that are set aside for people who are older and 
have some health problems. 
The boundaries for the person with hallucinations between public consensus reality, 
and internal imagination, may also leak.  Internal imaginings and dreams may seem 
to be as real as consensus reality and common sense logic can be applied to explain 
it.  Dave responds to my question about seeing anyone in the trees on a windy day as 
they would be very foolish to be there in that type of weather.  Common sense logic 
is employed in a situation where it does not appear to other people that it should fit.  
His knowledges seem out of synch. 
9.5.1 Isolation 
Turner describes societies in which people in a liminal state are secluded.  They are 
either removed to a physical place of seclusion, or they may be hidden from view 
behind masks. In the past people with dementia have been removed to either 
hospitals or care homes, rather than integrated into dementia friendly communities.  
Murphy et al (1988) describe the seclusion of people with physical disabilities due to 
mobility difficulties as similar to a liminal state, and I would argue that this applies 
equally to people with dementia, who may be isolated because physical and 
communicative difficulties make it difficult for them to engage with the community.   
All three of my participants with dementia had limited access to the public spaces in 
which they had previously moved with ease.  The reasons for this and the degree of 
this varied but they found more barriers than before they had dementia. Contraction 
of time and space results in a greater likelihood of isolation that may lead people to 
seek other sources of stimulation. 
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All the nurses in the study discussed care homes in relation to hallucinations.  They 
supported an understanding of isolation as a contributing factor in hallucinations.  
Their framing of hallucinations as a response to isolation is echoed by the two wives 
in this study. 
Joan wonders if the hallucinations are preferable for Dave than facing the reality of 
being isolated within the house as he has become less able to get out.  Jeanette too 
sees the hallucinations as compensation for the other losses associated with 
dementia.  Understanding spatial isolation as liminal allows us to explore the other 
aspects of liminality described by Turner (1977), which includes the suspension of 
normal structures, allowing reversals to occur. 
9.5.2 Perceptual liminality 
The relationship between social reality and their own private reality changes for the 
person with dementia who has hallucinations; they straddle the boundary between 
real and imaginary.  Experiences which people within Western society would ascribe 
to a private reality, such as dreaming, begin to slip into the social realm where one 
would anticipate consensual reality. The three people in my study were mostly able 
to distinguish between what would be viewed by others as an external reality, and 
dreaming or imagination, but the latter assumed a greater importance than previously 
in their lives.  There was often ambiguity in reality and the professionals gave more 
examples of this happening.   These included people acting on the other reality, 
feeding photographs or leaving their house in the middle of the night to escape 
music. 
9.5.2.1 Dreams 
In my study it was Dave who spent much of our interviews discussing dreams 
although the other two also described them to a lesser extent.  Dreams can become a 
metaphor for hallucinating.  Hallucinations are described in terms of another concept, 
dreaming.  Hallucinations are not something that can be easily described even by the 
people who experienced them, and one way of discussing a difficult concept is 
through metaphor.  Both hallucinations and dreams are difficult to describe but are 
connected by the associated change in consciousness.  They are also personal 
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experiences.  We can listen to the dream of another but we cannot enter into their 
dream and experience it.   
When we use metaphors to describe an abstract concept, we often compare it to 
something which is concrete, although a single concrete comparison is never quite 
right (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).  Metaphor can be a useful way to explain 
something that is difficult to describe but in this case it is compared to dreaming.  
One elusive term is explained by another, the contents of individual dreams may be 
difficult to convey but most people have experienced dreams.   Metaphor provides us 
with a shared understanding. 
Both dreaming and hallucinating are intangible, and another way of understanding 
them would be to view them as liminal. The way Dave and Simon thought of dreams 
and reality was uncertain and mysterious.  The discrimination between social reality 
and imagination becomes less important in hallucinations and dementia.  Perhaps this 
is why it appears that boundaries slip for the listener and the speaker when talking to 
people with dementia and hallucinations.  Liminality is a time and place of 
ambiguity; the perceptions of reality of people who hallucinate can be ambiguous.   
The linkages between hallucinations and dreaming, or between private reality and 
consensus reality, are unclear.  Dave moves between dreams and hallucinations 
without always knowing the difference.  The supposition that his reality and mine 
differ assumes a boundary between them, but sometimes our realities coincide.  The 
boundaries slip and become permeable, and so his reality, of the wind being 
unsuitable weather for boys to climb trees, was the same as mine, as was the reality 
of whether the cricket season was over.  These sorts of slippage happened frequently 
in my study. 
The problem with boundaries is that they can become stable and set up oppositions 
which may not exist (Mol, 2002).  Boundaries are flexible and permeable within the 
liminal space.  An understanding of liminality allows a space that is unstructured and 
in which it is possible to step outside the mundane.  My participants sometimes 
explained this as imagination. 
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9.6 Hallucinations as imagination 
Turner describes liminal time as ‘a time of enchantment when anything ‘might’ and 
even should, happen’ (Turner, 1979:465).  It is not necessarily a negative experience, 
but can be a time when people can enjoy themselves without having to conform to 
institutional roles.  It is similar to carnival, where the normal order is disrupted 
(Turner, 1979).  Liminality allows new options for creativity as people are not 
constrained by the established order.   
Descriptions of hallucinations usually emphasise the serious, and the ludic, inventive 
aspect is ignored.  Hallucinations can be creative and a source of imagination, they 
can entrance.  Roles have responsibilities and ‘neophytes’ who are in a liminal space 
can  
“be themselves”. ….when they are not acting institutionalized 
roles 
(Turner, 1967:101).   
As one of my participants argued ‘but you can see things in almost everything you 
look at’, he and his wife both viewed his experiences as aspects of his artistic 
imagination which was somehow more authentic than mundane everyday reality.   
Most of the participants in my study understood some experiences of hallucinations 
as entertainment.  In situations where there is a lack of other stimulation it was felt to 
be comprehensible and harmless.  Liminality can explain the playfulness of some 
aspects of hallucinations within dementia. 
Imagination, humour and ephemerality are considered inconsequential; they do not 
constitute the serious knowledge of objective truth.  Liminality troubles this 
understanding of knowledge 
Reality isn’t large enough to hold us 
(Neilsen, 2002: 211) 
Knowledge too is shape-shifting like hallucinations, it is contextualized and 
impermanent. 
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9.7 Chaos 
As in carnival, a disruption of the usual order can cause playfulness, but this is never 
far from anxiety.  The flip side of hallucinations as entertainment is that they may 
become nightmarish.  People may be unable to escape from scenes of their past.  The 
mental health staff were also able to recall episodes of fear in people they had 
known.  This turmoil is described by Frank (1997) as a chaos narrative.  Chaos 
stories lack narrative order and are difficult to listen to.  Some stories of 
hallucinations are like this: when told, they induce anxiety.  They are anti-narratives 
where time does not have sequence and there is no control (Frank, 1997: p98).  
Narrators may be stuck in the experiences of the past and are unable to provide a 
coherent narrative with movement through time.  There is no sense of future or of 
agency in these chaos narratives.  The narrator is not an active narrator, but a passive 
victim of the past, which has become a recurring nightmarish present. 
Chaos narratives may not be told unless one is at a distance and so can reflect.  If 
there is the temporal disruption described earlier, and someone is unable to escape a 
frightening present, whether that is a memory of the past that has slipped forward 
into the present, or a dream or imagining that has slipped through to reality then it 
can become a chaotic story. 
The chaos that may ensue in these narratives is difficult to listen to, and causes fear 
in the listener.  This is akin to the fear described in the earlier section about dementia 
and schizophrenia.  Frank (1997) argues that there is a moral duty to listen to a chaos 
story despite the discomfort that this can cause.  This has implications for nurses 
whose role as master of ceremonies is discussed in the next section. 
9.8 Master of ceremonies 
Liminality breaks down established boundaries and may cause chaos for the person 
who is in the liminal space.  It might become difficult to know how to act in this 
situation, as previous certainties no longer apply. The person may look for figures 
that can steer them through this time.  In the rituals studied by Turner (1967) and van 
Gennep  (1960)  there is a Master of Ceremonies who leads the neophytes through 
the liminal space from one status to the next.  For the purpose of this discussion I 
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would suggest that this is likely to be a member of the Community Mental Health 
Team.  Doctors and nurses have different roles in the rites of passage for people who 
hallucinate.  Doctors may perform the ritual of diagnosis, but nurses have a role in 
helping people to adjust to a diagnosis. 
9.8.1 Nurses 
Nurses assist people with dementia to live with their symptoms, they help the person 
with dementia, and their family to negotiate the medical world and their everyday 
life.  The nurses in my study positioned themselves as experts in professional 
knowledge of dementia and mental health problems and were therefore eminently 
suitable masters of ceremonies.  The day-to-day work of these nurses does not 
involve generalities, but working with specific people.  This is how they approach 
people with dementia and hallucinations: getting to know them as an individual and 
deciding what is good for this particular person.  They use what Mol (2002) calls 
indication criteria to decide how to treat their patients.  The nurses in this study 
concluded that the main indication criteria for intervening in hallucinations should be 
distress.  They obscure the implicit boundary between real and not real in favour of 
the boundary between distressed and not distressed.  They try to achieve order in the 
chaotic world of hallucinations. 
Using an understanding of liminality, the novice receives instruction in skills needed 
to live in their new status.  As described above, the chaos that may ensue from the 
hallucinations and dementia, can affect knowledge of everyday life.  The findings 
from this study suggest that nurses act as facilitators for people with dementia and 
their families, helping them to develop ways of managing their hallucinations and 
dementia.  They use their expertise within the context of a therapeutic relationship.   
Stories have to repair the damage that illness has done to the 
ill person’s sense of where she (sic) is in life and where she 
(sic) may be going. 
(Frank, 1997: 53 italics in original) 
Nurses make successful masters of ceremonies when they are able to assist someone 
to move along from a permanent repetitive present, which is causing distress, to 
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being able to imagine a future without anxiety.  This means that they have to listen to 
the story within an empathic relationship.   
9.8.2 Professionals as betwixt and between 
Nurses too are betwixt and between.  They can be between people with dementia and 
other professionals as in the narratives of negotiating with staff in care homes and 
sometimes in negotiations with other professionals.  They also described the dualism 
between person-centred care and the organisational demands that they face.  As 
Lapum et al. (2012) argue, nurses adopt a ‘cyborg ontology’ (p276) in  their 
negotiations of the boundaries that are inherent in their day to day work. 
These boundaries can be between knowledge practices, that of biomedicine and the 
knowledge of the person who hallucinates; they have to make a singularity out of the 
particular situation of practice in a specific relationship.  This may require that they 
keep different realities separate or they distribute them across time or space (Mol, 
2002). 
9.9 Rituals  
Turner (1977) described how people who entered a liminal phase were ground down 
and made to look stupid in the liminal phase of a rite of passage.  Cognitive tests 
such as the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Folstein et al., 1975) can 
demoralise people with dementia (Sabat and Harré, 1994) and if it is used without 
context can lead to testers making assumptions that adversely affect treatment.  For 
one of my participants it was the opposite effect that concerned him.  He had a 
passionate interest in politics throughout his life and had studied the history of 
British constitutional politics.  He argued that asking him who the Prime Minister 
was would give people a totally false idea of his functioning in other areas as he 
could remember every Prime Minister of the twentieth century.   
Diagnosis has its own norms and rules and has been described as a ritual (Sadler, 
2004).  In my study the participants referred to the change from their private 
experience to being given a diagnosis of hallucinations.  Their doctors, usually 
psychiatrists had the role of leading them to a diagnosis.  Doctors are the experts who 
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are trusted and initiate people into a diagnosis of hallucinations.  Initiatory rituals 
have the specific process, of moving people from one status to another.  The doctor 
can take someone to a position of ‘person with a diagnosis of dementia’, and to a 
position of ‘person with hallucinations’.  It is a rite of separation in that the person 
becomes separated from the world of consensual reality and enters a liminal state.  In 
psychiatry the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) acts as the book of spells.  As described in 
the literature review this is not without its problems.   
Diagnosis simplifies disease and symptoms into a classificatory system, and in turn 
ignores what does not fit; it creates order.   It is a fundamental aspect of medicine, it 
names and gives an explanatory structure (Bracken and Thomas, 2005).  In the 
context of biographical disruption, diagnoses can be understood as important for 
people for whom the disorder caused by chronic illness is so disruptive that it 
profoundly challenges their previous knowledge of everyday life (Bury, 1982).  
Diagnosis provides structure within a reality of illness.  A ritual can be an active 
process that makes a change in a situation (Moore and Myerhoff, 1977)  and this 
insight assists in understanding why people with dementia and their carers might 
look for a diagnosis.  Seeking a diagnosis can be seen as an attempt to create order 
out of the chaos that exists in the liminal space described above.  Graeme found it 
difficult to lose his diagnosis of dementia with Lewy bodies.  It put him back into a 
position of uncertainty. 
The DSM creates new ways for people to understand themselves (Pickersgill, 2011).  
It can separate the disease from the self, although this can be a difficult balance to 
maintain when chronic illness can affect all aspects of life (Bury, 1982).  This 
ambiguity was recognised within the narratives of my participants.   
Turner (1977)  argues that a ritual is not necessarily a static occasion but can 
potentially be flexible and interactive.  Mol (2008) makes the distinction between 
diagnosis and treatment and the knowledge needed for them.  They are distributed as 
different moments over the person’s itinerary.  Diagnosis should take into account 
the personal narrative and understanding of the person with the illness (Bracken and 
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Thomas, 2005, Hughes, 2011), it should be a ‘situationally specific’  (Moore and 
Myerhoff, 1977: 12) , ritual not merely symbolic. 
As we have seen, a diagnosis within psychiatry is value laden, and dementia as a 
diagnosis is not clear cut (Hughes, 2011).  I would concur with Hughes that 
diagnosis still has a place for people with dementia as long as it is embedded within 
an individual human perspective.  I find the term ‘hallucinations’ within the context 
of dementia is more problematic.  The nurses in my study all understood the 
stipulation of hallucinations in my inclusion criteria, but in their narratives they all 
began to question whether people had what one of them called ‘true hallucinations’.  
Slippages between hallucinations, misperceptions, and memories becoming more 
prominent, were common in the findings presented here.  Perhaps the use of the term 
should be re-thought and there should be more emphasis on the actual experience of 
the person with dementia.  The ‘Hearing Voices movement (Hearing Voices 
Network, 2013) has had some success in challenging the terminology of 
hallucinations in people who hear voices.  The people in my study all had visual 
experiences, but slippages described by the nurses are common and have been 
identified in previous literature (Ffytche, 2004, Lawrence et al., 2009).  ‘Hearing 
voices’ describes an experience, which is situated within a personal and cultural 
history (Thomas et al., 2004).  A more situated description of the experiences of 
people with dementia would provide a more useful person-centred understanding. 
 
9.10 Summary 
Living with hallucinations as a person with dementia, or as a carer can involve 
transitions.  Understanding this transition using the concepts of separation, liminality, 
and rebirth into a new social category, allows us to examine the ambiguous 
sociocultural invisibility of people with dementia and people who experience 
hallucinations, increasing our understanding of their marginalisation.  Using a 
framework of living in a liminal space can lead to an understanding of the experience 
of hallucinations in dementia as an ambiguous and paradoxical experience.   As 
Edith Turner wrote 
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I couldn’t find it in me to go out of my way to invent 
complicated explanations involving the social construction of 
reality and hallucinations, just in order to avoid what was in 
plain sight: the nonlogical 
(Turner, 2005: 258) 
Liminality is not a purely negative experience.  It can free people from constraints 
and allow a time of playfulness and possibility.  Hallucinations and dementia are 
often assumed to be unpleasant, but liminality provides space to disrupt and 
challenge previous boundaries.  Finally an understanding of the role of nurses as 
master of ceremonies, enhances appreciation of their skills in negotiating the 
multiple realities of hallucinations of dementia within an ethic of care. 
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10 An ending 
The findings from this thesis provide a contribution to our knowledge of 
hallucinations in dementia as understood by people with dementia, carers and 
community mental health nurses.  This contribution challenges the dominant 
understanding of hallucinations in dementia, which actively excludes other 
perspectives, resulting in the invisibility of the contextual surround.  This has 
negative implications for the social experiences of the person with dementia and is 
inadequate to understand the experiences of people with dementia, carers and nurses.  
It fails to allow a space to discuss the co-construction of hallucinations as they are 
lived within relationships and in interactions with mental health professionals. 
My work makes a methodological contribution to the examination of hallucinations 
in dementia from the perspective of people with dementia, their carers and mental 
health nurses.  It contributes to the debates of how the self is preserved in dementia 
especially when hallucinations are present, and points to liminality as a useful 
concept for understanding hallucinations within dementia.  In addition, it contributes 
to an understanding of how community mental health nurses work with multiplicity, 
and how hallucinations are understood within relationships, both by people with 
dementia and their carers.  This chapter will explore these contributions to 
knowledge. 
10.1 Methodological contributions 
Previous studies of hallucinations in dementia have not addressed the contextualized 
understandings of hallucinations in dementia, but have understood them as 
decontextualized pathological experiences.  This study has challenged this and 
contributed to the literatures that examine the perspective of the person with 
dementia and their shared narratives by adding an understanding of the narratives of 
hallucinations. 
10.1.1 A lived experience: narrative approach 
Where the dominant discourse of hallucinations is that they are a biochemical 
deficiency, the person with dementia remains a passive victim of these changes, and 
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their experience is silenced.  There is no room for the understanding of hallucinations 
as meaningful experiences that happen within biographical and sociocultural 
contexts.  My methodology provided a space to go beyond the medical 
understanding. 
A narrative case study approach using unstructured interviews enabled me to gather 
rich data from all participants.  Understanding interviews as narratives, in which 
narrative identities were constructed, allowed me to attend to the narrative resources 
that people with dementia and their carers used to understand hallucinations within 
the context of their biographical lives.  As discussed in Chapter 2 there has been a 
growing body of research that has addressed the experience of the person with 
dementia, but the experience of hallucinations has been absent from this literature.  
This study shows a methodological approach that has begun to address that gap.  
Narratives of people with dementia who hallucinate have previously been unheard by 
researchers; this study demonstrates a way of attending to their narratives, rather than 
privileging those of other people.  It supports the findings of other studies that have 
shown the importance of narratives for making sense of experiences of dementia  
(Robertson, 2013, Beard and Fox, 2008, Cayton, 2004), and hallucinations (Woods, 
2013). 
The expansion of narrative inquiry has resulted in a focus of interest on the 
experience of illness and also that of the narratives practised within medicine (Hydén 
and Brockmeier, 2008).  A triadic case study approach has allowed me to listen to the 
different and joint narratives of people with dementia, carers and nurses.  This has 
produced a rich description of the multiplicity and complexities of hallucinations and 
their co-constructions. 
The understandings of people living with dementia, including carers were partially 
congruent, but carers were more likely to add additional narratives of biographical 
disruption.  They understood the content of hallucinations predominantly as 
biographically explicable, and their cause as compensation for losses that come from 
chronic illness.  The addition by Williams (2000) of diversity of age, previous health 
and life experience, to chronic illness as biographical disruption (Bury, 1982) is 
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supported by the data in this study.  Hallucinations are understood within the context 
of narrative identity and biography. 
The authenticity of narratives of people with dementia and people with psychotic 
symptoms has been questioned (McLean, 2006, Lovell, 1997).   Within dementia it is 
often assumed that the ability to narrate is affected because of its association with 
memory, language loss and lack of awareness (Phinney, 2002) .  This can be 
compounded by psychotic symptoms, which are synonymous with losing touch with 
reality (Lovell, 1997).  My methodology demonstrated that the participants with 
dementia in this study were able to construct coherent narratives of their 
hallucinations and as such challenged methodological assumptions regarding people 
with dementia. 
10.1.2 Sense of self and 1-poems 
Doucet and Mauthner (2008) highlight the ‘multi-layered interpretative approach’ of 
the listening guide.  It allows an in-depth exploration of the ways that people talk 
about themselves.  The creation of I-poems allows the listener to follow how the 
speaker represents themselves by attending to their first person statements (Edwards 
and Weller, 2012). 
In Chapter 2 I outlined some of the on-going debates about whether the self remains 
in dementia.  The understanding of selfhood proposed by  Sabat and Harré (1994) 
and further developed by Sabat (2001) is that it can be understood within a 
framework comprising three aspects. 
 Self 1- is the sense of identity that is experienced as continuity in the world 
 Self 2- is the physical and mental attributes we have, and our attitudes 
towards them 
 Self 3- is the way people present themselves.  This is the self that is most 
vulnerable as it requires acceptance from an other 
(Sabat, 2001:17-18) 
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These understandings are similar to the explanation by Somers (1994) of the 
‘ontological narratives’ that we use to define who we are and what we do.  Sabat 
(2001) argues that the use of first person pronouns is indicative that a sense of self is 
maintained in dementia (Self 1).  Using first person pronouns is assumed to be a 
public expression of an inner process of self-awareness (Aquilina and Hughes, 2006).  
Attending to these indices through the second reading of my analysis allowed me to 
trace the way that that the participants represented themselves.  I do not believe that 
this results in knowledge of a ‘real self’ of the research participant, but it does 
illustrate that everyone, especially the people with dementia, in my study expressed a 
sense of self.  
Distilling the interviews down to I statements and I-poems in particular in my study 
cut out the extraneous speech that might be seen as confused.  Shakespeare (1998) 
explores how despite confused speech being an accepted part of normal 
conversation, when it is identified in a group deemed to have less competence than 
others, like people with dementia, it begins to be seen as problematic.   
Presenting the data as poetry offers a way that a different voice can be heard.  The 
use of poems slows down the words, giving the listener an opportunity to take more 
time in hearing the voice presented.  These are not formalised poems written by a 
skilled wordsmith but I would argue they retain some elements of what makes poetry 
speak.  The poems speak to me of emotional knowledge, but I bring to my 
interpretation a belief in the value of emotional relationality.   
Knowledge from stories is more likely to generate emotional reactions 
(Polkinghorne, 1995) and I found the I-poems particularly powerful in this regard.  
Attending to the emotional responses of people with dementia can contribute towards 
supporting well-being.  Aesthetic ways of knowing that are acquired through 
emotional engagement are integral to providing good care (Stenhouse et al., 2013). 
The analysis presented here demonstrates that hallucinations in dementia do not 
result in a change in Self 1 in people with dementia; hallucinations did not present a 
threat to their sense of self.  This is in contrast to an understanding that a person with 
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dementia and a person who experiences hallucinations are a different person because 
they lose contact with reality. 
10.1.3 Answering the research questions 
The research aim was to explore different realities of hallucinations of people with 
dementia, their carers and mental health professionals.  The questions were 
 How do hallucinations affect the daily lives of people with dementia? 
 Do hallucinations impact on the self identity of people with dementia? 
 How do the multiple practices of dementia and hallucinations hang together? 
My methodology used narrative triadic case studies with an ontological 
understanding of reality as enacted in situated practice.  It allowed me to explore the 
multiple realities of my participants through their narrative realities.  The narratives 
and their enactments were not fixed; they were continuously negotiated and 
renegotiated. 
Using this methodology enabled me to elicit narratives of everyday life from people 
with dementia and their carers.  It also allowed a space to explore how they jointly 
understood the impact of hallucinations on their lives.  Clinical medicine relates to 
daily lives according to Mol (2008) and I would argue that this methodology 
demonstrated that clinical care by mental health nurses concerns daily lives.  
Section 10.1.2 discussed the use of voice centred relational method in exploring the 
sense of self in participants.  Although I have concentrated on the 2
nd
 reading in this 
section the method also enabled an investigation of the way the ‘narrated subject’ 
(Doucet and Mauthner, 2008) is embedded in a social and interpersonal space.   I 
would therefore argue that this method was suitable to answer the research question 
about identity. 
My ontological understanding of multiplicity was reflected in the third question.  
Attending to narratives, especially of community mental health nurses showed how 
they moved fluidly between the understandings of categories or paradigmatic 
knowledge and the understandings of the particular.  The nurses utilised different 
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knowledges, for example, when they assess that hallucinations appeared suddenly, it 
was likely to be caused by a delirium requiring treatment for an infection.  Despite 
incongruities that can appear within a care setting the tensions were held together and 
there was ‘coherence without consistency’ (Law et al 2013).  Care cut across the 
tensions (Moreira, 2010) and the most important response for them was to find the 
least bad responses for example not interfering when someone was not distressed by 
hallucinations, but  this approach involved ‘tinkering’ (Mol et al., 2010), as it was 
flexible. 
To summarise, the methodology I used in this study contributes to knowledge by 
proving a different understanding of hallucinations in dementia.  It enables different 
ontological positioning to that of the dominant discourse by facilitating an 
examination of the individual experience.  The use of I-poems in particular enables a 
method of ‘standing alongside’ rather than detachment from the research subject 
(Edwards and Weller, 2012).  This contrasts with, and provides a different 
perspective to, that of medical diagnosis, which does not provide a meaningful 
reality for the individual (Bracken and Thomas, 2005).  In the next three sections I go 
on to explore the theoretical contributions of the research in relation to a new 
understanding of hallucinations and dementia in liminality, relationships and 
multiplicity. 
10.2 Liminality 
One of the key findings of this study has been the ambiguous and shifting way in 
which hallucinations were understood by all three members of my triads, as 
discussed in the previous chapter on liminality.  This stands in stark contrast to the 
way they are understood in the medical discourse, which firmly divides 
hallucinations from reality.  In this study it is not the loss of reality that dominates 
the narratives but the desire to integrate the hallucinations into the narratives of 
biographical identity.  Liminality explains the transgression of boundaries that was 
prevalent in this study.  Borders between reality, dreaming, imagination, ‘true 
hallucinations’, misperceptions and past memories are crossed seemingly fluidly in 
hallucinations and dementia. 
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Hallucinations are ephemeral and elusive and to try to pin them down is a fruitless 
task; it changes their shape.  Language is inadequate to try to describe them.  They 
are at the same time meaningful and bizarre.  Edith Turner describes the difficulties 
of understanding spirituality in its many guises 
I know it is useless to try classifying and categorizing and 
clearing up the ambiguities in all of these, because each is 
right in its own context.  Each shades into each. 
(Turner, 2005: 259) 
Her work on spirituality is intrinsically bound up with her husband Victor’s work on 
liminality; they challenge the reductionism of dualisms, allowing an easy fluidity.  
In this study I have used liminality as a concept for understanding the structural 
positioning of people who hallucinate and have dementia, and the experiential impact 
on individuals.  The experiences of hallucinations and dementia were intrinsically 
linked, they were impossible to separate, and this complicates them both.  Liminality 
provides a means of understanding hallucinations in dementia in a way that has not 
been met otherwise, either by the literature on hallucinations, or the literature on 
dementia.  The living with dementia literature has not addressed living with 
hallucinations in dementia, despite it being viewed as indicative of a need for care 
(Leroi et al., 2003).   
The concept of liminality was originally structural, a transitional state that is 
essentially unstructured (Turner, 1967).  It can act as an explanation for the 
ambiguous understanding of the roles into which people are placed by society.  
People with dementia and people who have schizophrenia, where the predominant 
symptom may be hallucinations, are often placed by other people into an ambiguous 
category of not quite full members of society (Sabat et al., 2011, Barratt, 1998).  This 
can also be conceptualised as the Self 3 of Sabat (2001), which is the role given by 
other people.  In dementia, as has been argued in the consideration of the literature, 
people can be placed in an ambiguous situation by healthy ageing debates and 
epidemiological perspectives that position dementia as a social and political crisis, as 
well as the Enlightenment concept of the rational independent man.  This thesis 
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provides an understanding of liminality that adds to the debate about how and why 
this ambiguity happens, the impact it may have on the individual, and the difficulty 
in changing this perspective.  An individual in a liminal space is ‘structurally 
invisible’ to the rest of society (Turner, 1967).  The analytic approach used in the 
study included a reading for how people place themselves within the broader social 
and cultural debates.  It illustrated that my participants with dementia and their carers 
were aware of these debates about dementia, and were selective about revealing their 
diagnosis to others.  Carers predominantly upheld the Self 3 of the people with 
dementia, although there was some ambiguity resulting from uncertainty and change 
in the person with dementia. 
Kelly’s (2008) study of living with AIDS dementia explored the psychological as 
well as the socio-cultural liminal spaces of the experiences of loss in AIDS dementia.  
This study too explores the internal emotional and psychological liminal spaces, but 
of hallucinations, rather than loss. 
Liminality helps to understand the temporal slippages that may occur in dementia, 
and how hallucinations may incorporate aspects of the past into the present.  The 
study demonstrates a multi-dimensional understanding of time and memory, 
challenging the predominant linear assumptions of narrative.  Stories told about 
hallucinations are complex, they interrupt each other.  Temporal sequencing of past, 
present and future interfere with each other.  Carers attempt to smooth out time 
within relationships by assisting with linear constructions of narratives. 
Most previous studies of liminality in health situations have explored some of the 
negative aspects of being in a liminal space, especially in the way that an ambiguous 
status results in loss of social visibility.  Turner also describes liminality as an 
opportunity for reflection and freedom from institutional commitments.  My 
participants with dementia were often playful in their approach to their 
hallucinations, viewing them not as negative but as creative. 
My findings contrast with the definiteness of other understandings of hallucinations.  
Liminality presents a fluid understanding of hallucinations that are not problematic in 
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themselves.  The experience of hallucinations may be both disabling and freeing 
rather than incapacitating.  Liminality supports the vague, elusive and unknowable, 
allowing ambiguity,  rather than othering them into the prescriptiveness of 
singularity because they are irrelevant or impossible.  
10.3 Relationships 
The medical understanding of hallucinations reflects the autonomous individual self 
of Western modernity.  It assumes that hallucinations are the perceptual experiences 
of one person.  The emotive and psychological effects of hallucinations were shared 
in relationships in this study.  In contrast to the medical discourse of hallucinations, 
the data suggested that the meanings of hallucinations were constructed within 
relationships. 
Recent research studies have seen a shift away from the dichotomised understanding 
of a split between the experiences of individuals with dementia and carer givers, to 
explorations of relationship focused understandings (Hydén and Nilsson, 2013, 
Hellström et al., 2005).  In this study caregivers did not construct themselves as 
burdened, they structured relationships in complex ways, as couples or as daughter, 
father, but also as individuals.  Relationships were not just reduced to caring 
relationships but working relationships, in line with other recent studies (Hydén and 
Nilsson, 2013, Taylor, 2008)  An emotional closeness was apparent in all the 
interviews with people with dementia and carers demonstrated in their mutual use of 
humour, collaboration in telling stories and the use of ‘we’ in I-poems. 
Nurses situated their understanding of hallucinations within a developing relationship 
with the person with dementia and their supporters. They demonstrated principles 
associated with an ethic of care, engaging with people in ways that demonstrated 
attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness.  The findings of the 
study showed they gave more attention to the needs of people with dementia than 
carers, indicating that balancing differing needs can prove difficult. 
Community mental health nurses positioned themselves as experts in the field of 
dementia and hallucinations, they were critical of others when they judged them 
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inattentive and incompetent.  Nurses in care homes in particular came in for 
disapproval, being judged inattentive to the needs of people who were hallucinating, 
and incompetent in providing appropriate care.  Responsibility requires spending 
time building up trust and a relationship (Barnes and Brannelly, 2008).  The mental 
health nurses all identified this in their own practice, but they recognised that they 
were able to spend more time doing this, than care home staff. 
The attentiveness of the nurses responded to the emotional needs of the person with 
dementia who hallucinated, rather than the imperative of the diagnosis.  Tronto 
(1993) highlights that within responsiveness there is a recognition of a vulnerability 
in one of the parties.  The mental health nurses’ assessment of vulnerability was not 
based on whether the person with dementia was seeing things that deviated from 
consensual reality, but on whether it caused them distress.  
The proliferation of recent interest in ethics of care have cautioned that providing 
complex care within systems with organisational demands is messy in practice 
(Barnes and Brannelly, 2008, Brannelly, 2011).  Providing care for people with 
dementia and hallucinations is complex and needs skilled practitioners who are open 
to relational based care. 
My findings contrast to the view that  hallucinations in dementia inevitably 
precipitate an increased carer burden leading to requirement for institutionalisation 
(Leroi et al., 2003).  Ethics of care challenges the view that those who need care are a 
burden and this study supports that challenge.  An understanding of ethics of care 
also provides a more nuanced understanding of the care practised by mental health 
nurses and a framework to inform research relationships. 
10.4 Multiplicity 
None of the participants understood hallucinations using one dominant discourse; 
their understandings were multiple.  The fluidity between categories was obvious in 
findings with everyone. In the analysis, it was apparent that hallucinations were not 
understood as reality disjunctures.  A reality disjuncture implies that there is a 
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dichotomy between consensus reality and the reality of the person who hallucinates.  
Hallucinations were messy objects; they were viewed as fluid categories.   
This did not mean that participants all had different perspectives of hallucinations, 
what was important to them was the reality of a particular situation.  Coherence was 
not valued in understandings; practice involved situated knowledge rather than fixed 
categories.  Participants had different understandings that they used in different 
situations, their knowledge was situated and they did not have difficulty in moving 
between knowledges. 
Previous studies of hallucinations in dementia have mainly encompassed a medial 
understanding.  This is the first study that has considered the understanding of 
community mental health nurses as far as I am aware.  Cohen-Mansfield and 
Golander (2012) explored the perceptions of hallucinations by formal caregivers in 
an institutional setting but they were a mixture of trained and untrained staff.  There 
were similarities in our findings of the difficulties for nurses in deciding whether an 
experience was a hallucination or not, but they attributed this to lack of training and 
discussion with residents, whereas I attribute it to the ambiguous and shifting nature 
of the experiences.  Our findings also concur that hallucinations may be exacerbated 
where there is a lack of stimulation. 
Although medical diagnosis is the role of the doctor, in practice nurses do become 
involved with this.  Diagnosis may involve different realities and this was beautifully 
described by one of my participants in his description of suddenly being told he had 
hallucinations.  Diagnosis is enacted out of the story of the patient and the embedded 
knowledge of the doctor and sometimes the nurse. When a person enters a room 
without a diagnosis, the diagnosis is enacted in a room, and requires two people.  
This does not mean that the person did not have something before, but had they 
something different; another reality. Stories do not always fit together.  
Clinicians usually talk about a single object or sets of objects or processes that fit 
together.  Hallucinations are no different; they are out there, anterior to and 
independent of medical intervention. When they discuss the specifics of one person 
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though, community mental health professionals enact differing realities rather than 
discovering or believing in one single reality.  Their first task is to work out what 
reality is within a relationship, and the second task is to intervene and help. 
Sometimes it works smoothly, but at other times, realities are poorly coordinated.  
Medicine often works with multiple possible truths.  What counts as the best, 
depends on circumstances, it may be best to try to work with the person to change the 
hallucination or it may be best not to do anything.  Hallucinations can however 
change meaning for the person and so there is a need to attend to the fluidity. 
10.5 Implications for practice 
I am a nurse and my motivation for this study was to inform practice.  The value of 
being with people in relationships is to hear narrative understandings.  This enables 
practitioners to engage in an attentive way to enhance recognition of complexity and 
inform treatment decisions.  The idea of person centred care (Kitwood, 1997) and the 
importance of nurse-patient relationships (Altschul, 1972, Peplau, 1988) are not new.  
Relational care has the potential to enhance personhood.  As Kittay (2005) reminds 
us, personhood may be a contested term, but it has a real life urgency for those 
whose personhood is at stake. 
Using an ethic of care understanding requires an attentiveness to need and also that 
the person receiving the care is responsive.  If the person who experiences 
hallucinations is not distressed by them then it is questionable that there is a need.  At 
the level of treatment delivery, the research findings point to the need to attend to the 
meaning of hallucinations for the person with dementia and their carer.  If 
hallucinations are not currently producing a threat to that person then there is no 
necessity to attempt to intervene, especially with medication that has consequences 
for the person receiving it.  There has been enough evidence that antipsychotic 
medication can produce serious adverse effects for older people with dementia 
(Ballard et al., 2009, Banerjee, 2009).  Some people with dementia may wish to learn 
techniques to control their hallucinations, or to establish the veracity of differing 
realities.  The study showed that practitioners in collaboration with people living 
 
An ending  263 
with dementia can help to develop strategies to assist with this in certain 
circumstances. 
There were a number of occasions described in these interviews, where the use of the 
symptom ‘hallucinations’ was given to someone without considering its effects.  In 
my study two people with dementia had found it amusing or interesting, turning the 
medical interview into an object of their view rather than vice versa, but the evidence 
on the social effects of giving such a diagnosis have been well enough documented 
to require professionals to think more carefully.  Other instances include the use of 
the term by people who were ill qualified to do so, which had implications for the 
way in which people will be treated. 
Although my understanding of hallucinations at the beginning of the project was that 
it was a slippery concept that could include misperceptions and illusions, I still 
located it as a mental health problem.  It was a concept that could be shared with 
other mental health professionals as shorthand for a multiplicity of experiences.  My 
opinion has now changed about its use.  The term comes with too many negative 
connotations for society and can be meaningless for the individual who experiences 
them.  It was understood by my participants as stimulation in the absence of other 
social stimuli, memories, imagination, creativity and dreams.  I now believe that the 
most important response is one based on the emotional impact it has for the person 
experiencing it. 
A medical definition of hallucinations is inadequate in dementia.  Practitioners need 
to listen to the experiences of people and use descriptive accounts as given by the 
person with dementia, rather than ‘hallucinations’, which means little, either to a 
person with dementia, or often to a nurse.  If dementia is a conceptual mess as 
Hughes (2011) argues,  the term ‘hallucinations’ is equally so, and serves little 
purpose as opposed to dementia. 
Woods (2013) argues that people who heard voices did not exist before 1987 when 
the Hearing Voices Movement developed a new way that people could talk about 
their experience.  Perhaps there are people with dementia who have already started to 
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challenge the predominant discourses of dementia, who may also challenge the 
decontextualized discourse of the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Mental health practitioners are well 
placed to support a development of that debate. 
10.5.1 Recommendations 
 The findings from this study highlight the importance of relationships within 
care.  Nurses in all areas, including care homes, need to spend time with 
people with dementia who hallucinate, listening to their narratives. 
 Seeing things that others do not, is not necessarily a negative experience for 
someone with dementia.  Assessment for well-being should be based on the 
meaning of the experiences for the person with dementia rather than their 
divergence from consensus reality. 
 The term ‘hallucinations’ does not reflect the lived experience of people with 
dementia, their carers, nor the understandings of the different realities seen by 
nurses.  There is a value attached to it that can disadvantage those receiving 
it.  Practitioners need to address its usefulness and consider using other 
terminology that is more descriptive of the person’s understanding.   This 
would be person specific but may include terms such as vivid dreams or 
seeing things that other people do not. 
10.6 Limitations of the study 
As I was critical of other studies that collected data about the experiences of people 
with dementia from formal and family caregivers, I cannot ignore the limitations of 
my study. 
My initial understanding of hallucinations situated them within a community mental 
health context.  This meant that the pool of potential recruits was small and may have 
been biased towards those perceived as having a behavioural problem and in need of 
mental health services. 
The findings may have been strengthened if my sample had been larger and more 
diverse.  I had hoped to recruit a sample of five people with dementia but difficulty 
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in recruiting meant I only managed to recruit three.  Although two more participants 
may not have made much difference it may have provided more diversity.  The thick 
data that can be produced from a case study, however, allows an exploration of 
complexity (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
My criteria excluded people who would become distressed talking about 
hallucinations.  The voices of people who are disturbed by hallucinations were 
reported through accounts of professionals.  They describe distress as a predominant 
cause for concern within their practice.  This means that the findings may not be 
representative of the referrals to the mental health services. 
The voices of women who hallucinate, and male carers, are also absent.  Gilligan 
(1982) identified gender differences in the development of moral reasoning, and 
there are gendered assumptions of care (Tronto, 1993, Barnes, 2012) and so this 
study is unbalanced.  Despite these limitations, the study is a beginning in exploring 
narrative understandings of hallucinations in dementia. 
The interviews with carers differed due to the preferences of the people with 
dementia and the carers.  One of the participants with dementia wanted his wife to be 
present through all the interviews, the other two carers were only interviewed once.  
Both chose to be interviewed with the person they looked after present but it would 
be a mistake to see these as much of an examination of their relationship.  They were 
not asked to focus on something that predominantly affects them as a social unit but 
their individual understandings.  They were asked about the experiences of 
hallucinations of the other person, rather than having an interactive focus.  The 
analysis highlighted some interactional aspects of their relationships, but the task 
differed from that in studies such as Hydén and Nilsson (2013). 
Neither the aim of the study, nor the methodology used, was intended to produce 
data that was representative of the whole population of people living with dementia 
and hallucinations.  It is situated and partial knowledge, contingent rather than 
objective, its value is in sensitizing the reader to issues that arose in the narratives of 
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these participants.  Despite this I hope the narratives would be recognisable to other 
mental health nurses. 
10.7 Future research 
The current study has challenged the medical discourse of hallucinations by 
demonstrating that people with dementia and carers integrate them into their 
narrative identity.  Further studies should be undertaken with wider and more diverse 
samples to examine the impact of different variables such as gender or ethnicity on 
how hallucinations are understood by people with dementia, carers and other 
professionals. 
Further research could engage with how to enhance more helpful responses to 
hallucinations, especially in different care environments.  Whilst not underestimating 
the challenges for care homes in terms of workloads and staff turnover, responses to 
hallucinations that are inappropriate can cause further distress to people with 
dementia and possibly escalate distress.  Supporting meaning making by attending to 
narratives of both people with dementia and carers who have a shared narrative 
history will enhance well being 
The dissonance between the experiences of all participants and medical diagnostic 
processes could be explored.  Wider studies of mental health professionals may 
increase pressure to abandon the use of the terminology of hallucinations. 
There are increased research and policy imperatives to be more inclusive in 
considering the experience of people with dementia and carers.  The research 
methods used in this study facilitated listening to narratives, and could be applied in 
other studies in dementia, and other areas where care is provided. 
10.8 Final reflections 
The thesis is situated knowledge and therefore I do not make definitive claims.  It 
makes a contribution to on-going research, but does not provide a conclusion.  My 
initial expectations that I would achieve one understanding or theory of 
hallucinations in dementia, and change practice now seem unrealistic and naïve.   
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The understandings developed during this study have helped me to realise that there 
is no meta-narrative to be found.  I have become comfortable making sense of 
experiences and relationships within contexts.  This study has underlined the 
complexity of both hallucinations and responses in dementia; in many ways they are 
unspeakable and unknowable, they are fleeting and ephemeral and liminal. 
I have questioned my understandings of reality and hallucinations, and found them 
inadequate.  If I let go of my belief in a single, independent, anterior and definite 
reality, hallucinations can be accepted as ambiguous and fragmentary.  I have also 
had to confront my conflict about the preservation of self in dementia, and what this 
means for people with dementia and for relatives.  This involved examining my 
experiences as a daughter to unpick some of the ambiguities involved within 
emotional relationships.  
My interrogation of my own practices has been through reflexivity.  I hope I have 
avoided the pitfall articulated by Jane Speedy (2013) of using reflexivity to discuss 
my unmessy, sorted thinking in contrast to my participants’ messy stories.  I would 
like with her to claim some solidarity with the unsorted and unsafe.  I have come full 
circle from confidence in my professional knowledge, through uncertainty about any 
certainty, to a reasonable comfort with the uncertainty of the metanarratives, and a 
certainty that we need to attend to the specifics.  There are different knowledge 
claims used in mental health nursing and these can be accommodated in situated 
knowledge, in partiality but not in universality (Haraway, 1988). 
Returning to the story of Alex in Chapter 1, this study has not explained to me what 
was happening for Alex, but it has helped to explain why my final response may 
have worked.  Somehow I recognised that his need for care was about feeling secure, 
I was able to act and he received what I said to him, as care.  This use of ethics of 
care (Tronto, 1993) sounds deceptively simple, at that moment we were 
therapeutically connected but as the data from other nurses show it is complex and 
multiple.   
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One of my regrets in concluding this thesis is that I have been unable adequately to 
capture the dynamic nature of my research encounters.  The examination of one 
aspect of a person’s life will always be a sleight of hand, and although hallucinations 
and dementia are the aspects of their identity that are inevitably portrayed here, they 
say little of the participants’ humour and ability to maintain warm relationships.  
Graeme’s hall may be the site of hallucinations but with its photographs and degree 
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